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Preface to the 2016 edition
Almost 35 years have elapsed since Roots of Language first appeared. It is there-
fore surprising how little needs to be changed. Despite repeated attempts to
refute them (and, of course, unfounded claims that this work or that has success-
fully refuted them) there is no need to change the central contentions of the orig-
inal book, e.g. that creole languages arise in a single generation, and are created
from an original, virtually structureless pidgin by children, who have an access
to universal grammar unavailable to their elders, with minimal reference to the
(substrate) languages spoken by their parents. However, it would be even more
amazing if after so many years those contentions did not need spelling out much
more clearly, and if a number of ancillary assumptions did not require correction
or replacement. There will not be time or space here to do more than summarize
these materials, but they are presented in considerable detail in Chapter 8 of
Bickerton (2014), to which interested readers are referred.
Probably the greatest weakness of Roots of Language was its failure to prop-
erly specify the group of languages to which it referred. The languages that have
been described as creoles do not form a natural class. Their differences have to
do with the very different nature and extent of contacts between the participants
involved. It is therefore a complete waste of time to look for “a theory of creoliza-
tion”, if by that we mean a theory that will provide a single explanation for all
languages that have been described as creoles. In contrast, plantation creoles do
form a natural class, because the sociocultural circumstances that gave rise to
them (see Bickerton 2006 for a full description) were unique, stereotypical, and
different from those that gave rise to “fort” and “maritime” creoles (which, of
course, differed equally from one another) and of course those circumstances, by
determining the nature and extent of contact, in turn determine the properties of
the resulting language. For convenience sake I continue to use the term “creole”,
but this should be understood as “plantation creole” in all that follows.
Members of this natural class show amuch greater homogeneity in their gram-
mars than the amorphous class of “all creoles”, and the significance of such
differences as remain can be easily understood once we grasp the notion of a
continuum of creoles. The continuum of creoles (not to be confused with the
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“creole continuum”, which applies within rather than between creoles) arose in-
evitably because of demographic and historical differences between different
creole-forming locations – differences that caused, in a few cases, more influ-
ence from the substrate, and, in a much larger number of cases, more influence
from the superstrate. However, just as with lects in the creole continuum, lan-
guages within the continuum of creoles can be ranked on an implicational scale
on which creoles with least outside influence can be placed at one end and cre-
oles with most such influence at the other. In other words, just as with the creole
continuum, the continuum of creoles will contain a basilect, a mesolect and an
acrolect (think Sranan, Jamaican Creole and Bajan). If one is most interested in
what creoles can tell us about the faculty of language, it is obvious that, in both
continuums, the basilectal class will be of greatest interest.
Perhaps the most widely challenged claim of the original book was that chil-
dren rather than adults are the creators of creole languages. This claim should
have been unconditionally confirmed by Roberts (1998), which showed that chil-
dren were responsible for the grammatical structures found in Hawaiian Creole
but not in the pidgin that immediately preceded it. Subsequent claims by Roberts
(2000; 2004; see Bickerton 2014 for detailed discussion) that the same structures
have substrate origins are directly contradicted by the very sources Roberts cites,
which show unequivocally that the substrate knowledge of the creole-forming
children was too limited for them to be even acquainted with (let alone control)
the substrate features involved in those structures. Corroborating evidence never
previously published, but again detailed in Bickerton (2014), comes from compar-
ing the lexicons of Sranan and Saramaccan. The 50% difference between these,
extending even to grammatical items and showing even higher figures among bi-
morphemic compounds (novelties by definition), together with the unprecedent-
edly macaronic nature of both lexicons, shows that the standard explanation for
the virtual identity between Sranan and Saramaccan grammars – that both lan-
guages descend from a single proto-Surinamese Creole – is unsustainable, that
only an early-stage pidgin (or several such pidgins) could have existed prior to
1690, and that therefore the similarity of the two grammars can only be explained
by universalist assumptions.
One shortcoming of the book is that it never specified the rules and/or prin-
ciples of universal grammar that were instantiated in creoles. It can now be
hypothesized that this grammar has little if any syntactic apparatus beyond the
Minimalist Program’s “Merge” (better described, since it is unidirectional, as “At-
tach”). Of course to operate this apparatus, the speaker has to know what can
legitimately be attached towhat. Though there are broad (and presumably innate)
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semantic guidelines for this knowledge, the properties enabling attachment are
to some degree arbitrary and must therefore be learned inductively for each lan-
guage. Pidgin speakers know what these are (for one language, at least) because
they know the properties of the lexical items in their native language; unfortu-
nately, that is not the language they now have to deal with. Creole speakers
don’t know what these properties are (since they don’t exist yet) but presum-
ably, being children, retain access to the innate semantic guidelines that inform
them, inter alia, of a default list of semantic distinctions that should correlate
with grammatical markers of some kind. They therefore seek in the lexical store
of the pidgin for any items that might plausibly be interpreted as markers of
those distinctions.
Roots of Language claimed that some grammatical subsystems like nominal de-
terminers and tense-aspect-mode (TMA) markers were innate, without precisely
specifying what this innatism might consist of. It can now be argued that the
classical creole TMA system is not innate per se but is an emergent property
arising from a combination of default categories and principles of economy. As-
sume that default categories include +/– past, +/– unreal and +/– non-single (re-
peated or continuous, as opposed to single, unitary events/actions). The system
that best minimizes the number of morphemes while maximizing distinguish-
able event types is a system with three overt markers and an unmarked form
which, if permitted to combine freely with one another (subject to ordering con-
straints) yields a possible eight combinations, and it is this optimal system that,
with slight additions or modifications, almost all creoles adopt.
The book was the first work to propose that the grammar underlying creoles –
the “language bioprogram” as it came to be called – must also be both what en-
abled children to acquire language on a limited exposure to it and the form in
which language originally evolved. The research of the thirty-odd years that fol-
lowed its publication has uncovered no evidence to challenge that relationship.
New evidence supporting its function is again found in Bickerton (2014: Chap-
ter 7), where those aspects of French and English that take the longest time for
children to acquire are shown to be precisely those aspects that most clearly and
directly conflict with bioprogram specifications.
Though it is, of course, impossible to say what the earliest true languages of
humans looked like, that they looked remarkably like creoles is consistent with
all we know about evolution, prehistory, and the faculty of language. That said,
it must be admitted that Chapter 5 of Roots of Language is the weakest part of
the book. It could hardly have been otherwise. All but a handful of linguists
still labored under the Linguistic Society of Paris’s ban on discussing language
ix
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evolution. Ignorance of evolutionary biology was universal among those who
defied the ban. Consequently, the chapter comes across today as naïve, and is of
course superseded by much subsequent work, especially Bickerton (2009; 2014).
Still, it remains as the first work to suggest that creoles could constitute a window
on the earliest stages of language.
x
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Of all the fields of study to which human beings have devoted themselves, lin-
guistics could lay claim to being the most conservative. Two thousand five hun-
dred years ago, Panini began it by describing an individual human language, and
describing individual languages is what the majority of linguists are still doing.
Even during the last couple of decades, in which linguists have begun to be inter-
ested in some of the larger issues that language involves, the main thrust toward
clarifying those issues has involved making more and more detailed and inge-
nious descriptions of currently existing natural languages. In consequence, little
headway has been made toward answering the really important questions which
language raises, such as: how is language acquired by the individual, and how
was it acquired by the species?
The importance of these questions is, I think, impossible to exaggerate. Lan-
guage has made our species what it is, and until we really understand it – that
is, understand what is necessary for it to be acquired and transmitted, and how
it interacts with the rest of our cognitive apparatus – we cannot hope to under-
stand ourselves. And unless we can understand ourselves, we will continue to
watch in helpless frustration while the world we have created slips further and
further from our control.
The larger and, in a popular sense, more human issueswhich language involves
lie outside the scope of the present work, and will be dealt with at length in a
forthcoming volume, Language and Species. First, there is a good deal of academic
spadework to be done. In the chapters that follow, I shall try to develop a unified
theory which will propose at least a partial answer to three questions, none of
which has as yet been satisfactorily resolved:
1. How did creole languages originate?
2. How do children acquire language?
3. How did human language originate?
Traditionally, these three questions, insofar as they have been treated at all,
have been treated as wholly unrelated. None of the solutions offered for (1) have
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had any relevance to (2) or (3); none of the solutions offered for (2) have had
any relevance to (1) or (3); and none of the solutions offered for (3) have had
any relevance to (1) or (2). It has even been explicitly denied, although without a
shred of supporting evidence, that an answer to (1) could possibly be an answer
to (3) (Sankoff 1979). Here and there, a few insightful scholars have hinted at
possible links between the problems, and such insights will be acknowledged
in subsequent pages. However, a single, unified treatment has never even been
attempted, and this book, whatever its shortcomings, may therefore claim at least
some measure of originality. Doubtless many of its details will need revision or
replacement; the explorer is seldom the best cartographer. However, of one thing
I am totally convinced: that the three questions are really one question, and that
an answer to any one of them which does not at the same time answer the other
two will be, ipso facto, a wrong answer.
I shall begin with the origin of creoles. To some, this may appear the least
general and least interesting question of the three. However, as I shall show, cre-
oles constitute the indispensable key to the two larger problems, and this should
come as no surprise to those familiar with the history of science, in which, re-
peatedly, the sideshow of one generation has been the central arena of the next.
In Chapter 1, I shall examine the relationship between the variety of Creole En-
glish spoken in Hawaii and the pidgin which immediately preceded it, and I shall
show how several elements of that creole could not have been derived from its
antecedent pidgin, or from any of the other languages that were in contact at the
time of creole formation, and that therefore these elements must have been, in
some sense, “invented”. In Chapter 2, I shall discuss some (not all – there would
not be space for all) of the features which are shared by a wide range of creole lan-
guages and show some striking resemblances between the “inventions” of Hawaii
and “inventions” of other regions whichmust have emerged quite independently;
and I shall also try to probe more deeply into certain aspects of creole syntax and
semantics which may prove significant when we come to deal with the other two
questions. In Chapter 3, which will deal with “normal” language acquisition in
noncreole societies, I shall show that some of the things which children seem to
acquire effortlessly, as well as some which they get consistently wrong – both
equally puzzling to previous accounts of “language learning” – follow naturally
from the theory which was developed to account for creole origins: that all mem-
bers of our species are born with a bioprogram for language which can function
even in the absence of adequate input. In Chapter 4, I shall try to show where
this bioprogram comes from: partly from the species-specific structure of human
perception and cognition, and partly from processes inherent in the expansion
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of a linear language. At the same time, we will be able to resolve the continuity
paradox (“language is too different from animal communication systems to have
ever evolved from them”; “language, like any other adaptive mechanism, must
have been derived by regular evolutionary processes”) which has lain like some
huge roadblock across the study of language origins. In the final chapter, I shall
briefly summarize and integrate the findings of previous chapters, and suggest
answers to some of the criticisms which may be brought against the concept of
a genetic program for human language.
3

1 Pidgin into creole
If one wants to account, ultimately, for the origins of human language (as I shall
try to do in Chapter 4), it seems reasonable for one to begin by trying to find out
how individual human languages came into existence. But, in most cases, such
a search would be futile. Modern Italian, for example, would be found to fade
back into a maze of dialects deriving ultimately from Latin, which developed out
of Indo-European, which sprang, presumably, from some antecedent language
now wholly inaccessible to us; and at no point in the continuous transmission
of language could we name a date and say, “Here Latin ended,” or “Here Italian
began.”
But there is one class of languages for which we can point, with reasonable
accuracy, to the year of birth: we can say that before 1530, there was no São
Tomense; before 1650, no Sranan; before 1690, no Haitian Creole; and before
1880, no Hawaiian Creole. And yet two or three decades after those dates, those
languages existed. Of course no one would claim that these languages were quite
devoid of ancestry; indeed, their relationships with several sets of putative an-
cestors have been and continue to be a subject of controversy (for a critical sum-
mary and bibliography of the relevant literature, see Bickerton 1976). But even
controversy could not exist unless the lines of descent were, at the very least,
considerably more obscure than they are for most other languages.
Creole languages arose as a direct result of European colonial expansion. Be-
tween 1500 and 1900, there came into existence, on tropical islands and in isolated
sections of tropical littorals, small, autocratic, rigidly stratified societies, mostly
engaged in monoculture (usually of sugar), which consisted of a ruling minority
from some European nation and a large mass of (mainly non-European) laborers,
drawn in most cases from many different language groups. The early linguistic
history of these enclaves is virtually unknown; it is generally assumed (but see
Alleyne 1971; 1979) that speakers of different languages at first evolved some form
of auxiliary contact-language, native to none of them (known as a pidgin), and
that this language, suitably expanded, eventually became the native (or creole)
language of the community which exists today. These creoles were in most cases
different enough from any of the languages of the original contact situation to
1 Pidgin into creole
be considered “new” languages. Superficially, their closest resemblance was to
their European parent, but this was mainly because the bulk of the vocabulary
items were drawn from that source, and even here, there were extensive phono-
logical and semantic shifts. In the area of syntax, features were much less easily
traceable.
In general, the term creole is used to refer to any language which was once a
pidgin and which subsequently became a native language; some scholars have
extended the term to any language, ex-pidgin or not, that has undergone massive
structural change due to language contact (one who shall be nameless confessed
to me that he did this solely to obtain access to a conference which, like most
creole conferences, was held in an exotic tropical setting!). In fact, I think that
even the traditional definition is too wide, since it covers a range of situations
which may differ in kind rather than in degree.
Since my aim here is not to account for the origins of all languages known as
creoles (which would be an absurd aim anyway since they do not constitute a
proper set) but rather to search for certain fundamental properties of human lan-
guage in general, my interests lie, not in creoles per se, but in situationswhere the
normal continuity of language transmission is most severely disrupted. While it
is true that the circumstances under which pidginization and creolization take
place represent “a catastrophic break in linguistic tradition that is unparalleled”
(Sankoff 1979: 24), there are still a number of areas where the severity of that
break was mitigated by other factors. Let us consider two quite different cases
of such mitigation: Réunion Creole and Tok Pisin (a.k.a. Neo-Melanesian, New
Guinea Pidgin, etc.).
One factor that would limit the extent of language disruption would be the
presence of any large homogeneous linguistic group in the community-more es-
pecially if that group happened to consist of speakers of the dominant language.
According to Chaudenson (1974), in Réunion during the first few decades of set-
tlement nearly half the population consisted of native speakers of French; in
consequence, although the resultant language bears the creole label, the distance
between that language and French is much less than the distance between most
creoles and their superstrates, while (more important still from the present view-
point) the language differs in many respects from creoles formed where access
to the superstrate was more restricted.
In New Guinea, the percentage of superstrate speakers was low, but the pid-
gin existed for several generations alongside the indigenous language before it
began to acquire native speakers. Thus Tok Pisin was able to expand gradually,
through normal use, rather than very rapidly, under the communicative pressure
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of a generation that had, for practical purposes, no other option available as a
first language. The bilingual speakers of Tok Pisin had ongoing lives in their own
languages and, perhaps more importantly still, in their own traditional commu-
nities; whereas in the classic creole situation, people had been torn from their
traditional communities and forced into wholly novel communities in which the
value of traditional languages was low or nil. The two situations are not com-
mensurate, and we would expect to find, as we do, that while Tok Pisin differs
from English much more than Réunion Creole does from French, it lacks, again,
a number of the features found in the classic creole languages, and possesses a
number of features which those creoles, in turn, do not share.
Accordingly, in the text that follows, I shall use the word creole to refer to
languages which:
1. Arose out of a prior pidgin which had not existed for more than a genera-
tion.
2. Arose in a population where not more than 20 percent were native speak-
ers of the dominant language and where the remaining 80 percent was
composed of diverse language groups.
The first condition rules out Tok Pisin and perhaps other (e.g., Australian Abo-
riginal) creoles; the second rules out Réunion Creole and perhaps other creoles
also (the varieties of Portuguese creoles that evolved in Asian trading enclaves
such as Goa or Macao are possible candidates for exclusion under this condi-
tion). Given the above, I shall continue to refer to certain languages or groups of
languages as “English creoles,” “French creoles,” etc.; this usage implies no con-
clusions as to the affiliations of these languages and is merely for convenience.
By limiting our research area in this way, it becomes possible to concentrate
on those situations in which the human linguistic capacity is stretched to the
uttermost. As I have said, we know little or nothing of the early linguistic his-
tory of most creoles, but what evidence we do have (e.g., Rens 1953, for Sranan)
suggests that they emerged from the pidgin stage fairly rapidly, within twenty or
thirty years after first settlement of the areas concerned. Such a time span gives
space for the first locally-born generation to come to maturity, but it hardly gives
space for a stable, systematic, and referentially adequate pidgin to be evolved in
a community which might initially speak dozens of mutually unintelligible lan-
guages; certainly, in the one case of which we have direct knowledge (Hawaii),
no stable, systematic, or referentially adequate pidgin had developed within that
time frame, and there are no real grounds for supposing that the Hawaiian sit-
uation was any less favorable to the development of such a pidgin than were
7
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the situations in other creole-forming regions. We can assume, therefore, that
in each of these regions, immediately prior to creolization, there existed, just as
there existed in Hawaii, a highly variable, extremely rudimentary language state
such as has been sometimes described as a “jargon” or “pre-pidgin continuum”
rather than a developed pidgin language. Since none of the available vernacu-
lars would permit access to more than a tiny proportion of the community, and
since the cultures and communities with which those vernaculars were associ-
ated were now receding rapidly into the past, the child born of pidgin-speaking
parents would seldom have had any other option than to learn that rudimentary
language, however inadequate for human purposes it might be.
We should pause here to consider the position of such children, for no one
else has done so, even in the vast literature on language acquisition. That posi-
tion differs crucially from the position of children in more normal communities.
The latter have a ready-made, custom-validated, referentially adequate language
to learn, and mothers, elder siblings, etc., ready to help them learn it. The for-
mer have, instead, something which may be adequate for emergency use, but
which is quite unfit to serve as anyone’s primary tongue; which, by reason of
its variability, does not present even the little it offers in a form that would per-
mit anyone to learn it; and which the parent, with the best will in the world,
cannot teach, since that parent knows no more of the language than the child
(and will pretty soon know less). Everywhere else in the world it goes without
saying that the parent knows more language than the child; here, if the child is
to have an adequate language, he must speedily outstrip the knowledge of the
parent. Yet every study of first-language acquisition that I know of assumes with-
out question that the more general situation is universal; every existing theory of
acquisition is based on the presupposition that there is always and everywhere an
adequate language to be acquired.
It is true that the situation I am describing is extremely rare and can indeed
occur only once even for a creole language. However, the rarity or frequency of
a phenomenon contains no clues as to its scientific importance.
The act of “expanding” the antecedent pidgin, which each first creole gener-
ation has to undertake, involves, among other things, acquiring new rules of
syntax. In the conventional wisdom, children are supposed to derive rules by
processing input (with or without the help of some specific language-learning
device); in this way, they arrive at a rule system similar to, if not identical with,
that of their elders. If this were all children could do, then they would simply
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learn the pidgin, and there would be no significant gap between the generations.
In Hawaii, at least, we have empirical proof that this did not happen – that the
first creole generation produced rules for which there was no evidence in the
previous generation’s speech.
How can a child produce a rule for which he has no evidence? No one has
answered this question; most people haven’t even asked it; and yet, until it is an-
swered, we cannot really claim to know anything about how languages in general
are acquired. For it violates both parsimony and common sense to suppose that
children use one set of acquisition strategies for “normal” acquisition situations,
and then switch to another set when they find themselves in a pidgin-speaking
community: parsimony because two explanations would be required where one
should be adequate, and common sense because there is no way in which a child
could tell what kind of community he had been born into, and therefore no way
he could decide which set of strategies to use.
I shall return to the topic of acquisition in Chapter 3; in the present chapter, I
shall simply describe what happened in Hawaii when pidgin turned into creole.
For a century after the first European contact, the population of Hawaii con-
sisted mainly of native Hawaiians, with a small but growing minority of native
English speakers. A small but growingminority of Hawaiians spoke English with
varying degrees of proficiency; the lower end of this spectrum acquired the name
hapa-haole ‘half-white’. Hapa-haole was not a true pidgin, or even a true pre-
pidgin, in the sense discussed above; rather it was a continuum of “foreigner’s
English,” similar to Whinnom’s (1971) description of cocoliche. It was, apparently,
limited to the towns, still hardly heard in country areas even in the 1870s. There
was a small sugar industry, but the labor force was almost entirely Hawaiian,
and, as far as one can discover, the plantation work-language was Hawaiian.
In 1876, a revision of U.S. tariff laws allowing the free importation of Hawaiian
sugar caused the industry to increase its productivity by several hundred per-
cent. The native Hawaiian population had so declined in numbers that workers
had to be imported, first from China, and then from Portugal, Japan, Korea, the
Philippines, Puerto Rico, etc. In a few years there came into existence a multi-
lingual community that greatly outnumbered the former population, Hawaiian
and haole alike.
A pidgin English was probably not the first, and certainly not the only, con-
tact language used on the Hawaiian plantations after 1876. A pidgin based on
Hawaiian and known as olelo pa’i’ai ‘taro-language’ – so called because it al-
9
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legedly originated with the Chinese, who largely took over taro growing from
the native Hawaiians – was widely used in the last two decades of the 19th cen-
tury (Bickerton 1977: 307–308) and perhaps for some years afterward, since one
speaker, a Filipino, was still alive in the mid-1970s. So far, it has proved impos-
sible to determine whether pidgin English grew up alongside pidgin Hawaiian or
whether the former grew out of the latter by a gradual relexification process. The
two processes may not be mutually exclusive, especially when we consider that
population balances and other demographic factors differed widely from island
to island. But one certain consequence of the existence of olelo pa’i’ai is that it
delayed the development of any form of pidgin English, especially on the outer
islands, where the Hawaiian language was strongest.
In 1973 and 1974, I and my team of assistants made recordings of several hun-
dred hours of speech from both immigrant speakers of Hawaiian Pidgin English
(HPE) and locally-born speakers of Hawaiian Creole English (HCE); this work is
described in detail in Bickerton & Odo (1976), Bickerton & Givón (1976), and Bick-
erton (1977). The earliest immigrant arrival in the group we recorded was 1907, a
time which, if our theory about the delayed development of HPE is correct, may
have been only a few years after the beginning of HPE. The latest arrival was
1930. In other words, a period of from forty-three to sixty-six years had elapsed
between our subjects’ dates of arrival and our recordings. Can recordings made
after such a long period give us an adequate idea of what HPE was like in the
period 1907–1930?
Although it is widely held that an individual’s speech changes little after ma-
turity has been reached, this may not necessarily be true of second languages or
contact languages. Pidginization is a process, not a state, and it is therefore pos-
sible that at least some of our subjects may now speak differently from the way
they spokewhen they first arrived in Hawaii, even though the vast majority were
already adults at that time. However, one thing is certain. If their version of HPE
has changed in those intervening years, then it must be more complex in struc-
ture and less subject to idiosyncratic or ethnic-group variation than it was in the
years that immediately followed their arrival. It is unthinkable that after several
decades of life in a community that was steadily becoming more integrated their
version of HPE should have grown less complex or more idiosyncratic. We must
therefore assume that either their HPE now adequately represents the HPE of
the early pidginization period, or that the latter was even more primitive and
more unstable than the versions they use today.
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But even if modern HPE represents early HPE quite accurately, it does not
follow that all HPE speakers are equally good guides to the state of HPE as it
was when creolization took place. On the basis of evidence discussed at length
in Bickerton (1977), we can place the time of creolization somewhere around 1910,
and certainly no later than 1920. There are considerable differences between the
HPE spoken by the earliest arrivals among our subjects and that spoken by those
who arrived in the 1920s. The former is considerably more rudimentary in its
structure; the complications that developed after 1920 could have been due to
internal developments in HPE, but were more probably caused by feedback from
the newly-developed HCE, whose earliest speakers would have come to maturity
by 1920 if not before (this issue, too, is explicitly dealt with in Bickerton 1977:
Chapter 4). We shall thereforemake the reasonable assumption that at the time of
creolization HPE was either adequately represented by our recordings of earlier
(pre-1920) immigrants, or it was at a still more primitive level of development.
At first glance, the second possibility might seem hard to credit. The HPE of
the older surviving speakers is both highly restricted and highly variable. The
main source of instability is first-language influence. Labov (1990) claimed that
these transference-governed versions of HPE were the idiosyncratic inventions
of social isolates; our much more widely-based research indicates that instead
they represent one of the earliest stages in the pidginization process in which
the more isolated the speakers, the more likely they are to become fossilized.
However, speakers who produced such versions were by no means all socially
isolated, and in particular, we noted that speakers of more evolved versions of
HPEwould sometimes relapse into this mode when they became excited or when
they had to deal with complex or unfamiliar topics (the speaker who produced
(1) below also produced, in the middle of a long and exciting narrative, (2)).































‘When he had caught it, he pulled it up’
In these examples, the italicized lexical items are Japanese, and anaphora is main-
tained by zero forms rather than by pronouns. In (1) the structure (with both
11
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direct and indirect objects preceding the verb and the auxiliary following the
main verb) represents direct transference from Japanese syntax. Example (2) can
hardly be said to have anything recognizable as structure; lexical items from the
English and Japanese lexicons are simply strung together. But what is striking
about these two sentences is that six out of the seven Japanese morphemes are
grammatical, not lexical, items; it is as if the speakers felt the need for some kind
of grammatical glue with which to stick their sentences together, and perforce
used the only brand available to them.
Speakers who immigrated into areas where there was a large native-Hawaiian
population show a rather different tendency; here, it is Hawaiian rather than























‘If you wanted to build (a temple), you should do it just before you die –















‘Who’ll carry it, boss? Everyone’ll cut it and everyone’ll carry it’
Example (3) was uttered by a Japanese speaker, (4) by a Filipino speaker; note
that the predominantly OV syntax of the former is replaced by a predominantly
VS syntax in the latter, reflecting the speaker’s native Visayan. Here, however, all
the Hawaiian items carry lexical meaning, in contrast with the Japanese items in
(1) and (2); this lends support to the claim that even as late as the 1910s, in some
areas, either olelo pa’i’ai was still dominant, or its relexification by English was
still far from complete.
Certainly examples (1)–(4) suggest an extreme instability in the languagemodel
that would confront the first locally-born generation.
That the macaronic elements in these examples may represent a deliberate
strategy on the part of speakers is suggested by the following perceptive com-
ment from an old Hawaiian woman:
(5) So we use the Hawaiian and Chinese together in one sentence, see? And
they ask me if that’s a Hawaiian word, I said no, maybe that’s a Japanese
word we put it in, to make a sentence with a Hawaiian word. And the
Chinese the same way too, in order to make a sentence for them to
understand you.
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In other words, in the original linguistic melting pot from which HPE eventu-
ally issued, the more skilled speakers acquired a core vocabulary in which the
commonest items, both lexical and grammatical, might be represented by forms
drawn from three or four languages. Small wonder that a Japanese woman,
asked if she spoke English, answered: “No, hapa-hapa [Hawaiian ‘half-half’]
shite [Japanese ‘do’]” – i.e., ‘I speak a mixture’ – and added (in Japanese), “I
never know whether I’m speaking one thing or the other.”
Even at a subsequent stage of pidginization, represented by speakers whose
vocabulary is drawn predominantly from English, syntactic features character-
istic of their native languages will still distinguish, for example, Japanese from














‘I think he earns a lot of money, though’
(7) da pua pipl awl poteito it
‘The poor people ate only potatoes’
Filipinos, however, often produce sentences in which verbs or predicate adjec-
tives precede their subjects:
(8) wok had dis pipl
‘These people work hard’
(9) mo plaeni da ilokano en da tagalog
‘Ilocanos were more numerous than Tagalogs’
The patterns of (6)–(9) were probably never categorical for any speaker; all the
speakers in our sample showed some SVO syntax. Variation, however, was fairly
unpredictable; Japanese speakers varied between 30 percent and 60 percent of
SOV sentences, although the figures for particular sentence types might range
between 10 percent and 90 percent (see Bickerton & Givón 1976 for full details)
while among Filipinos, percentages of VS structures ranged between 15 percent
and 50 percent in sentences where S was a full noun rather than a pronoun. On
the other hand, VS sentences from Japanese speakers and OV sentences from
Filipino speakers, while extremely rare, did occur from time to time. Since the
Japanese and the Filipinos constituted the two largest immigrant groups, a child
13
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in Hawaii who sought to learn basic word order by inductive processes alone
would have ended up in a state of total bewilderment.
Other features besides word order distinguish Japanese from Filipino speakers.




‘when we used to live here’
Filipinos never used such expressions, except for smaw-taim ‘when I was young’,
which became a universal HPE idiom. Filipino speakers inserted pronouns be-
tween most full-noun subjects and their verbs, for example:
(11) josafin brada hi laik hapai mi
‘Josephine’s brother wants to take me (with him)’
Japanese speakers seldom if ever used this structure. With regard to articles,
Japanese speakers rarely used either definite or indefinite; Filipino speakers, on
the other hand, often over-generalized the definite article, as in (9) above. While
both groups relied on zero anaphora more than English does, pronouns were
far more frequent among Filipino speakers. In short, anyone (in particular a
child) trying to learn HPE would have encountered formidable obstacles to even
figuring out what the rules of HPE were supposed to be.
But its variability was by no means the only obstacle to child acquisition of
HPE. The presence of two conflicting models, A and B, still leaves the learner
three theoretical choices: learn A, learn B, or learn some mixture of A and B.
But when neither of the models, nor the two together, constitutes an adequate
variety of human language, the problem is of a different order altogether.
Let us be quite clear as to what the deficiencies of HPE were, for it has been
claimed (e.g., Samarin 1971) that anything at all can be said in a pidgin. There is
a sense in which this is probably correct, even of an immature pidgin like HPE,
provided we do not count the cost of saying it. Take the following remarkable
speech:
(12) samtaim gud rod get, samtaim, olsem ben get, enguru [‘angle’] get, no?
enikain seim. olsem hyuman laif, olsem. gud rodu get, enguru get,
mauntin get – no? awl, enikain, stawmu get, nais dei get – olsem. enibadi,
mi olsem, smawl taim.
‘Sometimes there’s a good road, sometimes there’s, like, bends, corners,
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right? Everything’s like that. Human life’s just like that. There’s good
roads, there’s sharp corners, there’s mountains – right? All sorts of
things, there’s storms, nice days – it’s like that for everybody, it was for
me, too, when I was young’
This philosophic statement would be a striking piece of rhetoric in any language.
But it is an achievement against the grain of the language, so to speak; the
speaker, a retired bus driver (which probably accounts for his choice of imagery),
triumphs by sheer force of imagination over the minimal vocabulary and narrow
range of structural options within which he is obliged to work.
Similarly, HPE does not prevent speakers from finding ingenious ways of re-






















‘Li …Li …That place where you can borrow any of the books’
It is not absolutely necessary, for communicative purposes, that a language
have either an extensive vocabulary or a variety of syntactic structures; but the
goals of language, whether social communication or mental computation, seem
to be better served if a language has these things. HPE lacks, wholly or par-
tially, many of the building blocks which all native languages possess. Among
HPE speakers who arrived prior to 1920, the following features are largely or
completely missing: consistent marking of tense, aspect, and modality; relative
clauses; movement rules, embedded complements, in particular infinitival con-
structions; articles, especially indefinite. On the rare occasion when such fea-
tures do appear, they often do so in forms modeled directly on the speaker’s na-
tive language – for example, the relative clauses that precede, rather than follow,













‘And there were some that looked like pumpkins’
For the most part, however, sentences would consist of short strings of nouns
and verbs paratactically linked. Often even verbs would be omitted, as in the
following two examples:
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‘Before the mill was built, there were no Filipinos here at all’
If it were the case that children simply induced rules from input, onemight sup-
pose that when children were born to HPE speakers they learned the grammars
of their parents. If their parents were Filipinos, they would learn the rules charac-
teristic of Filipino speakers; if their parents were Japanese, they would learn the
rules characteristic of Japanese speakers, and so on. One might argue that when
Japanese and Filipino children went to school they met one another and ironed
out their differences; but if this, or something like it, did take place, it must have
had more to do with their being children than with their being in contact with
one another. Fifty years of contact were not enough to erase language-group
differences from the speech of adults. And while similar phenomena have been
observed among children of immigrant groups on the U.S. mainland, it must be
remembered that the latter had a ready-made target, while the first creole gener-
ation in Hawaii did not.
Whatever processes were involved, the erasure of group differences in that
generation was complete. Even other locally-born persons cannot determine the
ethnic background of an HCE speaker by his speech alone, although the same
persons can readily identify that of an HPE speaker by listening to him for a few
seconds.
Now it is true that we could construct an argument similar to that already con-
structed for HPE speakers. The reader will recall the claim that while the contem-
porary speech of old HPE speakers may be the same as, or more developed than,
their speech shortly after time of arrival, it could hardly be less developed. Simi-
larly, one might claim that older HCE speakers do not necessarily speak now as
they spoke in their childhood or early maturity; that, again, it would be absurd to
suggest that they then spoke a variety more developed than they speak now; and
that, therefore, their speech may have changed and become considerably more
complex since they reached adulthood. Indeed, on this showing, they might have
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spoken, as children, varieties as rudimentary and as ethnic-tongue-influenced as
their parents did; subsequently, and very gradually, they could have developed
the more stable, yet more complex, variety of language that they use today. If
this were true, the apparently sudden break between HPE and HCE would be a
misleading artifact of the analysis, produced by backprojection from synchronic
data.
Since we lack direct evidence from the period in question, this argument can-
not be conclusively disproved. However, it is an implausible one, and for the
following reason. If the argument is correct, then the homogeneity of modern
HCE must have come about by a gradual leveling process in which group differ-
ences were gradually removed through intergroup contacts. What were the crit-
ical differences between the immigrant and first locally-born generations? Not,
apparently, bilingualism versus monolingualism, since all the older, locally-born
subjects we interviewed spoke at least one other language besides HCE when
they were children. The only significant difference between the two generations
is that the first encountered HPE as adults, while the second encountered it as
small children.
Similar arguments can be mounted with regard to the greater complexity of
HCE. Again, we cannot prove empirically that this complexity did not result
from gradual increment. If we assume that it did, however, we have to explain
why HPE did not also become more complex; and we can only conclude, again,
that such an explanation must lie in the difference between language-learning
by adults and language-learning by children.
Finally, as we will see in Chapter 2, the forms and structures arrived at by
HCE resemble far beyond the scope of chance the forms and structures arrived
at by a variety of other creole languages, often with substrata very different from
Hawaii’s (and from one another’s too). It defies belief that a language formed by
the leveling of several substratum-influenced versions of a pidgin should exhibit
the degree of identity that will be illustrated with languages so diverse in their
origins, all of which must have evolved in a similar manner; the odds against this
happening, unless some set of external guiding principles was conditioning the
result, must be fantastic. It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume that the gap
between HPE and HCE that is reflected in our data is a genuine phenomenon, ac-
counted for by extremely abrupt changes which took place while the first creole
generation was growing to maturity.
I shall now examine some of the substantive differences betweenHPE andHCE
in the following five areas:
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e. relativization and pronoun-copying
I claimed above that HPE had no movement rules. In fact, HPE could not have
had any movement rules if we use the term in a rather restricted sense to cover
processes such as those which convert sentences like (17) and (19) into sentences
like (18) and (20):
(17) I spoke to John.
(18) It was John that I spoke to.
(19) Mary loaned us a book.
(20) The one who loaned us a book was Mary.
Rules of this kind are generally associated with certain functions, e.g., that of
focusing one particular constituent of a sentence, and they perform this function
in some English cases by adding structure but always by changing the basic,
unmarked word order of the sentence.
We saw that in HPE there were several possible sentence orders: SVO, for all
speakers sometimes; SOV, very often for Japanese speakers; and VS, quite often
for Filipino speakers. However, since Japanese speakers hardly ever produced VS
sentences, and Filipino speakers hardly ever produced SOV sentences, the use of
the non-SVO structures could hardly indicate focus or any similar emphatic de-
vice; they served merely as (probably unintentional) signals of ethnicity. Even
within a group – say, the Japanese – it could hardly be the case that SVO (or SOV)
represented an unmarked order, while SOV (or SVO) represented a marked order.
For instance, if SOV were the basic order, and SVO a marked order, those speak-
ers who produced only 30 percent SOV would be using their marked order more
than twice as often as their basic order. But if the relationship were reversed, the
result would be just as unlikely for those speakers who produced 60 percent SOV.
If there were two groups, one with basic SOV and marked SVO, and the other
with basic SVO and marked SOV, then it would become impossible for the lis-
tener to be sure whether contrastive emphasis was or was not intended, and the
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whole purpose of movement rules would be lost. We can therefore assume that
differences in word order among HPE speakers are not the result of movement
rules but are due to a gradual transition from VS or SOV orders, unmarked in the
speakers’ native languages, to the equally unmarked SVO which characterizes
almost all contact languages.
In HCE, the situation is quite different. HCE is homogeneous (except to the
extent that it has been increasingly influenced by English in recent years) both
across and within all groups irrespective of the parents’ language background.
For all speakers, without question, the basic, unmarked word order is SVO. All
speakers, however, have rules that will move either objects – (21), (22) – or pred-
icates – (23), (24) – to the beginning of the sentence:
(21) eni kain lanwij ai no kaen spik gud
‘I can’t speak any kind of language well’
(22) o, daet wan ai si
‘Oh, I saw that one’
(23) es wan ting baed dakain go futbawl
‘That football stuff is a bad thing’
(24) daes leitli dis pain chri
‘These pine trees are recent’
Object-fronting occurs only when the speaker wishes to contrast one NP with
another, or to contradict some inference that has been or might be drawn from
a previous utterance. This can be shown if we look at some context for (22), for
instance:
(25) Interviewer: You ever saw any ghost?
MJ75M: no – ai no si.
Interviewer: What about, you know, dakine fireball?
MJ75M: o, daet wan ai si.
The interviewer is referring to akualele, supernatural fireballs, allegedly con-
trolled by members of the kahuna or Hawaiian priestly caste. MJ75M (the letters
and numbers indicate: sex, masculine; ethnicity, Japanese; age, 75; and island of
residence, Maui, respectively) has just denied knowledge of supernatural enti-
ties and uses object-fronting to mark the exception to this denial, as soon as it is
brought to his attention.
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Predicate-fronting occurs when a predicate that contains new information is
introduced in conjunction with a subject which has been explicitly stated or im-
plied in the immediately preceding discourse. This can be shown by extended
context for (24):
(26) bifoa don haev mach chriz hia. in daet hil dea no moa chriz. daes leitli dis
pain chri.
‘There weren’t many trees here before. There were no trees at all on that
hill over there. These pine trees (that you now see there) were planted
recently’
Here, the speaker realizes that what he said in the first two sentences may seem
plainly false in light of what the interviewer can see before him. Since trees,
although their presence has been denied, have been established as a topic, he
can emphasize the recency of the presently visible trees’ appearance by fronting
the predicate.
This congruence between movement rule and discourse feature is, of course,
peculiar to HCE; one cannot find any similar congruence between discourse and
variant ordering in HPE. In fact, the result of the HCE rules is a series of order-
ings which differs markedly from the possible orderings of HPE, both in that
it contains orders which HPE does not permit, and in that it does not contain
orders which HPE does permit. The situation is shown in Table 1.1:








The SOV order which is the commonest among older Japanese HPE speakers
does not exist in HCE. While VS may occur in both HPE and HCE, its source is
different in each case: in HPE, it stems from the retention of verb-first ordering;
in HCE, from the operation of a regular rule. That rule, if it applies to transitive
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sentences, yields VOS order in HCE since objects and other constituents of the
verb-phrase move with the verb:
(27) no laik plei futbawl, dis gaiz
‘These guys don’t want to play football’
But although VOS is a possible order in Philippine languages, it does not emerge
in HPE, possibly because of the absence of either casemarking or consistent in-
tonation to distinguish the roles of the two NPs.
As for the two remaining orders, OSV and OVS, which are present in HCE but
not in HPE, the first arises through object-fronting, while the second can occur
when both object- and predicate-fronting apply to the same sentences. The result,
though infrequent, is occasionally found and is judged grammatical by native
speakers:
(28) difren bilifs dei get, sam gaiz
‘Some guys have different beliefs’
There is no way in which the sentence orders that are produced, or the rules
which produce them, could have been acquired by the first creole generation from
their pidgin-speaking parents. Moreover, even if we assume extensive bilingual-
ism in that generation, those rules could not have been derived from either the
substrate languages, or from English. Three substrate languages (Chinese, Por-
tuguese, Spanish), as well as English, have underlying SVO order, but Chinese
and English do not permit verb-first or predicate-fast sentences, except for one
or two highly marked structures like English left-dislocated pseudoclefts (Told
the landlord, that’s what he did). Portuguese and Spanish are freer in their order-
ing, tolerating certain types of verb-first sentences, but the equivalents of VOS
sentences like (27) and OVS sentences like (28) would be ungrammatical in these
languages. Conversely, the common Iberian VSX, as exemplified by Portuguese,

















‘The army generals arrived in Rio last night’
Of course, one might always say something like, “All the structures of HCE
are found in at least one of the languages in contact [it would be bizarre if they
weren’t!], and therefore HCE merely represents a random mix of the structures
available to children of various groups, through either the pidgin or their own
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ethnic tongues.” If anyone seriously believed that a language could be built by
randommixture, this answer might be satisfactory. But it would not explain why
one of the commonest (SOV) orders should be excluded – still less why the par-
ticular mixture illustrated in Table 1.1 should have been chosen, rather than one
of the many other possible combinations. However, it can hardly be accidental
if that particular distribution turns out to be exactly what is generated if one as-
sumes basic SVO order (which is virtually mandatory when you have no other
means of marking the two major cases) plus a rule which moves either of the
two major constituents, NP and VP, to sentence-initial position.1 We may there-
fore claim that the rules which move NPs and VPs cannot have been acquired
inductively by the original HCE speakers, but must, in some sense of the term,
have been “invented” by them ab ovo.
Next, let us look at articles. These appear sporadically and unpredictably in
HPE; typical of early (mainly Japanese) speakers is the 92-year-old 1907 arrival
who produced only three indefinite articles (out of 32 that would have been re-
quired by English rules of reference, i.e., 9.4 percent) and seven definite articles
(out of a total of 40 that English rules would have required, i.e., 17.5 percent).
Filipino speakers, on the other hand, generalized the definite articles to many
environments in which English does not require them, for example: with generic
NPs, as in (9) above; where there is only one possible referent, as in (30) or (31);
where there is a clearly nonspedfic referent, as in (32); or where noncount nouns
are involved, as in (33):
(30) hi get da hawaian waif
‘He has a Hawaiian wife’
(31) istawri pram da gad
‘God’s story’
(32) no kaen du nating abaut da eniting insai da haus
‘They can’t do anything about anything inside the house’
(33) oni tek tu slais da bred
‘I only take two slices of bread’
HCE speakers, however, followneither the under-generalization of the Japanese
speaker nor the over-generalization of the Filipino speaker. The definite article
1 I have not found any evidence for rule-ordering in either Creole English or Guyanese Creole. It
would seem that rules apply wherever their structural description is met. It may be that below
level of linguistic complexity, rule-ordering is not required. The topic merits further study.
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da is used for all and only specific-reference NPs that can be assumed known to
the listener:
(34) aefta da boi, da wan wen jink daet milk, awl da maut soa
‘Afterward, the mouth of the boy who had drunk that milk was all sore’
The indefinite article wan is used for all and only specific-reference NPs that can
be assumed unknown to the listener (typically, first-mention use):
(35) hi get wan blaek buk. daet buk no du eni gud
‘He has a black book. That book doesn’t do any good’
All other NPs have no article and no marker of plurality. This category includes
generic NPs, NPs within the scope of negation – i.e., clearly nonspecific NPs –
and cases where, while a specific referent may exist, the exact identity of that
referent is either unknown to the speaker or irrelevant to the point at issue. Ex-
amples include:
(36) dag smat
‘The dog is smart’ (in answer to the question, “Which is smarter, the horse
or the dog?”)
(37) yang fela dei no du daet
‘Young fellows don’t do that’
(38) poho ai neva bai big wan
‘It’s a pity I didn’t buy a big one’
(39) bat nobadi gon get jab
‘But nobody will get a job’
(40) hu go daun frs iz luza
‘The one who goes down first is the loser’
(41) kaenejan waif, ae, get
‘He has a Canadian wife’
(42) mi ai get raesh
‘As for me, I get a rash’
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(43) as tu bin get had taim reizing dag
‘The two of us used to have a hard time raising dogs’
These zero-marked forms would be marked three different ways in English:
with the in (36), (40); with a in (38), (39), (41), (42); with zero, but followed by
plural -s, in (37), (43). But note that the absence of plural marking in the last two
cases certainly does not stem from any more general absence of pluralization in
HCE; specific NPs with plural reference are always appropriately marked in HCE
(although not in HPE), except where numerals or other clear signs of plurality
are already present.
The fact that HCE unites in a single category what English treats as discrete
categories has led to some curious analyses, such as that of Perlman (1973: 99)
who writes: “Øs that mark generic singular NP should be distinguished from
those that mark indefinite singular ones. The distinction may be quite difficult
to make. In such cases as they go beer parlor, Ewa was never using crane that date,
that is hundred-pound bag, those days they get icebox, and olden days we gotta ride
train, it may actually be neutralized; however, I have distinguished generic from
indefinite where possible and discarded uncertain cases like the preceding.”
In reality, all Perlman’s cases and those cited above have in common the fact
that no specific reference is intended, or, in most cases, even possible; and the
semantic feature nonspecific happens to be shared by both generics and what
Perlman calls “indefinite singular.” That he uses the word “singular” at all in
this context is enough to show that he is looking at his data through English
spectacles. English has an obligatory number distinction; every NP has to be
either singular or plural. HCE does not have an obligatory number distinction, or
rather it has three numbers – singular, plural, and nonspecific (numberless). Thus,
while to the English speaker raesh in (42) is clearly singular, while dag in (43) is
clearly plural, HCE speakers treat both cases as unmarked for number, because
both are nonspecific: the rash, because no particular rash is being referred to –
simply the usual consequence when the speaker uses a certain brand of soap;
the dogs, because it was not one particular dog or group of dogs that gave the
speaker trouble, but rather the business of dog-raising in general.
We shall come back to nonspecificity in each of the next three chapters; for the
present, we only need to ask where the specific-nonspecific, marked-unmarked,
distinction that is incorporated in the HCE grammar came from. Based on the
evidence already shown, it could not have come from HPE. If HCE speakers had
followed the Japanese version, they would have marked far fewer NPs than they
do, and zero marking would have been assigned to at least some specifics. If
they had followed the Filipino model, they would have had far fewer zeroes, and
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some definite articles would have been assigned to non-specific NPs; compare,
for instance, (30) with (41). A mixing strategy – “Use more articles than Japanese
HPE speakers, fewer than Filiplno speakers” – would have achieved roughly the
right numerical proportions but, if used alone, would hardly have arrived at the
rigorous semantic distinction that all HCE speakers in fact make.
As for the influence of the original languages in contact, the glosses for (36)–
(43) show that English can hardly have been a model. Of the substrate languages,
many do not have articles at all. Of those that do, none show the same distri-
bution of zero forms; Portuguese and Hawaiian allow, to a varying extent, zero-
marked, number-neutral NPs in object position, but demand articles for subject
generics like that in (36). Indeed, those who believe in the strength of substrate in-
fluence might note that the speaker who produced (36), even after a generic with
a definite article had been presented to him by his interviewer, was a 79-year-old
pure-blooded Hawaiian who had spoken Hawaiian as a child.2 We must con-
clude, as with word order, that the zero marking of nonspecifics was an HCE “in-
vention”, and one firmly rooted enough to override counterevidence from other
languages known to its speakers.
Next, let us examine verbal auxiliaries. HCE has an auxiliary which marks
tense, bin (which sometimes takes the form wen, derived from it by regular
phonological rules); an auxiliary which marks modality, go (sometimes gon); and
an auxiliary which marks aspect, stei. I shall not discuss the first two here as
we will return to a fuller discussion of creole tense-modality-aspect (henceforth
TMA) systems in Chapter 2. The aspect marker stei will give us a clearer view of
how creole creativity works.
Bin and go (at least as surface forms, though not with their HCE meanings)
occur sporadically and unpredictably in HPE, but stei does not – at least not as
an auxiliary. It does, however, occur as a main verb, taking locative complements:
(44) mi iste nalehu tu yia
‘I was in Nalehu for two years’
In all our recordings of pre-1920 immigrants (the only ones who could possibly
have provided input to the creolization process) there were only seven sentences
in which stei preceded another verb. When a feature that occurs so frequently
2 The appropriate response in Hawaiian would have been ka ilio ‘the dog’; ilio alone is quite
ungrammatical.
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in HCE occurs with such vanishing rarity in HPE, there clearly exists the possi-
bility that it was invented by HCE speakers and was only afterward adopted by
some HPE speakers – who, as was suggested earlier, are hardly likely to have
lived through a half-century without any addition to their grammars. But let us
assume the contrary and ask, first, whether the occurrences of stei represent a
true auxiliary, or whether the sentences contain mere sequences of two main
verbs; and second, whether uses such as these could have provided evidence for
the HCE speaker to develop a true auxiliary with nonpunctual (progressive plus
habitual) meaning. The seven sentences are:
(45) haus, haus ai stei go in, jaepan taim.
(46) ai stei kuk.
(47) mi papa stei help.
(48) aen istei kam – i kam draib in i ka.
(49) mai brada hi stei make hia.
(50) oni tu yia mi ai stei wrk had.
(51) samtaim wan dei stei gat twentipai baeg.
I have not provided glosses since everything turns on what the sentences mean,
and what they mean is far from transparent. If (45) were an HCE utterance, stei
go in would mean something like ‘kept entering’, which is improbable here; the
most likely meaning, in context, is that the speaker, when she was a girl in Japan,
seldom used to leave the house. In the latter case, stei would be the main verb
with the meaning ‘stay’, while go in would probably have been learned as an
undifferentiated chunk meaning something like ‘inside’. In (46), too, the second
“verb” may not really be a verb either; kuk could represent the noun cook, in
which case the sentence would mean simply ‘I was a cook’. Sentence (47) could
represent verb serialization as easily as auxiliary-plus-verb; ‘I stayed and helped
my father’ or ‘I stayed to help my father’ are as plausible as glosses, in context, as
‘I was helping my father’. Sentences (48) and (49) could contain auxiliaries – the
reformulation of (48) makes it impossible to tell what was intended – but in both
cases, punctual events are referred to; the most probable glosses are ‘He drove
up in his car’ and ‘My brother died here’, respectively. But (49) is puzzling since
the Hawaiian verb make alone would mean ‘died’, while stei make would mean
literally ‘is (or was) dead’, which in conjunction with here makes little sense.
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The only sentences that could have any kind of nonpunctual meaning are (50)
and (51). Sentence (50) is most like an HCE sentence with its suggestion of du-
rative activity. Sentence (51) is more problematic – it could be a past habitual
with a zero impersonal subject (‘Sometimes they used to collect twenty-five bags
a day’) or some kind of premature attempt at a passive with the quasi-copular
stei (‘Sometimes twenty-five bags were collected in a day’).
If the input to the first creole generation was as chaotic as this – and, as we
saw, it could hardly have been less chaotic although it may well have been more
chaotic – it is impossible to see how children of that generation could have dis-
tilled any kind of regular rule out of it, still less the particular rule that they did
in fact derive. But if, as is highly possible, sentences such as (45)–(51) would not
have been produced by any HPE speaker prior to 1920, and in fact represent a
case of partial imperfect learning of HCE rules by those speakers (a possibility
that I shall document in another area later in this chapter), then the achievement
of the first creole generation becomes still more mysterious, since it must have
been completely ex nihilo.
For if we look at the stei + V sentences of HCE speakers, we find no ambiguous
cases and no reference to single punctual events. All their uses of stei as auxiliary
fall into what an English speaker would probably describe as four categories –
present continuous, past continuous, present habitual, and past habitual – but
these four categories, as I have demonstrated elsewhere (Bickerton 1975: Chapter
2), really constitute a single nonpunctual category, semantically opposed to a
punctual category expressing single nondurative actions or events:
(52) Present continuous:
ai no kea hu stei hant insai dea, ai gon hunt
‘I don’t care who’s hunting in there, I’m going to hunt’
(53) Past continuous:
wail wi stei paedl, jaen stei put wata insai da kanu – hei, da san av a gan
haed sink!
‘While we were paddling, John was letting water into the canoe – hey,
the son-of-a-gun had sunk it!’
(54) Present habitual:
yu no waet dei stei kawl mi, dakain – kawl mi gad
‘You know what they call me, that bunch? They call me God’
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(55) Past habitual:
da meksikan no tel mi nau, da gai laik daunpeimen – i stei tel mi, o, neks
wik, hi kamin, kamin
‘Now the Mexican didn’t tell me that the guy wanted a downpayment –
he kept telling me, oh, next week it’s coming, it’s coming’
A further difference between the HPE examples cited above and the many
hundreds of stei sentences we recorded from HCE speakers is that out of the
seven examples, two conjoined stei with predicates – gat andmake – with which
it is never conjoined in HCE. This is because both are perceived as stative verbs,
and in HCE, nonpunctual aspect cannot be applied to statives: *shi stei no da
ansa is as ungrammatical as its English equivalent, *she is knowing the answer.
It is true that on one of our glosses of (51) gat is not stative; but then it would
not be used to express collect by an HCE speaker, for whom gat is limited to an
alternative form for get ‘have’.
How could HCE speakers have invented the stei + V form? Stei is common as
a locative in modern HPE, but there is some doubt whether it was so common
at the time of creole formation. Examples in Nagara (1972), drawn from data
collected from very old speakers a decade earlier, contain only stap as a locative,
and the oldest speaker in our own survey, who arrived prior to 1910, also has only
stap. Thus it is conceivable that even the locative use of stei was acquired by HPE
speakers from HCE speakers. However, I would think it more likely that stei was
a low-frequency variant around 1910 and that HCE speakers selected it over stap
because, semantically, stei was a more appropriate expression for durativity.
Locative expressions are a common source of nonpunctual markers: for in-
stance, forms such as I am working derived originally from I am at working –
main verb be plus locative preposition plus gerund – which gave rise first to the
form I’m a-working (still found in some conservative areas, e.g., West Virginia)
and then, via phonological reduction and syntactic reanalysis, to the modernAux
+ V + ing. These processes in English took several centuries to produce a result
which HCE must have produced almost instantly.
Again, wewill look in vain for any substratum languagewhich unites all the in-
gredients which make up HCE nonpunctual: preverbal free morpheme, semantic
range inclusive of both progressive and habitual, indifference to the past-nonpast
distinction. Many substratum languages express aspect via bound morphemes,
or by reduplication (e.g., Philippine languages – it is surely surprising, in view of
the frequency with which “reduplication” is hailed as a universal creole charac-
teristic, that HCE speakers did not avail themselves of this particular resource!).
Hawaiian uses free morphemes, but these are placed both before and after the
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verb; Chinese uses preverbal free morphemes, but semantically there is hardly
any point of resemblance between the HCE and Chinese TMA systems. Perhaps
the closest form to stei, semantically, is Japanese -te iru/-te ita; these forms cover
(very roughly) the same semantic range as stei. However, it is the discontinuous
segment -te i- which carries nonpunctual meaning; -ru and -ta signify nonpast
and past, respectively, and nonpunctuality cannot be marked without marking
one or the other of them. Thus, the Japanese form satisfies neither the first nor
the third characteristic of stei. To assume Japanese influence on stei would be to
assume that a TMA system can be put together like a jigsaw puzzle;3 indeed, the
implicit supposition that all languages are like erector sets which can be disman-
tled, cannibalized, and put together again in new combinations lies at the heart
of all substratum arguments.
Our fourth area involves a particular type of sentential complementation. It
has already been mentioned that sentence embedding of any kind is virtually
nonexistent in HPE. Certainly there are no examples of anything resembling En-
glish for-to complementation, whether for is obligatorily present (56), optionally
present (57), or obligatorily deleted (58):
(56) Mary bought this for you to read.
(57) Mary prefers (for) Bill to go.
3 In fact, it is very difficult to answer substratomaniac arguments because of the profound vague-
ness in which they are invariably couched. For instance, Alleyne (1979) states: “In dealing with
the [substratal] input source, we have to make allowances for plausible processes of change
analogous to what in anthropology are called reinterpretations …It is the failure to make such
allowances that reduces the merit of those statements that seek to refute the derivation by ‘sub-
stratomaniacs’ of Atlantic creole verbal systems from generalized West African verbal systems,
because the two do not match up exactly point by point” (emphasis added). Since nowhere are
we told what kind of allowances to make or what is or is not plausible, this simply amounts to a
plea to swallow anything that fits the substratomaniac case – even such an absurdity as the ex-
istence of “generalized West African verbal systems” (if you want to flavor the condescension
implicit in that concept, substitute “generalized European verbal systems”), or the greater ab-
surdity that real-world speakers could derive anything from such a chimera. In the case under
discussion, if we took the semantic range of the Japanese form, half the syntax of the English
form, and the HPE indifference to tense, we might wind up with something approximating
HCE stei V – but would anyone seriously propose that you can construct a language in this
way? Moreover, if anyone did, the burden would be on that person to show why that particu-
lar mix of features from those particular languages, rather than dozens of other possible mixes
from the dozen or so languages in contact, happened to get chosen. Until substratomaniacs
are prepared to deal with problems of this nature, there is really nothing to argue against.
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(58) Mary prefers (*for) to go.
HCE does have sentential complements, but these are marked not by to but by fo
(presumably derived from English for) and go; the precise distribution of these
will be discussed shortly.
First, we must see what, if anything, HCE speakers could have learned from
HPE. Fo is found in HPE only as a preposition, and it is rare even as a prepo-
sition in speakers who arrived prior to the late 1920s. Go, however, occurs fre-
quently, and in three contexts: as a main verb, as a marker of imperatives, and as
a preverbal modifier of extremely indeterminate meaning and wildly fluctuating
distribution (some HPE speakers use it before every third or fourth verb; others
don’t use it at all). The nearest antecedent to a complementizer go derives from


















‘Take two men and take this away’
From their intonation contour, pauses, etc., these are clearly two independent
sentences, but production of such sequences in the more rapid tempo of HCE
could conceivably serve as a source of true complementation. Such a result might
be even more likely in the case of reported imperatives, such as (60):
(60) ai no tel yu palas, go join pentikosta
‘I’m not telling you guys, “Join the Pentecostal Church” ’
This could, presumably, be reanalyzed as …telling you guys to join…; at least with
the benefit of the native English speaker’s 20/20 hindsight.
Apart from these two constructions – imperative strings and reported imper-
atives – there is nothing that looks remotely like a go-complementizer construc-
tion in HPE, and even these two are quite rare. There is thus no precedent far
sentences such as the following, which occur with considerable frequency in
HCE:
(61) dei wen go ap dea erli in da mawning go plaen
‘They went up there early in the morning to plant’
(62) so ai go daun kiapu go push
‘So I went down to Kiapu to push (clear land with a bulldozer)’
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(63) ai gata go haia wan kapinta go fiks da fom
‘I had to hire a carpenter to fix the form’
However, fo often replaces go in environments which might appear at first
glance to be identical:
(64) aen dei figa, get sambadi fo push dem
‘And they figured there’d be someone to encourage them’
(65) mo beta a bin go hanalulu fo bai maiself
‘It would have been better if I’d gone to Honolulu to buy it myself’
(66) hau yu ekspek a gai fo mek pau hiz haus
‘How do you expect a guy to finish his house?’
In fact, the two sets of environments differ in an interesting way. The actions de-
scribed in (61)–(63) all actually occurred, while those described in (64)–(66) were
all hypothetical: there wasn’t anyone to encourage the basketball team referred
to in (64); the speaker of (65) hadn’t gone to Honolulu; and the hypothetical guy
in (66) couldn’t complete his hypothetical house because the very real bank man-
ager who was being addressed wouldn’t issue a loan for that purpose. In other
words, HCE marks grammatically the semantic distinction between sentential
complements which refer to realized events and those which refer to unrealized
events.
The distinction is blurred a little by some sentences which contain both fo and
go:
(67) pipl no laik tek om fo go wok
’People don’t want to employ him’
(68) tumach trabl, ae, fo go fiks om op
‘It’s a lot of trouble, you see, to fix it up’
But again, these complements express hypothetical or even nonoccurring events;
thus, these examples confirm the claim that fo only occurswith unrealized events,
and does not affect the claim that go, alone, occurs only with realized events.
In this area, then, HCE has made two distinct innovations, one semantic, one
syntactic. The syntactic innovation consisted of taking fo and go, a preposition
and an imperative marker, respectively, and using them to introduce embedded
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sentences, which were themselves an innovation. Even with the possible stim-
ulus supplied by HPE sentences such as (59) and (60), this represents a massive
change. However, the semantic innovation – distinguishing realized from unreal-
ized complements – was completely without precedent in HPE, in English, or in
any of the substrate languages. We should bear this in mind when we encounter
widely separated creoles with identical distinctions in Chapter 2.4
The fifth and final example of HCE innovation which we will examine here
is rather more complex than the previous examples, involving, as it does, the
interaction of two rules: a rule of relativization and a rule of subject-copying.
Each of these rules itself involves innovation, but I shall say little about these
since it is their interaction that shows most dramatically the working of creole
creativity.
Insertion of a pronoun between subject and predicate was noted above as a fea-
ture of Filipino HPE; this feature is discussed at length in Bickerton & Odo (1976:
3.6.1). There is no clear evidence that it is used as anything but a marker of verbal
(as distinct from adjectival, nominal, or locative) predicates by any but a small
minority of very late (post-1926) arrivals. However, HCE speakers use the same
feature for all full-NP subjects on first mention and for all full-NP contrastive sub-
jects; it follows from this that all full-NP subjects of indefinite reference are thus
marked (since indefinite reference marks first mention only, and the some guys
who do X turn into the they or those guys who do Y ). Thus, in HCE, sentences
such as (69) and (71) are common, whereas (70) and (72) would be ungrammatical:
(69) sam gaiz samtaimz dei kam
‘Sometimes some guys come’
(70) * sam gaiz samtaimz kam
4 I am aware, of course, of the research that shows that English does make realized-unrealized
distinctions, although in a much more oblique and clumsy fashion: e.g., the contrast between
I believed that John was guilty, but he wasn’t and *I realized that John was guilty, but he wasn’t.
But (a) this distinction is made in that-complement sentences rather than for-to complement
sentences; and (b) it is not surface-marked in the form of complementizer differences, but
rather has to be inferred from the semantics of individual verbs. Again, it is true that -ing
complementation is in general “more factive” than for-to complementation, but many cases go
the oppositeway, e.g., Bill managed to seeMary (entails Bill sawMary) versus Bill dreaded seeing
Mary (does not entail Bill saw Mary). For more relevant examples, see Chapter 2, examples
(31)–(34).
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(71) jaepan gaiz dei no giv a haeng, do
‘Guys from Japan don’t give a hang, though’
(72) * jaepan gaiz no giv a haeng, do
The function of pronoun-copying in HCE is dearly linked with that of the move-
ment rules discussed above. All deal with constituents selected for special focus;
movement rules move those constituents to the left, but subject NPs are already
leftmost constituents and can thus only be “symbolically” moved by inserting
something between them and the rest of the sentence.
Relative clauses, among pre-1920 immigrants, are rare, and when they do oc-
cur, often they do so in forms influenced by the speaker’s native language, cf.
(14) above. Among HCE speakers, relative clauses are common. However, they
differ from English relative clauses in that they contain no surface marker of rel-
ativization even where English demands one, i.e., in sentences where the noun
relativized on is subject of the clause, and either subject (73) or object (74) of the
main sentence:
(73) da gai gon lei da vainil fo mi bin kwot mi prais
‘The guy who is going to lay the vinyl for me had quoted me a price’
(74) yu si di ailan get koknat
‘You see the island that has coconut palms on it?’
We will consider how such sentences may be generated in Chapter 2.
The interaction of those two rules comes about when full NPs of indefinite
reference and other NPs which must be copied occur as head nouns of relative
clauses and subjects of those clauses. In nonrelative sentences, such as (69) or
(71), the copy either immediately follows the NP, as in (71), or, if an adverb is
present, as in (69), immediately precedes the verb. In relative-clause sentences,
however, the copy must follow the entire relative clause:
(75) sam filipinoz wok ova hia dei wen kapl yiaz in filipin ailaenz
‘Some Filipinos who worked over here went to the Philippines for a
couple of years’
(76) * sam filipinoz dei wok ova hia wen kapl yiaz …
(77) * sam filipinoz dei wok ova hia dei wen kapl yiaz …
(78) * sam filipinoz wok ova hia wen kapl yiaz …
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(79) sambadi goin ova dea dei gon hia nau
‘Anybody who’s going over there will hear it now’
(80) * sambadi dei goin ova dea gon hia it nau
(81) * sambadi dei goin ova dea dei gon hia it nau
(82) * sambadi goin ova dea gon hia it nau
It cannot be claimed that in (75) or (79) the copy represents some “resumptive”
device whose presence is due to the distance between subject and main verb; if
this were the case, the subject of (73), which is even further from its verb, would
be similarly copied. Moreover, a “resumptive” argument does not explain why
(77) and (81) are ungrammatical, and cannot account for the presence of copies
in (69) and (71).
The real problem is explaining the different placement of the copy in, e.g., (71)
and (79). We can see what is happening if we look at what is probably the under-
lying structure of (79) (I shall defend the rule that rewrites NP as S, rather than









ova deagoinsambadi gon hia nau
If S1 constituted an independent sentence, then the rule of subjectcopying would
place the appropriate pronoun immediately to the right of the NP marked with
an asterisk to yield sambadi dei goin ova dea. However, when S1 is embedded in
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S0, the higher-circled NP node must have the pronoun adjoined to it in order to
yield (79), rather than the ungrammatical (80).
Chomsky (1964) proposed a universal principle termed the “A-over-A princi-
ple”, which states that if a major category, such as NP, is directly dominated by
the same major category, then any rule that would normally apply to the lower
category node could apply only to the higher node. Although the principle as
there formulated has not been widely accepted (cf. Ross 1967), similar phenom-
ena have been observed in a number of languages, and something resembling
such a principle must still be regarded as a likely formal universal. Formal uni-
versals must be regarded as part of the innate equipment of the species, and HCE
speakers, however they may have arrived at the A-over-A principle, cannot have
done so as a result of experience.
In the first place, no sentences involving both relativization and subject-copying
are found in pre-1920 arrivals, and therefore the varying distribution of copies in
relative and nonrelative sentences cannot have been acquired fromHPE speakers.
The differences from English are obvious: sentences like (75) and (79) would be
ungrammatical even in those so-called “substandard” dialects of English which
permit subject-copying and/or deletion of relative pronouns in subject position.
No substrate language combines similar modes of relativization and focusing;
therefore, none of them could have provided relevant evidence. Moreover, in
this case we have much clearer proof than before that the current of innovation
ran from HCE back into HPE, rather than vice versa.
Among later immigrants, there was just one (arrival date 1930) who attempted
complex sentences such as (79). Although he sometimes got them right, hewould,
with equal frequency, produce sentences with two copies, as in (81), or no copies,
as in (82):
(84) awl diz bigshat pipl dei gat plenti mani dei no kea
‘All these big shots who have plenty of money don’t care’
(85) sam kam autsaid kam mo was
‘Some who come out (of jail) become worse’
These sentences are of course ungrammatical inHCE, and no locally-born speaker
would have produced them. But they are just the kind of vague approximations
that are made by foreign-language learners when they try to apply a new and
imperfectly-acquired rule. Indeed, HCE, once established, was just that – a new
foreign language – and joined earlier versions of HPE as a part of the input to
immigrant speakers who arrived in Hawaii after 1920.
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We have now surveyed five quite distinct aspects of HCE grammar and found
in each of them clear innovations by the earliest HCE speakers; developments in
the grammar which can have owed little or nothing to HPE, to English, or to any
of the substrate languages involved. We may briefly review those developments
by presenting amore formal summary in terms of the grammatical rules involved,
showing first the HPE rules – if HPE can be said to have rules or a grammar of its
own; I think that HPE would really have to have an analysis like that proposed
by Silverstein (1972) for Chinook Jargon, in which the pidgin forms would be
produced by extensions and modifications of the HPE speakers’ original native
languages – and then the HCE rules for each of the five areas.
With regard to basic sentence-structure and movement rules, HPE would have







HPE would have no movement rules. HCE, on the other hand, would have the
following PS rules:
(87) S → NP Aux VP
(88) VP → V (NP) (PP)
and in addition the following movement rules:
(89) SD: NP VP
1 2 →
SC: 2 1
(90) SD: X V NP
1 2 3 →
SC: 3 1 2
For the second area, involving articles, HPE, if it had any rule at all, would







There would be no rule that would determine the circumstances under which da,
wan, or Øwould be generated. HCE, on the other hand, would have the following
rule (I will ignore determiners other than articles):
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(94) Definite → da
(95) Nondefinite → wan
(96) Nonspecific → Ø
For the third area, involving stei and other auxiliaries, it is not clear what rules,
if any, HPE would have – possibly a rule such as (97), which would also account
for the fact that some auxiliaries, such as kaen, may function as main verbs, as
in no kaen ‘(You) can’t (do it)’/ ‘It’s impossible’:
(97) V → (V) V
HCE, however, would have (87), plus the following PS rules:
(98) Aux → (Tense) (Modal) (Aspect)
(99) Tense → Anterior
(100) Modal → … Irrealis …
(101) Aspect → Nonpunctual
(102) Anterior → bin
(103) Irrealis → go
(104) Nonpunctual → stei
For the fourth area, involving fo, go, and sentential complements, HPE would
have no rules. HCE would possibly have something like the following PS rule
(but see Chapter 2 on the status of complementizers in creoles generally):
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(107) Realized → go
(108) Unrealized → fo
In addition, HCE would require something analogous to (but probably not iden-
tical with) the English rule of equi-deletion.
Finally, for the fifth area, involving relativization, subject-copying, and their
interaction, we might need a rule for Filipino speakers which would modify (97)







(All but the later HCE-influenced HPE speakers realize the copy, if indeed for
them it is a copy – it is more likely a marker of a particular predicate type – as
an invariant i, i.e., in contradistinction to the HCE rule, subject features such as
plural or feminine are not copied onto it.) A few speakers might have, in addition,
a rule for relativization that would simply replace NP by S. HCE speakers would
have a well-established rule:
(110) NP → S











TheA-over-A principle, orwhatever general constraint governs the subject-copying
rule in relativized sentences, would not need to be separately stated in the HCE
grammar since it would presumably be a universal.
All that remains for us is to ask how these quite substantial innovations could
have been produced. There would seem to be only two logically possible alterna-
tives. They could have been produced by some kind of general problem-solving
device such as might be applied in any field of human behavior where the re-
quired human institutions were lacking – much as survivors of a shipwreck or
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an atomic holocaust might reconstruct government, laws, and other social insti-
tutions. Or they might have been produced by the operation of innate faculties
genetically programmed to provide at least the basis for an adequate human lan-
guage.
If Hawaii were the only place where people had been faced with the problem of
reconstructing human language, it would be impossible to decide between these
alternatives. However, Hawaii is far from unique. There are a number of creole
languages in other parts of the globe, but produced under very similar circum-
stances, several of which have been described well enough to make comparison
possible. It is true that in these cases we do not have the antecedent pidgin for
comparative purposes,5 but we shall see that there are still some oblique indica-
tions of antecedent structure. In any case, it is difficult to see, given the rapidity
with which creoles arose, how those antecedent pidgins could have developed
any further than Hawaii’s did.
Now, of the two alternatives stated above, each would seem to make different
predictions about the general nature of creoles. If some general problem-solving
device were at work, we would not expect that in every different circumstance it
would reach the same set of conclusions. There are any number of possible solu-
tions to the structural and communicative problems that language poses, as the
very diversity of the world’s languages shows, and we would expect to find that,
given the differences in geographical region, culture, contributing languages, and
so on, each group faced with the task of reconstructing language would arrive at
quite different solutions. Indeed: unless I am mistaken, orthodox generativists,
even while believing in an innate language faculty, might predict the same result
since their theory assigns to that faculty nothingmore than those formal and sub-
stantive universals which are reflected in all languages. Thus, they could predict
no more of a creole than that it should not violate any universal constraint.
However, if all creoles could be shown to exhibit an identity far beyond the
scope of chance, this would constitute strong evidence that some genetic pro-
gram common to all members of the species was decisively shaping the result.
5 Alleyne (1979) uses this fact to argue that there never were antecedent pidgins – if there had
been, he claims, they should have left traces in contemporary creoles, but he denies the exis-
tence of such traces. This argument will be dealt with further in Chapter 2. Meanwhile, the
reader may well wonder how much pidgin structure one could legitimately expect to be left





Although similarities among creoles have been known to exist at least since the
pioneering work of Schuchardt and others in the latter half of the 19th century, it
was not until the middle of the present century that articles by Taylor (1960; 1963;
etc.), Thompson (1961), Whinnom (1956; 1965), and others began to spell out these
similarities in any detail. Curiously, their pioneering efforts were not systemati-
cally developed; in general, creolists continued to describe individual creoles, or
(much more rarely) groups of creoles with a common superstratum (e.g., Good-
man 1964, Hancock 1970, Alleyne 1980), or else simply used already existing data
in long-drawn-out and essentially fruitless debates on issues such as monogene-
sis versus polygenesis, or substrate versus superstrate influence (Bickerton 1976
provides a brief summary of these).
While the profession badly needs a volume that would systematically compare
all the well-known creoles, such a task lies beyond the scope of the present vol-
ume. Instead, I shall look at general creole patterns in the five areas covered in
the last chapter, plus some other areas, to give a rough general picture which
should enable us to determine how far they, and HCE, resemble one another;
and I shall then explore in greater depth two areas – verb-phrase complementa-
tion and the syntax and semantics of TMA systems – which have already been
treated by various writers more extensively than other areas. We should then be
in a position to answer the questions posed at the end of the previous chapter.
Before embarking on this task, however, it is necessary to say a few words
about some of the peculiar problems it involves. One set of problems arises from
the limitations of many existing descriptions of creoles. No creole language has
yet been provided the kind of comprehensive and detailed reference grammar
that is taken for granted in most areal fields. With too few exceptions, creole
grammars tend to stop where the syntax gets interesting, e.g., “complex sen-
tences” are often dismissed with a page or two of unanalyzed examples. For
many creoles, only outline sketches are available. Moreover, some descriptions
may be based on incorrect data or contain incorrect analyses. As for the two cre-
oles that I know best – Guyanese Creole and Hawaiian Creole English – I must
regretfully state that I find all previous descriptions deficient or misleading in a
number of respects.
2 Creole
It might be argued here that it is premature to begin any general or theoreti-
cal work, especially one of a novel or controversial nature, until these lacunae
have been filled and these errors amended. For instance, Corne (1977: 2) states:
“Questions about the ‘genesis’ of the creole languages, their genetic relations
with each other and with their source language(s), the processes of creolisation
(and pidginisation) cannot be approached seriously unless we know something
about the object being talked about, and that we shall not know (in sufficient de-
tail) until a lot more of the unglamourous drudgery of careful descriptive work
has been completed.” This statement shows a profound misunderstanding of the
ways in which science is developed and knowledge increases. Empirical knowl-
edge is no guarantee of certitude, and its absence no barrier to insight; I would
oppose, to Corne, the following statement by Dingwall (1979: 3): “Relying on
logical argument alone, Leucippus was able to develop the atomic theory, while
Aristotle, able to rely on the results of numerous dissections, failed to discover
the correct function of the brain, imagining it to be the cooling system of the
body.”
The view that theorists are mere grandstanding prima donnas, while the real
work of the trade is done by the modest empirical plodder, is a widespread mis-
conception in creole studies that merely underlines the immaturity of the field.
In the real world, unglamorous drudges never arrive at that moment of revela-
tion which is always, like the rainbow, just beyond the next bend. For them, it’s
always “a little too early to judge”; the data are “not yet all in.” They bequeath
to their successors no more than mountains of fact, which may or may not con-
tain the nuggets that would genuinely enrich us; more often, I suspect, the latter,
since the facts one can gather about any language are infinite in number, and by
nomeans all of equal value. What is needed is not dogged fact-gathering (with or
without moral sermons) but the capacity to distinguish between the trivial and
the nontrivial. The task of the theorist is to tell the field worker where to look
and what to look for, and if the latter chooses to reject such aid, he has about as
much brain as the man who throws away his metal detector and proceeds to dig
by hand the three-acre field where he thinks treasure lies buried.
Another problem in creole studies is the question of how to interpret differ-
ences among creoles, where they genuinely exist. Are we to assume that any
and every difference must be given equal weight? Such an assumption would be
naive, as I shall try to show.
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Creoles are the nearest thing one can find to ab ovo creations of language,
but they are not and cannot be purely ab ovo creations. At the very least, pidgins
provide some input to them, and this, even if deficient, even if sometimes rejected,
as we saw, is still input. Since pidgins show clear substratum differences, and
since the composition of substrata differs from place to place, that input must
also be a variable, which must somehow be factored out if we are to determine
the extent to which creoles are genuinely creative.
But there is another variable in pidgins that may have more far-reaching con-
sequences than differences in the pidgin substrata: that is, the extent of super-
strate influence on the pidgin. This in turn will depend on ratios of superstrate to
nonsuperstrate speakers; if the former are numerous, there will be more super-
strate features available to the first creole generation. We have already noted the
case of Réunion. But there are some areas in which population ratios during the
pidginization stage are unknown; hence, even if we exclude known cases like
Réunion, this variable cannot be entirely eliminated. Moreover, factors other
than demographic may influence it. Population ratios in Hawaii differed little
from those in the Caribbean, but the (relative) freedom of an indentured as op-
posed to a slave society must have had some effects on the quantity and quality
of linguistic interaction, andmaywell explain whywe findmore English features
in both HPE and HCE than we do in a creole like Sranan, or even in the basilectal
varieties of Guyanese or Jamaican Creole.
Other problems arise from the operation of linguistic change processes, be
those processes internal or contact produced.
Internal changes affect languages regardless of their ancestry, and one would
imagine that creoles, by the very recency of their emergence from rudimentary
pre-pidgins, would be more, rather than less, subject to such changes than more
developed languages. The oldest creoles have a time depth approaching five hun-
dred years, which is certainly adequate for a number of significant changes to
have taken place; but inmost cases the absence of written records from earlier pe-
riods, and the unreliability of such records where they do exist – not necessarily
the fault of the witnesses, since these were Europeans, and code-switching pre-
sumably existed in the 17th century as it does today – makes it difficult indeed
to estimate the extent and nature of such changes.1
1 Very few writers on creoles seem to have much background or experience in variation study,
and on all the numerous occasions on which writers have used historical citations to make
claims about earlier stages of creoles, I cannot recall a single one where the possibility of
codeswitching was even mentioned. It may well be that the average fieldhand was monolectal,
but the slaves whose speech was most likely to be cited by Europeans were precisely the do-
mestics and artisans who had the most access to superstrate models and who would therefore
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However, in addition to internal change there is the contact-stimulated type of
change known as decreolization. This can affect any creole which has remained
in contact with its superstrate, as most have. Decreolization is well documented
for some English creoles (DeCamp 1971, Bickerton 1973a; 1975), but has been
largely ignored in studies of other creoles. Valdman (1973) suggests that it is
equally widespread among French varieties, and its presence in Cabo Verdiense
and some other Portuguese creoles is quite apparent. The result of decreolization
is to create a continuum of intermediate varieties between creole and superstrate.
If this process is sufficiently long and intense, the continuum may be progres-
sively eroded at its creole end. The result may be a synchronic state in which the
most conservative variety recoverable is already considerably different from (and
considerably closer to the superstrate than) the original creole; this is obvious in
some cases, e.g., Trinidad, but may be less so elsewhere.
Again, in some cases where truly conservative varieties are recoverable, re-
searchers may have failed to unearth them (the observations of Bailey (1971) on
the texts in Le Page & DeCamp (1960) are very relevant here). To compare a par-
tially decreolized creole with a nondecreolized one can only produce an appear-
ance of difference which might not have existed had it been possible to compare
the two languages in their pristine condition. Yet, given present uncertainties as
to which creoles have decreolized, and howmuch, this trap is one into which the
most careful scholar might inadvertently fall.
A field so fraught with possible sources of error might seem to provide the
comparativist with an inexhaustible source of alibis. Faced with any apparent
difference, he could say: “Well, this must be due to one or another of these inter-
fering factors, so let’s just forget it!” Any such procedure would turn the inquiry
into a farce, and yet, in light of the foregoing paragraphs, it would be equally ir-
responsible to take every difference at its face value and accord equal weight to
each. If, as indicated in Chapter 1, there is some unique, creative force at work in
the formation of creoles, we must try to distinguish this from other forces that
might interact with it and serve to mask it. But unless we can show precisely
which factor is involved, why it should have taken effect, and how it could have
worked to provide the observed results, our efforts will be valueless.
A final problem concerns the weighing of evidence and the criteria for making
judgments. This is of particular importance when we come to deal with apparent
cases of substratum influence.
be the likeliest to be able and willing to adapt their speech in a superstrate direction when
interacting with superstrate speakers. Historical citations should therefore be handled with
great care, especially when they suggest earlier stages of a creole which would show a heavier
superstrate influence than is found in the contemporary basilect of that creole.
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Claims of substratum influence still persist strongly in creole studies and are
made in such recent works as Jansen, Koopman &Muysken (1978), Alleyne (1979;
1980), etc. However, substratomaniacs, if I may give them their convenient and
traditional name, seem to be satisfied with selecting particular structures in one
or more creole languages and showing that superficially similar structures can be
found in one or more West African languages (at least one careful study, Huttar
1975, has shown that such structures are not always as similar as they might
appear at first glance). Thismay be just as well; if they pursued their inquiries any
further, they would find that not only would they have to confront some rather
serious difficulties, but that even if they overcame these, they would, perforce,
wind up in a position which is only a step away from that which is proposed
here.
Let us suppose that a very common structure in Caribbean creoles is also at-
tested for Yoruba and perhaps one or two other relatively minor languages (this
case is not hypothetical; we shall meet with it in the very next section). To most
substratomaniacs, the mere existence of such similarities constitutes self-evident
proof of the connection. They seldom even consider the problem of transmission.
How does a rule get from Yoruba into a creole?
Theoretically, there are several possibilities. One at least – some kind of mono-
genetic ancestor which would have taken structure from Yoruba and other lan-
guages and passed it on to a wide range of descendents – has been proposed
many times, but no body of evidence (save for just those creole similarities it
purports to explain!) has ever been presented for such a language, and until one
is, we can safely ignore it. Consequently, we must assume that our rule, and
perhaps others, passed from Yoruba into the antecedent pidgins of a number of
creoles, and thence into those creoles. For this to have happened, a substantial
number of Yoruba speakers must have been present during the pidgin phase in
each area, or at least no later than the earliest phase of creolization. If not, if a
substantial number did not arrive in a given area until after the creole had been
formed, then previous speakers would hardly abandon the rules they themselves
had arrived at and replace themwith new rules, unless the number of Yoruba was
so great as to constitute an absolute majority – and that, to the best of present
knowledge, was never true at any time for any Caribbean territory.2
2 It is at least highly questionable whether even an absolute majority of speakers of a single
substrate language can influence the formation of a creole. Just after the turn of the century,
when creolization must have been actively in progress, the Japanese constituted 50 percent
of the population of Hawaii, yet there is virtually no trace of Japanese influence on HCE. It
would be interesting to hear the substratomaniac explanation for this fact, but dealing with
counter-evidence has never been the strong point of that particular approach.
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Now, while it would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove that there were
no Yorubas in any given area at the time of creolization, there are a number of
areas where their presence must have been heavily outweighed by members of
other groups. If we take Saramaccan, for instance, generally regarded as the most
African-like of creoles, we find very few lexical survivals even from the whole
Kwa group (of which Yoruba is a member) but very many from Bantu languages,
in particular Kikongo (Daeleman 1972). One would think that the first task in
constructing any substratum theory would be to show that the necessary groups
were in the necessary places at the necessary times. But this has simply not been
done.
There are linguistic as well as historical problems to be faced by any serious
substratum theory. As things stand, we are asked to believe that different African
languages contributed different rules and features to particular creoles. To ac-
cept that this is possible is to accept what Dillard (1970), in a slightly different
context, aptly termed the “Cafeteria Principle.” Dillard was arguing against the
once widespread belief that creoles were mixtures of rules and features from var-
ious regional dialects of the British Isles. But if it is absurd to suppose that a
creole could mix fragments of Irish, Wessex, Norfolk, and Yorkshire dialects it is
at least as absurd to suppose that a creole could mix fragments of Yoruba, Akan,
Igbo, Mandinka, and Wolof – to mention some of the African languages which
substratomaniacs most frequently invoke.
Let us suppose, however, that such miracles were possible, and that Yoruba
speakers were indeed distributed in such a way that the requisite input could be
provided. Nobody can deny that, in every case, there were many other African
languages involved in each area, and nobody who knows anything about African
languages can deny that, even within the Kwa group – and a fortiori outside it
– there are wide differences in rules and rule systems. What could be so spe-
cial about a particular Yoruba rule (such as the one for verb-focusing which we
will shortly discuss) that would cause it to be accepted over all competitors in a
number of different and quite separate groups?
This question has been raised with respect to one feature which is by no means
limited to Yoruba: verb-serialization. In their analysis of this phenomenon, Jansen,
Koopman & Muysken (1978), while accepting the standard substratum explana-
tion, wonder why it is that creoles, with their clear preference for features that
are unmarked in the Jakobsonian sense, should have selected one which is quite
rare among the world’s languages, and highly unstable (subject to rapid change)
even in those that have it. They are unable to provide an answer, although I shall
suggest one in the latter part of this chapter.
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In a general sense, we can claim that the only possible factor that could lead a
group to accept a particular rule out of a set of alternatives must have to do with
the emerging system of the language which that group is engaged in develop-
ing. It could only be that, at any given stage in that development, the language
could only incorporate rules of a certain type, and would have to reject others.
Although we still know far too little about dynamic processes in language to be
able to say what such constraints on development might be like, we can be rea-
sonably certain that they exist. Languages, even creoles, are systems, systems
have structure, and things incompatible with that structure cannot be borrowed;
SVO languages cannot borrow a set of post positions, to take an extreme and
obvious case. If a marked structure is incorporated (and if verb-serialization is
highly marked, then verb-focusing is super-highly marked), it can only be be-
cause the language, at that particular stage of its development, has to have some
such rule.
That a creole language has to have certain types of rules is exactly what the
present study is designed to prove. If such rules happen to be present in the
input in certain cases, that is in no way counter to the theory expressed here;
the creole will acquire such rules, not because they are in the input, for many
conflicting rules must be there also, but because such a rule is required by the
structure of the emerging language. Indeed, presence in the input may not even
be a necessary, let alone a sufficient, condition since the first creole generation
could well have devised such a rule for itself; we saw in the first chapter that that
generation can and does invent rules without benefit of experience. But even if
we accept the entire substratum case, the situation is not substantively changed;
the first creole generation has merely acquired the kind of rule that it was pro-
grammed to acquire, and saved itself the trouble, so to speak, of having to invent
something equivalent. Thus, when taken to their logical conclusions, substratum
arguments only bring us back to the question this book will try to solve: why do
creole speakers acquire some types of rule, but not others?
With these points clarified, we can now survey some key areas of grammar
and see something of the range and extent of the similarities which any creole




HCE, as we have seen, moved focused constituents to sentence-initial position.
The same procedure, with some modifications which I shall discuss in a moment,
is followed by all other creoles.
It is sometimes suggested that there is nothing very remarkable about this
fact, since many languages have similar processes. But it is also true that many
languages have also, or instead, other methods of marking focus, such as changes
in stress or tone patterns, or the use of focusing particles. The fact that creoles
have adopted none of these alternative strategies cannot be without significance.
However, there are certain differences betweenHCE and the Caribbean creoles
in the ways in which this general strategy is implemented. I shall illustrate the
Caribbean strategy from Guyanese Creole (GC), since this language seems to be
typical in all respects.
Let us start with a simple declarative sentence such as (1):
(1) Jan bin sii wan uman
‘John had seen a woman’
The subject can be focused by adjoining the equative copula a to the first NP:
(2) a Jan bin sii wan uman
‘It was John who had seen a woman’
The object can be focused by moving the NP to sentence-initial position and
again adjoining a:
(3) a wan uman Jan bin sii
‘It was a woman that John had seen’
Other VP constituents such as oblique-case NPs and adverbials can be focused in
an identical manner. However, the verb can also be focused by a rather different
procedure; it is again preposed and a is adjoined to it, but a copy is obligatorily
left at the extraction site:
(4) a sii Jan bin sii wan uman
There is no exact equivalent to (4) in English; it is roughly equivalent to ‘John
had seen a woman’ or ‘John had really seen a woman’ or ‘Seen a woman, that’s
what John had done’. In English, it is impossible to apply a movement rule to V
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alone; English movement rules apply to major categories, and major categories
in English are NP and VP.
This fact must immediately raise doubts about the status of VP in GC, for while
NP and V can be moved freely, VP cannot:
(5) * a sii wan uman Jan bin
(6) * a bin sii wan uman Jan
(7) * a sii wan uman Jan bin sii
(8) * a bin sii wan uman Jan bin sii
Note that (6) without a and with appropriate lexical and phonological changes
would be grammatical in HCE:
(9) (i) bin si wan wahini, Jan.
One difference between GC and HCE could then be due to the fact that the
latter has the category VP while the former does not. VP has always been a prob-
lem for generative grammar; many scholars have been unwilling to accept it as
a universal category since (among other things) it is hard to posit for VSO lan-
guages where it would be a discontinuous constituent in deep structure. I know
of no rule in GC for which VP has to be specified in the structural description
(GC does not have the equivalent of English VP deletion, for example).
However, this seems like a pretty massive difference to begin our list of simi-
larities with. If creoles are constrained by a genetic program, how could things
like this possibly come about?
If, as will be claimed in Chapter 4, the original building blocks of language are
just NPs and Vs, then VP is not a primitive constituent, but V is; thus, in the ear-
liest stages of a creole, I would predict that V, but not VP, would be a category.
However, either as a result of decreolization, involving contact with a language
which already has VP as a category, or of internal change, a creole can develop
VP.
Previously, we established that superstrate influence was one of the factors
which would disrupt natural creole development, whether that influence came
during pidginization or, much later, through decreolization. That the results of
influence at these two points can be virtually identical and impossible to disen-
tangle is testified by the eloquent bafflement of Corne’s comments on the status
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of Réunion Creole (Corne 1977: 223–224).3 For instance, as mesolectal varieties
of GC come under English influence, they develop VP. Now, it seems plausible
to suppose that HCE, which, as we have seen, was influenced by English more
strongly thanmost other English creoles, acquired VP at birth, rather than two or
three hundred years later (though I would agree that for the moment there is no
obviousway to prove this). If this is so, thenHCEwould not be typical of themost
natural creole development; but the overall theory would be unaffected, since
Washabaugh’s (1979) claim that any genetically-programmed feature should ap-
pear universally in creoles, irrespective of other conflicting factors, is a blatant
straw man.
However, we still have to show why GC copies the verb. Here, the hypothet-
ical case of the Yoruba rule discussed in the preceding section becomes real, for
Yoruba does indeed have a rule that yields sentences very similar to, although
not identical with (4). At first sight this rule looks so weird that one thinks (I my-
self thought for several years) that direct borrowing must be the only possible
source. However, consider for a moment what would happen if GC had a rule
which said, “Move all major categories” (probably true of any human language),
plus a condition which specified that major categories were NP and V (which is
highly probable based on the evidence), but this movement did not leave a copy
of V at the extraction site.
Such a rule would separate verbs from their auxiliaries, and this would imme-
diately cause severe processing problems for speakers of creoles. It is a condition
on transformations generally that meaning be recoverable, but since a number
of auxiliaries (e.g., GC go) are homophonous with full verbs or can modify zero
copulas, and since many full verbs are homophonous with the nouns derived
from them, sentences in which only V is fronted could wind up with meanings
completely different from those they originally had. Take the following exam-
ples:
3 “It is clear that R(éunion) C(reole) is, to quite a large degree, a different animal fromM(auritian)
C(reole), Ro(drigues) C(reole), and S(eychelles) C(reole) …There can be no doubt that RC shares
many features in common with MC, RoC and SC …The usual explanation … is that RC is a ‘de-
creolized’ version of proto-I(ndian) O(cean) C(reole) … Another, and perhaps more plausible
explanation, is that RC is, on the contrary, a modified version of a variety of French (original
emphasis) … The modification of this lete ki French may be seen in terms of convergence …”
Corne is led to conclude that Bourbonnais (the conventional term for proto-IOC) did not orig-
inate on the Ile de Bourbon (the old name for Réunion), but he is unable to say where it did
originate, or to commit himself as to whether there was or was not a true proto-IOC. In fact,
only an analysis along the lines of Bickerton (1975) can hope to make sense of RC history; but
so far, no such analysis has been attempted.
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(10) Jan bin go wok a haspital
‘John would have worked at the hospital’
(11) * a wok Jan bin go a haspital
The italicized main clause in (11) constitutes a complete sentence with the mean-
ing ‘John had gone to the hospital’. Since wok can be noun or verb, and since
nouns are fronted without copying, as in (2) and (3), (11) could be, and almost
certainly would be, interpreted as ‘It was work that John had gone to the hospi-
tal for’. Again, if V-fronting minus copying were applied to (1) above, it would
yield:
(12) * a sii Jan bin wan uman
This could only be interpreted as a (slightly ungrammatical) version of ‘He (or I)
saw that John was a woman!’ Thus, if a copy is not left, meaning is irrecoverable.
It would seem, therefore, that any language with movement rules that involve
V only, rather than VP, must develop a copying rule (or if, as has often been
suggested in the literature, movement rules normally consist of two parts, one
which Chomsky-adjoins a copy of the constituent to S and one which deletes the
original constituent, it must then merely suppress the second half of the process).
No borrowing from any other language would be required. Moreover, a claim
that GC borrowed the rule from Yoruba sets up an infinite regress: where did
Yoruba borrow it from? It is much more plausible to suppose that languages
independently invent rules when these are demanded by the structure of the
language plus functional requirements.
The other difference between GC and HCE rules involves the use of an equa-
tive copula. HCE could not use such a copula because it never developed one.
Absence of an equative copula seems to be characteristic of those languages (e.g.,
HCE, Crioulo, the IndianOcean creoles (IOC))which showheavier superstrate in-
fluence, but as there is no plausible mechanism here to show why that influence
should have this effect (positive influence is one thing, negative influence quite
another), we must note this as a potentially significant difference. In the absence
of such a focus-marking device, some other morpheme must be recruited, and
creoles seem to have no specific program for either source or position: Crioulo ki
is drawn from a superstrate relativizer (Pg. que) and postposed to the extracted
constituent; Seychelles Creoles sa is drawn from its own definite article, in turn
derived from Fr. ça, and optionally preposed; while HCE uses (for subject NP)
the quasi-obligatory verb-predicate marker fortuitously present in Filipino ver-
sions of HPE, postposing it and adding number and gender. This diversity is in
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sharp contrast to the generality of left movement, and suggests (we will later
provide abundant evidence, not just from creoles but from child language acqui-
sition) that the genetic program which produces language in the species highly
specifies some areas of language and leaves others undetermined; this is only
to be expected, as a genetic blueprint which leaves no room for variation and
development would freeze a species at a single developmental level.
Articles
There seems, in contrast, to be hardly any variation at all in the way that creoles
handle articles. Virtually all creoles have a system identical to that of HCE: a defi-
nite article for presupposed-specific NP; an indefinite article for asserted-specific
NP; and zero for nonspecific NP. GC provides the following examples:
(13) Jan bai di buk
‘John bought the book (that you already know about)’
(14) Jan bai wan buk
‘John bought a (particular) book’
(15) Jan bai buk
‘John bought a book or books’
(16) buk dia fi tru
‘Books are really expensive!’
Papiamentu (PP) provides the following examples:
(17) mi tin e buki
‘I have the book’
(18) mi tin e bukinan
‘I have the books’
(19) mi tin un buki
‘I have a book’




(21) buki ta caru
‘Books are expensive’
Seychelles Creole (SC) provides the following examples:
(22) mô pe aste sa banan
‘I am buying the banana’
(23) mô pe aste ban banan
‘I am buying the bananas’
(24) mô pe aste ê banan
‘I am buying a banana’
Corne (1977: 13) follows the same Anglocentric route as Perlman (1973) did for
HCE when dealing with nonspecifics; he cites the following two examples, (25)
























‘We shall go and borrow some tools’
Corne does not mention subject generics, but we can assume that these too are
treated as nonspecifics.
Similar illustrations could be produced for almost any creole. This area of gram-
mar seems to be highly specified in creoles; the distinction between specific and
nonspecific is particularly clear and consistent, and when we look at language
acquisition in Chapter 3, we will find confirmatory evidence that it is probably
innate.
4 Note that fakter ‘postman’ also lacks an article, although the definite article is required in
English. But in fact, the NP here is as nonspecific as let. ‘the postman’, ‘the doctor’, ‘the
cashier’, etc., are really role titles. Postmen often change routes and schedules, and there is
no indication in the sentence that one particular postman might have brought the letter, that
either the speaker or the listener could have answered the question “which postman?” or that




A majority of creoles, like HCE, express tense, modality, and aspect by means of
three preverbal free morphemes, placed (if they co-occur) in that order. I have al-
ready discussed the typical creole system elsewhere (Bickerton 1974, 1975: Chap-
ter 2), so here I shall give only a brief outline, returning later in the chapter to go
much more deeply into some apparent counterexamples which have been men-
tioned in the literature.
In the typical system – which HCE shares with GC, Sranan (SR), Saramac-
can (SA), Haitian Creole (HC), and a number of other creoles – ranges of mean-
ing of the particles are identical: the tense particle expresses [+Anterior] (very
roughly, past-before-past for action verbs and past for stative verbs);5 the modal-
ity particle expresses [+Irrealis] (which includes futures and conditionals); while
the aspect particle expresses [+Nonpunctual] (progressive-durative plus habitual-
iterative). The stem form in isolation expresses the unmarked term in these three
oppositions, i.e., present statives and past nonstatives. In addition, there exist
combined forms, some of which in some languages have been eroded (in GC by
phonological rules, in HCE by decreolization), but of which the full set is attested
for HC (Hall 1953) and SR (Voorhoeve 1957). Again, wherever combined forms
are present, their meaning is the same: anterior plus irrealis, counterfactual con-
ditions; anterior plus nonpunctual, past-before-past durative or habitual actions;
irrealis plus nonpunctual, habitual or durative unrealized actions; anterior plus
irrealis plus nonpunctual, counterfactuals which express duration or habituality.
Surface forms, of course, take a number of different shapes: anterior, GC bin,
SA bi, SR hen, HC and Lesser Antillean Creole (LAC) te; irrealis, GC sa/go, SA o,
SR sa, HC ava, LAC ke; nonpunctual, GC a, SA ta, SR e, HC ape, LAC ka.
HCE, with bin, go, and stei, shares even two of the GC surface forms, although
the two languages are several thousandmiles apart and their speakers have never
been in contact. Combined forms have almost disappeared through decreoliza-
tion, but are retained by a few speakers (Bickerton 1974), and/or are attested
for earlier periods (Reinecke 1969; Tsuzaki 1971), although nowadays those who
remember them are so unsure of what they once meant that one investigator
(Perlman 1973) accused his consultants of making them up! (See discussion in
Bickerton 1980: 183ff.) Thus, we can again claim a highly programmed area, and
many details of the ways in which children acquire quite different kinds of TMA
systems (see Chapter 3, below) will serve to confirm this claim.
5 The anterior-nonanterior distinction is not an easy one for the naive speaker (i.e., anyone who
does not speak a creole) to understand, as I have found in trying to teach it to several classes
of graduate students. The reader who wishes to understand this is strongly recommended to
read the account in Bickerton (1975: Chapter 2).
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Realized and unrealized complements
What work has so far been done on creole complementation has focused largely
on verb serialization, so data on this topic are extremely scarce. However, all the
languages for which I have been able to find good data attest an identical struc-
ture to that of HCE, i.e., complementizers which are selected by the semantics of
the embedded S.
Roberts (1975) reports the following contrast from Jamaican Creole (JC):
(27) im gaan fi bied, bot im duon bied
‘He went to wash, but he didn’t wash’
(28) * im gaan go bied, bot im duon bied
Here, go as complementizer cannot co-occur with a negative conjunct because
its meaning expresses a realized action. However, fi is fully compatible with
negative conjuncts since the actions it introduces are not (or, perhaps, are not
necessarily) realized.
Jansen, Koopman & Muysken (1978) report an identical contrast in Sranan:
(29) a teki a nefi foe koti a brede, ma no koti en
‘He took the knife to cut the bread, but did not cut it’
(30) * a teki a nefi koti a brede, ma no koti en
Here, the contrast is between foe and Ø as complementizers, but the semantic
distinction is identical.6
The examples so far have all been from English creoles although it is obvious
that the distinction cannot have been derived from a language which does not
make it:
(31) I managed to stop (entails “I stopped”).
(32) I failed to stop (entails “I did not stop”).
(33) I went to see Mary and we talked about old times.
(34) I went to see Mary but she wasn’t home.
6 Jansen et al. have a different (and much more complex) explanation involving logical form,
propositional islands, truth values, etc. Although they cite Roberts (1975) in another context,
they appear to be unaware of the JC examples in that paper, cited above as (27) and (28), as
well as of the other parallels cited here.
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Fortunately for those who might still hypothesize some occult English influence,
the same contrast is found in Mauritian Creole (MC). In one of the texts in Baker













‘She decided to put a fish in (the pool)’













‘She gave the fish a little nickname’
In other words, she had indeed done what she decided to do, i.e., put a fish in
the pool. The al-complement, therefore, indicates a realized action. However, in







































‘He would have gone that evening to burn the boy’s house, but on the
way he was attacked by witches’
Here, the subject of the sentence was prevented from carrying out his intention
by the witches; accordingly, the complement is marked with pu al. Since Baker
does not discuss this construction, we have no way of knowing if, as I suspect,
(38) would be ungrammatical in that particular context:
(38) li ti pe ale aswar al bril lakaz …
However, all realized complements in Baker’s texts are marked with al or Ø , and
all unrealized complements are marked with pu or pu al.
These similarities, not previously pointed out in any publishedwork, are partic-
ularly striking in that the structure looks like a highly marked one, being attested
in few if any noncreole languages; and yet the identity is not merely semantic
and syntactic; it extends even to the choice of lexical items – for pu derives from
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Fr. pour ‘for’, and Eng. for is the source for HCE fo, JC fi, SR foe,7 while MC
al ‘go’ and MC Ø parallel HCE go, JC go, and SR Ø. While it is conceivable that
JC and SR might have some kind of genetic connection (although no historical
or systematic linguistic evidence has been advanced), there is no possibility that
either could have any connection with HCE, and it is, if that is possible, even less
likely that there was ever any connection between these three and MC, which
has a different superstrate and different substratum language. It is impossible to
imagine any other explanation than one based on the possession, by speakers in
all four areas, of some quite specific program for language-building.
Relativization and subject-copying
In these areas there exist certain differences. Most creoles have relative pronouns,
at least when the head-noun is also subject of the relative clause, but HCE does
not. However, the time that most creoles have had to gain relative pronouns
is little less than the time it took English to gain them in this position (Bever
& Langendoen 1971). If creoles were indeed born without surface relativizers,
then the same processing problems that Bever & Langendoen discuss would have
applied to them, and there would have been a similar pressure to borrow or adapt
some feature that would serve to avoid such problems.
However, any such speculation would be pure conjecture, if it were not for the
fact that in a number of creoles there still exist conservative dialects or restricted
sentence types in which relative pronouns are deletable in subject position – or
7 There is the possibility that an African source may also be involved. Yoruba, for instance,
has both fi and fún (final nasals in Yoruba orthography mean that the preceding vowel is
nasalized, and do not indicate the presence of a nasal consonant). Both verbs have a number
of functions, but perhaps the most relevant for creoles are those found in sentences like ó fi
owó náà fún mi, lit. ‘He take money the give me’, or ‘He gave me the money’. The similarity
to creole instrumentals is obvious, but if Yoruba fi is the source for JC fi, the shift in meaning
is baffling. Fún is puzzling in a slightly different way. Rowlands (1969) notes that “Bilingual
Yorubas tend to use fún rather indiscriminately to translate ‘for’”, making a joint source for
GC fu, SR foe (phonetically /fu/) sound very plausible. Also many creoles use verbs meaning
‘give’ to introduce dative and/or benefactive cases (e.g., HC bay, ST da, etc.). But if SR foe is
derived from Yoruba fún, why did SR select gi (from Eng. give) to mark oblique cases and use
foe as a complementizer? Moreover, HCE uses fo as a complementizer without the benefit of
any Yoruba model, and French and Portuguese creoles turn Fr. pour ‘for’ and Pg. para ‘for’
into complementizers even though no one, to my knowledge, has suggested any verb with the
form pu or pa in Yoruba or any West African language that could have served as a model. The
question is by no means closed, however; it merely underlines the fact that we need to know a
lot more both about different West African grammars and about what African languages were
spoken in which creole areas.
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rather, more probably, were never inserted. In GC, for instance, this can happen
when the head-noun of the relative clause is the object of the higher sentence and
when the main verb of that sentence is an equivalent of have or be (the regular
GC relative pronoun is we):
(39) wan a dem a di man bin get di bam
‘One of them was the man who had the bomb’
(40) shi get wan grandaata bina main
‘She had a grand-daughter who was being looked after (by her)’
Corne (1977: 38) gives some examples of relative clauses in SC where, also, the





































‘They see the poor driver who is still waiting’
Again, although in general the Portuguese creoles of the Bight of Benin have














‘My mother likes the children who are good’
Thus, although there is no proof that creoles started without relative pronouns,
the possibility cannot be ruled out. Moreover, as we shall see later, a rather indi-
rect argument based on grammatical simplicity points in the same direction.
From what we have already seen of movement rules, we would not expect
to find much similarity in the area of subject-copying. This, at least initially;
is some kind of focusing device, and we saw that other creoles have means for
focusing which employ other features. However, there are at least two creoles,
Crioulo (CR) and SC, which have a form i that characteristically occurs between
subject and predicate, but is also the third person singular subject pronoun in
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both cases. Clearly, whatever function this form may originally have had, it has
now become obligatory in certain contexts; for instance, it serves tomark present





























I shall not explore themeanings and functions of this particle sinceWilson (1962),
practically the only source for CR, does not provide adequate data, while at the
other extreme, Corne (1974–1975 and 1977) presents masses of data on the SC
form and shows that its complexities will not yield easily to analysis. In any
case, the principal point that was made with regard to HCE was not specifically
to do with either relativization or subject-copying.
We saw in Chapter 1 that when the subject of the higher clause is also subject
of the relative clause, the subject-copy pronoun follows the relative clause rather
than the subject noun, although elsewhere it directly follows the subject noun
– as i does in (46), for example. Now, in both CR and SC, in other words in the
only two creoles in which we could look for an analogue of the HCE structure
(since they are the only ones with anything like a subject copy), we find that in
subject-subject relative-clause sentences, i follows the relative clause and not the
noun subject, i.e., it also obeys the A-over-A principle or its equivalent (examples












































‘The only farmer that I can go and fool is just that old man’
Moreover, these are not the only cases where the A-over-A principle applies to
creoles: the placement of HC articles in relative clause sentences is also affected.
Normally, the HC definite article la immediately follows the noun: chwal-la ‘the
horse’, kaptên-na ‘the captain’. However, if the noun is head-noun of a relative
clause, the definite article follows that clause, i.e., it is adjoined to the higher




























‘He was sending the horses to replace the one which had died’
We have now surveyed the five areas which were discussed in Chapter 1 and
found that in three of them (articles, TMAmarkers, and realized/unrealized com-
plements) the “innovations” made by the original speakers of HCEwere identical
with the equivalent forms and meanings in all or most creoles, while in the re-
maining two there were broad, general similarities along with some differences
in detail. It is worth noting that the similarities are most striking where a combi-
nation of semantic and syntactic factors interact; where purely syntactic rules
are involved, as with movement rules and relativization, there is a lesser degree
of identity. Why this should be so will be explained in Chapter 4, fn. 15.
I shall now, much more briefly, indicate some other areas in which strong cre-
ole resemblances can be found, before proceeding to a more thorough analysis




In creoles generally, nondefinite subjects as well as nondefinite VP constituents
must be negated, as well as the verb, in negative sentences. Examples are from
GC and Papia Kristang (PK):
(52) non dag na bait non kyat









‘Nothing has any value’
Sentences of this kind do occur occasionally in HCE, e.g.:
(54) nowan no kaen bit diz gaiz
‘No one can beat these guys’
However, while negated VP constituents are common, negated subjects with neg-
ative verb are rare, perhaps because of persecution in the schools.
Existential and possessive
Over a wide range of creoles, the same lexical item is used to express existentials
(“there is”) and possessives (“have”), even though this is not true of any of the
superstrates (it may be true of some substandard Portuguese dialects of Brazil,
but these may well be decreolized remains of an earlier creole). Examples are
from GC, HC, PP, and São Tomense (ST), respectively:
(55) dem get wan uman we get gyal-pikni















































‘There is a woman who has a daughter’
HCE follows an identical pattern:
(59) get wan wahini shi get wan data
‘There is a woman who has a daughter’
We will refer to this area again in Chapter 4.
Copula
Practically all creoles show some similarities in this area. Adjectives are surface
verbs in creoles (see next section) and therefore require no copula. Locatives are
introduced by verbs which normally are limited to that role, i.e., do not extend to
existential or prenominal environments. A split occurs over treatment of nominal
complements: the more heavily superstrate-influenced creoles (HCE, the Indian
Ocean creoles, some Asian Portuguese creoles) tend to have zero copulas here
also, although in some (SC, CR) the i form appears here as a predicate marker;
the less heavily superstrate-influenced creoles of the Caribbean generally have a
distinct verb in these environments.
There areminor exceptions to these generalizations. GC locative de can express
existentials, which HCE stei, for example, cannot:
(60) wok na de
‘There isn’t any work’
(61) * wok no stei
(62) nomo wok
‘There isn’t any work’
HCE and SC have negative existentials – nomo and napa – a feature found in few
if any other creoles which, in the HCE case at least, represents an inheritance
from the antecedent pidgin. The locative ye in HC appears only sentence-finally,
i.e., where it is stressed, which, together with its phonetic shape, suggests that it
disappeared from medial position through phonological reduction processes.
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Although some of these differences may arise from pidgin retentions or post-
creolization changes, it would seem that the copula area is only moderately spec-
ified. There is a general tendency toward semantic transparency, i.e., having
separate forms for each semantically distinct copula function (attribution, with
adjectives; equation or classmembership, with predicate nominals; locative, with
adverbials of place). However, since these semantic distinctions are unambigu-
ously marked by predicate type, to mark them a second time with distinctive
copulas may seem redundant, and perhaps this accounts for copula variability
within individual creoles as well as across the class.
Adjectives as verbs
In a number of creoles (e.g., JC, Bailey 1966; GC, Bickerton 1973b) the adjective
has been analyzed as forming a subcategory of stative verbs. Evidence from GC





(65) i a wok
‘He is working’
(66) ia wiiri
‘He is getting tired’
(67) au i wok!
‘How he works!’
(68) au i wiiri!
‘How tired he is!’
(69) a wok i wok
‘Work, that’s what he did’
(70) a wiiri i wiiri
‘Tired, that’s what he is’
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Note that though syntactic rules apply identically, semantic interpretation is of-
ten different in the two cases.8
Originally, all writers on the Indian Ocean creoles who dealt with this area
(Baker 1972; Corne 1973; 1977; Papen 1975; 1978; Bollée 1977; etc.) treated verbs
and adjectives as distinct classes and posited an underlying copula before pred-
icate adjectives, which was subsequently deleted. However, in an insightful ar-
ticle, Corne (1981) renounces his former analysis and sets up a class of “Verbals,”
which would contain predicate adjectives as well as verbs and which would not
require a copula in underlying structure; these “verbals” would then undergo at
least some (Corne seems hesitant to push his argument too hard) of the processes
which verbs undergo. It is worth noting that some of the evidence Corne surveys
bears a striking resemblance to that found in GC, in particular the “inchoative”
meaning of the nonpunctual marker pe when applied to adjectives, as compared
to the meaning of the GC nonpunctual marker a when similarly acquired; com-







‘He is getting sick’
(72) li pe â-koler
‘He is getting angry’
(73) mô pe lafê
‘I am getting hungry’
This resemblance between creoles so widely separated in location and origin is
quite striking. Moreover, I know of no creole where an alternative analysis of
adjectives would be required. HCE, not surprisingly, has a similar “inchoative”
sense when nonpunctual and adjective are conjoined:
(74) ho, ai stei wail wid da meksikan gai
‘Wow, I was getting mad at the Mexican guy’
8 Both Christie (1976) for LAC and Corne (1981) for SC propose a tripartite division of verbs into
Action, State, and Process. As far as I can tell (neither treatment is particularly rigorous), this
proposal arises from a confusion of syntactic ruleswith semantic interpretation. For instance, it
is not syntactic rules that (normally) bar co-occurrence between stative verbs and nonpunctual
markers, as is shown in the discussion of the sentence i bina waan fu no in Bickerton (1975: 38),




No creole shows any difference in syntactic structure between questions and
statements. Question-particles, where they occur, are sentence-final and op-
tional:
(75) Guyanese Creole
i bai di eg-dem
‘He bought the eggs’
(76) Guyanese Creole
i bai di eg-dem?










‘They wouldn’t have wanted to take me to his house’
(78) Haitian Creole
yo pa-t-a-vlé mênê-m lakay-li?
‘Wouldn’t they have wanted to take me to his house?’
Question words
In WH-questions, the question-word is directly preposed to the declarative form
of the sentence. The question-words themselves, if not clearly adapted from their
superstrate equivalents, are always composed in the following manner: they are
bimorphemic; the first morpheme is derived from a superstrate question-word –
English creole we, wi, or wa from Eng. which or what, French creole ki from Fr.






































‘Where did he put the maize?’
Other forms in English creoles include Cameroons Creolewetin, lit., ‘what thing’,
‘what’; GC wa mek, lit., ‘what makes’, ‘why’.
Very often a creole has doublets, a superstrate adaptation and a bimorphemic
creole form. Papen (1978: 509) gives the following sets for SC and RC:
(82) where = (i) (a)kot(e) (Fr. à côté de ‘at’)
(ii) ki ladrua (Fr. *qui l’endroit), ‘Which place?’
ki bor (Fr. *qui bord), ‘Which edge?’
(83) how = (i) koma (Fr. comment ‘how’)
(ii) ki maner (Fr. *qui manière), ‘What way?’
(84) why = (i) (l)akoz ki (Fr. la cause que ‘the reason that’)
(ii) ki fer (Fr. *qui faire), ‘What makes?’
(85) when = (i) ka (Fr. quand ‘when’)
(ii) ki ler (Fr. *qui l’heure), ‘What hour?’
Papen does not state whether, in his estimation, one set is older or more creole
than the other (failure to make any serious attempt to sort variants is a grave
weakness in the otherwise thorough work done recently on Indian Ocean cre-
oles), but we can be reasonably certain that the periphrastic forms represent the
original creole; if the quasi-French forms existed already, why should others have
been invented?
Since HPE speakers acquired the full set of English question-words except for
why (HPE wasamata, lit., ‘What’s the matter?’, which seems not to have been
passed on to HCE), HCE was never required to develop a bimorphemic set. How-
ever, the similarities above are so close that we can predict that any creole which





Passive constructions in creoles are extremely rare, and those that exist (the
wordu and ser passives in PP, cf. Markey & Fodale 1980; the gay passive in MC
and SC, cf. Corne 1977; and the get passive in GC) are either marginal to the lan-
guage or relatively recent superstrate borrowings, or both. The general pattern
of creoles is described by Markey & Fodale (1980) as “rampant lexical diathesis”;
for any V-transitive, N V N will be interpreted as “actor-action-patient,” while
any N V will be interpreted as “patient-action”:
(86) Guyanese Creole
dem a ponish abi
‘They are making us suffer’
(87) Guyanese Creole
abi a ponish
‘We are suffering/being made to suffer’
(88) Jamaican Creole
dem plaan di tri
‘They planted the tree’
(89) Jamaican Creole
di tri plaan
‘The tree was planted’
(90) Hawaiian Creole English
dei wen teik foa bead
‘They took four boards’
(91) Hawaiian Creole English
foa boad wen teik
‘Four boards were taken’
We shall return to structures of this type in Chapter 3.
We have now surveyed seven areas of the grammar in addition to the five al-
ready examined in greater depth. Of those seven, HCE shows substantial identity
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with all other creoles in four (existential/possessive, adjective as verb, questions,
and passive equivalents); substantial identity with a number of other creoles in
one (copula); and little similarity in two (negation, question-words). Thus, out of
the twelve areas, HCE is identical with all or with a large percentage of creoles
in eight, shows a fair degree of similarity in two, and differs sharply in two, one
of which (negation) may well have followed the regular creole pattern before
decreolization set in.
This degree of identity is quite remarkable when we consider that HCE shares
none of the substratum languages of the other creoles – except that a superstrate
language for some creoles was a substrate language in HCE, i.e., Portuguese!
However, there is nothing in the grammar of HCE except perhaps stei as locative
that one can point to as having stemmed from Portuguese influence. The only
thing HCE seems to have in common with other creoles (apart from the similar
social conditions that gave birth to them) is that all have European superstrates,
a fact which has been used to caution creolists against premature universalist
claims (Reinecke 1977).9 However, since practically all the common features of
creoles are not only not shared by, but run dead counter to the structural ten-
dencies of, Western European languages (the latter have well-established single
copulas, well-established passives, use subject-verb or subject-auxiliary inver-
sion in questions, etc.), no one could invoke this shared ancestry to explain cre-
ole similarities unless he were to propose that creoles, like naughty children, do
everything the opposite of what their parents tell them to do!
However, an earlier work of mine (Bickerton 1974) that was limited to a dis-
cussion of TMA systems has been the subject of a number of criticisms, several
to the effect that there were a number of exceptions to the generalizations made
therein. I shall therefore deal with the issues raised in the most cogent and ex-
tensive of these criticisms, namely, Muysken (1981), before going on to show that
all the genuine divergences from the classic TMA pattern can be accounted for
9 A problem not faced by those who call for the examination of non-European creoles is that
it is far from clear that there are any. The only languages without a European superstrate
which might qualify under the conditions specified in Chapter 1, above, are Ki-Nubi and Juba
Arabic. Although the data that have emerged on these languages so far are scanty and unclear
(and for this reason I have refrained from citing them in the present volume), most of what is
available suggests that they follow the creole pattern described here. But even these languages
do not have a third condition which may be necessary to qualify for true creolehood: their
populations were not, in general, displaced from their native homelands. It is a historical fact
that it was only Europeans who uprooted people from their cultures and carried them across
thousands of miles of ocean in order to exploit them; therefore, it is only in European colonies
that one would expect to find the massive disruption of normal language continuity which
would permit the emergence of innate faculties.
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by the impingement on that pattern of three factors. Two of these factors are
quite extraneous and have already been discussed: influence of the antecedent
pidgin and language change. A third will have to wait until Chapter 4 for a full
explanation; for the time being, let us call it “indeterminacy in semantic space.”
Muysken challenges my analysis of creole TMA systems by evidence drawn
from six languages: Papiamentu, Negerhollands, Senegal Kriol, Seychellois, Tok
Pisin, and São Tomense. Data from two of these are quite irrelevant to the issues
involved. Tok Pisin has already been ruled as having arisen under circumstances
so vastly different from those of the classic creoles that the fact that it is now
some people’s native language – hence, nominally a creole – has no bearing
on the present discussion. Senegal Kriol is described by Muysken himself as an
“inter-tribal lingua franca which may have had native speakers in the past and
which has some recent ones now in urban areas”; since he himself is forced to
admit that this checkered history may have “given it a very marked, deviant
character,” one wonders why he should have bothered to present data from it.
Negerhollands is, or rather was, a genuine creole in the terms of this study,
but there are at least two reasons why evidence drawn from it cannot stand up
against evidence from languages which are still vital. First, the language is dead;
one has to rely entirely on printed sources. This may not present a genuine ob-
stacle to the writing of grammars of classical languages, but the case of creoles is
quite different. If one takes the text of a Hittite law or a Sanskrit prayer, one can
be reasonably certain that it was written by a native speaker; if one takes any text
of Negerhollands, one can be certain that it was not written by a native speaker.
As with virtually all other creoles, texts – whether they take the form of fact or
fiction, catechism or simulated dialogue – were written by Europeans, with all
the biases of their time and without any special linguistic skills or training. Many
of the texts were written by missionaries, who are notorious for producing Eu-
ropeanized varieties of pidgins and creoles wherever they go (Voorhoeve 1971).
This is not to say that a European, even a European missionary, could not on
occasion accurately represent a creole. The problem is knowing when a creole is
being accurately represented.
For example, there is one excellent literary source for GC: Quow (1877). It is
too excellent, if anything, because it gives several stylistic levels without the facts
that might enable one to sort them out. There are also a number of other sources,
of widely varying quality. If I had had to write a GC grammar from written
sources only, there is no way that I could have learned to preferQuowwhenever
he is in conflict with other evidence; that knowledge came from having four
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years of unrestricted access to native speakers.10 Consequently, my work would
have seriously misrepresented the language.
The second reason against using Negerhollands as evidence for any general
creole tendency is that although languages, like people, die, they do not, like
some people, drop dead. On the contrary, like Charles ii, they are an uncon-
scionable time a-dying, and since we know that in language death languages
become severely distorted, but do not know at what time the process started,
there is no way in which we can be certain what any text represents – whether
the full flush of the language, the early onset of decrepitude, or the final phases of
decay, in which key forms are lost or, worse, replaced by forms from competing
languages and dialects. For these reasons, we can dismiss the third of Muysken’s
six languages.
This leaves PP, SC, and ST. Muysken does not state where he acquired the
data from São Tomense. To the best of my knowledge, there are only two recent
descriptions of the ST TMA system – Valkoff 1966 and Ferraz 1979 – although
perhaps one should say that there are three, since Valkoff gives two different
ones in the same chapter. His account is a somewhat tortuous one, and the exact
status of these two descriptions is far from clear; he seems to suggest that the first
is in some sense hypothetical, though whether intended as a reconstruction of
some earlier phase of ST, or of proto-Bight-of-Benin, is far from clear. Be that as
it may, one of the two forms he specifically stars as hypothetical turns up as real
in Muysken’s account, while four forms that appear in his second description do
not appear in the first. Ferraz mentions Valkoff’s work but does not discuss it;
nor does he explain why, or even note, that his own account differs substantively
from either of Valkoff’s. Finally, Muysken’s account bears scant resemblance to
any of the previous three.
In Table 2.1, the various auxiliaries and combinations of auxiliaries claimed to
occur in ST are arranged along the horizontal axis, and the four accounts (V1 and
V2, Valkoff 1966; F, Ferraz 1979; M, Muysken 1981) along the vertical. Pluses and
minuses have the same values as in distinctive feature tables.
In addition, Muysken’s account suggests four more forms (tava ka te, tava ka
bi, sa ka te, and sa ka bi) which are not attested anywhere else, although to do him
justice this impression may merely result from a faulty formalism. Even making
allowances for this, he attests four forms that the other sources do not attest, and
he fails to attest two that both the other writers attest, as Table 2.1 shows.
10 However, anyone wishing to use Quow as a historical source should be warned that the above
remarks apply only to his rendering of basilectal speakers. Like many whites, he did not feel
threatened by illiterate blacks, and could therefore treat them objectively; but he did feel threat-




Table 2.1: Four accounts of the ST TMA system
ka tava ta ska kia te sa bi za
V1 + – + + – – + – –
V2 + + – + + – – – +
F + + – + + – – – –
M + + – – – + + + –
tava ka ta ka sa ka te di ka bi ka te
V1 – + – + + –
V2 + – – + + –
F + – – – – –
M + – + – + +
If this picture seems confused, the reader had better not even attempt to follow
the names which the various tenses, modes, and aspects are given by these three
authors. I shall give a single example. The names of the ka + V form are given,
respectively, as: incompletive aorist, Valkoff1; habitual, Valkoff2; aorist, Ferraz;
incompletive, Muysken. This pattern is followed throughout. If a tense, mode, or
aspect is mentioned in two accounts, it has two names; if in three, three names;
if in four, four names. Sometimes the differences in name merely disguise the
semantic similarities of the accounts; sometimes they mark real conflicts; some-
times it is impossible to tell. In one case where there is a dear similarity between
Valkoff’s and Ferraz’s accounts, Muysken is clearly wrong. Valkoff calls tava + V
“completive in the past”, Ferraz calls it “pluperfect”, but it is obvious from their ex-
ample sentences that whatever it is (and it looks like the anterior of the present
analysis), it is not a simple past – which is what Muysken says it is. Here, of
course, the evidence of Ferraz and Valkoff suports the position that Muysken is
attacking.
Muysken’s analysis is supported by two example sentences. The original form
of the analysis he is attempting to undermine, in Bickerton (1975: Chapter 2),
is supported by ninety-eight example sentences. Further comment should be
superfluous. Until someone is prepared to devote to the analysis of the ST system
at least a fraction of the amount of careful work that went into the analysis of




The two remaining systems, those of PP and SC, have TMA systems too widely
known to undergo much distortion, although even here Muysken’s account is
unsatisfactory in several respects. However, since the features of these and other
systems which differ from my predictions have been mentioned by other writers
(see Hill 1979), I shall not comment further on Muysken’s particular analysis,
although I shall return to some broader aspects of his paper in Chapter 4.
The major and, if we were to eliminate sloppy scholarship, perhaps the only
deviations from the regular creole TMA system are the following:
(A) The presence in Crioulo of an anterior marker, ba, that follows rather than
precedes the main verb.
(B) The presence in Papiamentu of an irrealis marker, lo, that may occur before
rather than after the subject.
(C) The presence in certain creoles (e.g., Papiamentu, Palenquero, Papia Kris-
tang, and Negerhollands) of tense markers that look more like +past than
+anterior.
(D) The presence in Indian Ocean creoles of two markers, ti and (fi)n, which
compete for some kind of pastness, and two markers, pu and a(va), which
compete for some kind of irrealis.
(E) Themerging of iteratives/habitualswith either punctuals or irrealis, claimed
to occur in a number of creoles (cf. Taylor 1971), thus reducing the nonpunc-
tual category to no more than a progressive/durative.
The first two deviations involve only syntactic aspects of TMA systems, while
the other three involve semantic aspects. It will be convenient if we take (A) and
(B) together since both arise from the nature of antecedent pidgins.
Alleyne (1979), in arguing against the existence of a pidgin-creole cycle, claims
that no vestiges of pidgins can be found in creoles. This, if true, would be unsur-
prising – as unsurprising as the fact that we find no trace of the caterpillar in
the butterfly, and for similar reasons. In fact, the data now to be surveyed show
some exceptions to the general irrecoverability of pre-creole pidgins.
As is widely known (but see Labov (1990) for explicit discussion), pidgins ex-
press temporal relations by means of sentence adverbs, in clause-external po-
sition, which indicate the temporal sequence of events. HPE has two, baimbai
‘then, later, afterward’, and pau ‘done; already, finished’:
72
Passive equivalents
(92) bambai mi waif hapai, bambai wan lil boi kam
‘Then my wife got pregnant, and later a little boy was born’
(93) pau wrk fraidei, go daun kauai
‘After work on Friday, we went down to Kauai’
Both baimbai and pau can occur clause-finally, although this is much more fre-
quently the case with pau; another speaker might well have begun (93) with
fraidei, hanahana pau … ‘On Friday, when work was over …’.
If creoles were, as they are popularly supposed to be, no more than “expan-
sions” of pidgins, one would expect them to take markers of this kind, transmute
them into obligatory markers of tense, modality, or aspect (the “later” sequence-
marker into a future or irrealis, the “earlier” sequence-marker into a past, ante-
rior, or completive), and incorporate them into an Aux category. But this devel-
opment is the creole exception rather than the creole rule.
When HCE developed out of HPE, neither pau nor baimbai underwent any
change of meaning, nor were they incorporated into Aux. Two quite different
forms, bin and go, were selected to express anterior and irrealis, respectively. Pau
and baimbai are retained as optional, clause-external adverbs, but their frequency
in HCE drops dramatically compared with their frequency in HPE (in the set of
recordings which most accurately reflect basilectal HCE, bin and go occur a total
of 433 times, while pau and baimbai occur a total of 38 times; Bickerton 1977:
Tables 3.1, 3.6, 3.9).
Good data on pidgins are even harder to come by than good data on creoles,
and data of any kind on the antecedent pidgins of any creole but HCE are simply
nonexistent; however, I still think that reconstruction is possible if we make the
simple and reasonable assumption that other pidgins resembled HPE in taking
their “later” marker from some temporal adverb and their “earlier” marker from
some verb with the general meaning of finish (the meaning of pau in Hawaiian).
We can then go on to show that while a majority of creoles decisively rejected
“later” markers, most, if not all, accepted “earlier” markers with a marginal status,
while some, at a later stage, allowed them, more or less grudgingly, to occupy po-
sitions within Aux. This is understandable since, if we are right, “earlier” markers
have a verbal source, while “later” ones have a nonverbal source.
Most creole irrealis markers are derived from verbs or auxiliaries. English cre-
ole go is an obvious case; SR sa is usually (I am not sure if correctly) attributed
to Eng. shall, JC wi to Eng. will. The form that underlies most French creole
irrealis markers is Fr. va ‘(3rd pers. sing.) go’, yielding ava, reduced to a. LAC ke
and ST ka remain mysterious; for the latter, Ferraz (1979) suggests two possible
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sources – Bini ya, an irrealis marker, and Twi ka ‘to be usual’ – while another
possible source is Pg. ficar ‘remain’. Only a few Portuguese creoles show a differ-
ent tendency, e.g., PK logo, derived from the adverbial Pg. logo ‘next, soon’ and
reducible to lo. And lo, as we have seen, is the Papiamentu form which deviates
from the regular model.
Wewill return to lo in amoment. First, let us look at the provenance of ba. Most
creoles have an “earlier” form which is derived from a verb with the meaning
‘finish’; in addition to pau, we find IOC (fi)n from Fr. fini ‘finished (p. part.)’,
English creole don from another past participle, Eng. done, and Portuguese creole
(ka)ba from Pg. acabar ‘finish’ (kaba is found in SR also). Looking over the range
of creoles, it would seem that such markers can have three distinct distributions.
First, they may remain as marginal particles, occurring optionally in clause-
final position. This state is exemplified by SR, in which kaba can only occur
clause-finally and is never incorporated into Aux. The same is true of PP caba.
In basilectal GC, don often occurs clause-finally (cf. Bickerton 1975: Examples
2.65–67).
Second, they may be incorporated into Aux but without its being possible to
combine them with other Aux constituents. This state is exemplified by mesolec-
tal GC don and possibly also JC and other Caribbean don and by HC fin.
Third, they may be incorporated into Aux where they may combine with other
Aux constituents quite freely. This state is exemplified by Krio (KR) don, and IOC
(fi)n, among others.
If we were working with a static-synchronic model, we would have to stop
with this statement. However, since we have to work with a dynamic model in
order to account for creole development, we can next propose that these three
“states” in fact constitute stages in a diachronic development and exemplify a
gradual process of incorporation which is well advanced in some creoles and
has not begun in others. In order to prove that states in different languages
show different stages of the same process, it is desirable to be able to point to
languages in which two stages co-exist synchronically. Basilectal GC has both
postclausal and preverbal don, the latter becoming obligatory in the mesolectal
varieties; thus GC represents the transition between states one and two. Evi-
dence for IOC is conflicting, but by at least some accounts, stages intermediate
between noncombinability and free combinability (states two and three) are to
be found there.
Crioulo ba clearly derives from kaba, which in accordance with its Portuguese
etymon is stressed on the final syllable. Papiamentu lo equally clearly derives
from Pg. logo. We can assume that in Portuguese pre-creole pidgins gener-
74
Passive equivalents
ally logo and kaba were, respectively, the “later” and “earlier” forms that cor-
responded to HPE baimbai and pau. Papiamentu retained both; Crioulo (as far
as we can tell with present, inadequate data) retained only the second; and both
PP lo and CR ba were incorporated semantically into the TMA system (i.e., were
allotted the expected meanings of irrealis and anterior) while remaining syntac-
tically outside it (i.e., retained clause-external position, obligatory in the case of
ba, co-varying with subject type in the case of lo).
It is one thing to show that deviations (A) and (B) (Page 72) could have arisen
from pidgin features; it is quite another to explain why in these two cases, but
not in others, pidgin characteristics should have been able to override creole ones.
However, we can make what is at least a very plausible conjecture.
The only other member of the pidgin-creole family in which pidgin sequence-
markers have graduated to creole auxiliaries is Tok Pisin (TP). Here, “later”-
marker baimbai reduced to bai, acquired irrealis meaning, and is in the process
of being incorporated into the auxiliary by native speakers (Sankoff & Laberge
1974); “earlier”-marker pinis (from Eng. finish) has followed a similar course ex-
cept that it continues to occur only postverbally. I have consistently claimed
that differences between TP and classic creoles would result from differences in
their histories, in particular the period of several generations which TP passed
as a pidgin prior to creolization. Such a period would allow time for the origi-
nal sequence-markers to become firmly established in the language and to take
on more tense-like and modal-like meanings through the operations of natural
change. By the time TP creolized, therefore, it had already developed a complex
auxiliary system, without any of the catastrophic suddenness which, as we saw
in Chapter 1, characterizes true creoles. The first creole generation in TP was
therefore presented with a fait accompli; all it could do was accept the mark-
ers bequeathed to it and carry out some minor cosmetic operations on baimbai,
phonologically reducing it and shifting it to a more “appropriate” position.
The gap between TP and true creoles is not, of course, an absolute one. Some
of the features that distinguish TP (prolonged growth period, sustained bilingual-
ism, etc.) could be shared to a lesser extent with some of the true creoles. In the
case of Crioulo, evidence is flatly contradictory: “Crioulo … has no native speak-
ers” (Alleyne 1979); “Crioulo … [is] the first language of many who are born and
bred in the main towns” (Wilson 1962: vii). A plausible compromise would seem
to be late creolization followed by the persistence of a small native-speaker core
within a wide lingua-franca penumbra. Under such circumstances, a more grad-
ual transition from pidgin to creole, with concomitant retention of more pidgin
features, is certainly a possibility.
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Curaçao, home of Papiamentu, might at first sight look very different from the
Guinea of Crioulo – a Caribbean island where sustained bilingualismwould have
been impossible. However, Curaçao differs frommost Caribbean islands in that it
is extremely dry and infertile. For over a century, before the Dutch seized it, and
indeed to some extent thereafter, it served as a staging post in the slave trade,
a place where slaves were held and seasoned while awaiting transportation to
other points in the Caribbean or Latin America. With a constant turnover in
the population, and transients always heavily outnumbering the minority who
remained, it may well be that a pidgin stage persisted here much longer than it
did elsewhere in the Caribbean, or at least long enough for more pidgin features
to establish themselves. Clearly, in both cases, more historical study is needed,
but the hypothesis of somewhat delayed creolization would both explain the phe-
nomena involved and accord with our present knowledge of social history.
Let us turn now to Deviation C (Page 72), the past versus anterior issue. In the
first place, it must be made clear that GC, SR, and HC were generally claimed to
have past-tense markers, prior to my reanalysis of their TMA systems (see, e.g.,
Hall (1953) for HC, Voorhoeve (1957) for SR, etc.). However, that reanalysis has
not been seriously challenged.11 It seems reasonable, therefore, to suppose that
in a number of other creoles which I did not specifically examine, markers are
still being described as “past” which in reality are +anterior.
Let us examine a language, Seychelles Creole, of which this claim is frequently
made. According to Corne (1977: 102), “the marker ti defines the past, both sim-
ple and habitual”; according to Bollée (1977: 55), “ti expresses the past, definite
or indefinite; it is comparable to the past tense in English”. However, these confi-
dent and sweeping statements are immediately modified by both parties. Corne
observes that “once past time has been established in a given situation, ti is fre-
quently omitted”, especially in narratives “where, after an initial use (or uses) of
ti, much of the remainder of the story may be told with verb forms unmarked for
Past (i.e., as a sort of “historical present”)”. This “historical present” also crops up
in Bollée’s second thoughts. While, according to her, the zero or stem form of the
verb “has the value of the French present tense” – the reader will note the Euro-
11 There have been some nonserious nonchallenges, of course. Christie (1976) produced an anal-
ysis of LAC which showed it to be not far short of identity with GC but insisted on preserv-
ing traditional terms, obvious though it was that these did not fit (getting the distribution of
anterior correct and then calling it past is, to me at least, a quite incomprehensible maneu-
ver). Seuren (1980) endorsed the analysis of Voorhoeve (1957), shown in Bickerton (1975) to be
internally incoherent, and neatly avoided having to consider the latter analysis by calling it
“sociolinguistic” [sic!]. But no one has systematically attempted to criticize my analyses of GC,
SR, HC, and HCE, for the obvious reasons.
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centrism that unites these accounts – it also expresses the “historical present”
which is “above all others the narrative tense … . After a brief introduction in
the past, the rest of the story is told in the present.” However, she immediately
adds a second thought: “The above is not quite correct; the past often reappears
at the opening of a new paragraph.”
Accounts of this nature inevitably arouse one’s suspicions, especially as the
First Law of Creole Studies states: “Every creolist’s analysis can be directly con-
tradicted by that creolist’s own texts and citations.” To demonstrate this law, I
will analyze the middle portion of the second paragraph of the story Sabotaz at























































































‘The Bureau of Information received a letter from France, sent by
someone called Mr. Lezen, who was thirty years old, and who wanted
to obtain a portrait of a Seychellois girl … . But as the agent knew Mr.
and Mrs. Lamur well … he took into consideration …’
Here, as in many other places in Bollée’s texts, the narrative switches from
“historical present” into “past” and back again, right in mid-paragraph. Even
Bollée’s final disclaimer, therefore, will not work here. What is the explanation?
The alert reader will perhaps have noticed that the “historical present” verbs
that immediately precede and follow the switch into “past” are both nonstatives
– resevwar ‘receive’, gaj(e) ‘obtain, take’ – while the three verbs marked with
ti are all statives – ana ‘have’, ule ‘want’, and kone ‘know’. If we refer back to
the story openings that both Corne and Bollée mention, we find that the verbs
marked there by ti are also statives. Folktales almost invariably begin with one
or several of these: “Once upon a time therewas a girl … she was called such and
such … she had two sisters …” It is this simple coincidence that has given rise to
the hard-dying creole myth about “narrative tenses” and “historical presents”.
In fact, in systems which have the feature anterior, past-reference nonstatives
are unmarked, while past-reference statives receive anterior marking (see Bicker-
ton (1975: Chapter 2) for an explanation of why this is so). Thus, the distribution
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of ti and zero in SC texts follows exactly the same rule of anterior marking that
affects stative and nonstative pasts in GC, HC, SR, etc. Bollée and Corne cannot
be blamed too heavily for this faulty analysis since SC is not a pure anterior sys-
tem but one which underwent certain changes when the completive (fi)n was
incorporated into Aux and permitted to combine with other markers. We shall
see the consequences of this when we return to SC in the discussion of Deviation
D.
However, there are creoles in which the presence of the category past cannot
be attributed to faulty analyses. Papiamentu is perhaps the best attested of these
so, pending adequate data on the few creoles that seem to resemble it, we may
take the PP model as typical. I propose to claim that wherever this deviance is
attested, it is the result of either heavy superstrate influence on the pidgin stage,
or (more probable in the majority of cases) subsequent decreolization.
In the first place, in both HCE and GC, where decreolization phenomena are
clear and well understood, the shift from anterior marking to past marking rep-
resents one of the earliest superstrate-influenced changes (Bickerton 1975; 1977).
Even in Sranan, no longer in contact with its superstrate, a similar change is tak-
ing place at least among literate Sranan-Dutch bilinguals as can be seen if we
compare the most recent texts with earlier ones in, e.g., Voorhoeve & Lichtveld
(1976).
However, a problem arises in the case of languages for which, unlike GC or
SR, no prior anterior stage is attested. Can we reconstruct such a stage from
synchronic evidence?
There is a good likelihood that we can. In Bickerton (1980) I showed that we
could differentiate between decreolization stages and natural changes: the former
changed forms first and functions later; while the latter preserved old forms and
gave them new functions. If the changes in PP are due to decreolization, and if
there was an original anterior marker, then it follows that whatever is the past
marker now could not have been the anterior marker then; in decreolization,
instead of the originalmarker changing its function, a newmarker is first adopted
alongside of it, originally with an identical meaning (did alongside GC bin, wen
alongside HCE bin), and then gradually changes its meaning to +past while the
original anterior marker disappears or, if we are lucky, remains fossilized in some
social or grammatical corner of the language. So, if we are both correct and lucky,
we should be able to find in PP both a synchronic past marker and some vestige
of the original anterior marker it displaced.
The PP past marker is a, presumably cognate with PQ a, PK ya – all of which
most probably derive from Pg. ja ‘already’. Adverbs, as we have seen, are not a
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good source for creole TMA markers. Anterior markers are most often recruited
from a past copula form: Fr. été yielding French creole ti, te, etc.; Eng. been yield-
ing English creole bin, ben, etc.; and Pg. estava yielding ST (and other Bight-of-
Benin creole) tava. Tava/taba is therefore what one would predict as an anterior
marker in the original stage of any Portuguese creole.
Taha is of course well attested for PP, and its distribution is most interesting.
Unlike other auxiliaries, it cannot occur alone before a verb, but only in conjunc-
tion with nonpunctual ta:
(95) * mi taba lesa
(96) mi a lesa
‘I read (past)’
(97) mi ta lesa
‘I am reading’
(98) mi tabata lesa
‘I was reading’
The fusion of taba and ta clearly recalls GC bina, of similar meaning and origin
(i.e., the conjunction of anterior and nonpunctual attested, I believe, for every
creole without exception). If a had formed part of the original set of auxiliaries,
whether with past or anterior meaning, we would have expected to find the form
*ata for past-progressive sentences such as (98).
We may therefore propose the following scenario for Papiamentu. Originally,
it had taba anterior and ta nonpunctual, permitting the formation of tabata (it is
hard to think of any other way in which this form could have been derived). De-
creolization then began, via contact between PP and the Spanish of the Venezue-
lan mainland only a few miles away. Spanish ya could have been the model as
easily as Pg. ja; indeed, for PP-Spanish bilinguals, ya and ha, the Spanish 3rd per-
son perfective marker, could have easily reinforced one another to merge in a.
The result of borrowing a as a past marker would have been to bring Papiamentu,
phonologically as well as semantically, more in line with its prestigious neighbor.
But by the time a entered the language, tabata would already have come to be
perceived as a single unit (as its modern orthography suggests) and would thus
have survived the subsequent disappearance of taba. Similarly, ti pe, an SC form
of comparable meaning, was retained even when some anterior functions of ti
were taken over by (fi)n.
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A further argument for an original anterior-nonanterior distinction in Papia-
mentu comes from the synchronic distribution of zero forms. For example, Goilo
(1953: 107) observes that stem forms express the present indicative for verbs such
as gusta ‘like’, quier ‘love’, jama ‘be called’, etc. – i.e., statives – while all other
verbs form the same tense with ta. It should be made quite clear that this is
not a parallel to the English habitual-progressive distinction. In English, we can
have I write as well as I want, and there exists the opposition I write/I am writing.
Papiamentu presents quite a different picture:
(99) mi quier esaquinan
‘I want these’
(100) * mi ta quier esaquinan
(101) * mi skirbi buki
(102) mi ta skirbi buki
‘I write books/am writing a book’
If Papiamentu started life with a simple past-present opposition, expressed by
a versus ta, then the fact that statives in the present cannot take ta, while non-
statives must, becomes merely a mysterious anomaly. However, if it began with
an anterior-nonanterior opposition, the fact is well motivated. In all such sys-
tems, present-reference statives are unmarked (since by definition they cannot
take nonpunctual marking), and present-reference nonstatives are obligatorily
marked with the nonpunctual morpheme (since any event or action that is ongo-
ing in the present must be either durative or part of a series, whereas, conversely,
any punctual event or action must be over, i.e., in the past, by the time it can be
referred to!). The distribution of zeros and nonpunctuals in PP is identical to that
of synchronic SR or basilectal GC, except for one thing: in the latter, past punctu-
als, as well as present statives, are zero-marked (again, Bickerton (1975: Chapter
2) explains why this should be so). In Papiamentu, a has moved in to fill the “vac-
uum” created by zero-marked past-reference nonstatives, thereby bringing the
PP TMA system closer to European models, but, again, as with tabata, leaving
clear traces of the more creole system that must have existed at an earlier stage.12
12 It is perhaps worth observing that no account of Papiamentu that I know of translates I had
worked, so that the PP TMA system may not, in fact, differ as much from the classic system as
those accountsmight suggest. In general, not only aremost analyses of TMA systems incorrect,
nine out of ten of them are simply incomplete, lacking the critical information which would
make it possible to determine how they work. Yet, since these defective analyses buttress
Euro-centric prejudices, they are hardly ever questioned, let alone criticized.
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We can now turn to Deviation D: the fact that MC and SC contain both ti and
(fi)n, a and pu.
First, I shall have to comment on the state-of-the-art in Indian Ocean creoles.
In MC and SC, and a fortiori in Réunion Creole, that state is perhaps best exem-
plified by the following pessimistic remarks of Corne (1977: 94–95):
A close study of SC preverbal markers has been made by Bollée, by Papen
and by myself, and the results of our efforts do not always coincide … .
The sociolinguistic background of our informants is to some extent differ-
ent, and this alone is quite possibly the source of conflicting data. It seems
likely that some speakers categorise given markers differently from other
speakers.
Methods which make it possible, without invoking extralinguistic data, to sys-
tematically order and account for all variations in such systems were publicly
presented by DeCamp in 1968 (DeCamp 1971), refined and extended by C.-J. Bai-
ley (1973, etc.), and applied to the analysis of a seemingly far worse preverbal
chaos in Bickerton (1975), after they had been proven effective in a number of
other areas where creoles showed similar variation (Bickerton 1971; 1973a,b, etc.).
The bibliographies of Baker, Bollée, Corne, and other IOC scholars (Carayol &
Chaudenson 1977 is a distinguished exception) betray no awareness of any of
this work, which I suppose merely reflects the parochialism that afflicts the field.
Given this methodological time lag, anything one says about IOC TMA systems
must be treated as provisional.
Combinations of markers form the liveliest areas of dispute. According to
Baker (1972) and Valdman (1980), (fi)n will combine only with ti in MC; accord-
ing to Moorghen (1975), it will also combine with a and pu. According to Bollée
(1977), (fi)nwill combine with a and pu in SC, but not with pe; according to Corne
(1977), n pe combinations are found, in addition to the others.
A dynamic analysis can easily reconcile all these apparent contradictions. It
was suggested earlier that between the second stage of (fi)n incorporation –
movement into Aux – and the third stage of (fi)n incorporation – free combinabil-
ity with other preverbal markers – we would expect to find intermediate stages,
and the data in the previous paragraph suggest just such stages, preserved syn-
chronically in the Indian Ocean population either by different groups, or at dif-
ferent stylistic levels, or both. If those data are correct, it would appear that the
combinability of (fi)n began with ti in SC, spread to MC, while in SC it extended
also to pu and a, and (for at least some speakers) spread to pu and a in MC while
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it was extending to pe in SC – a classic demonstration of Baileyan wave theory.13
This proposal is made all the more plausible by the fact that combinability pro-
ceeds from tense, the leftmost Aux constituent, to modal, the second leftmost,
to aspect, the rightmost (which, perhaps coincidentally, perhaps not, is a con-
junction of two members of the same class, (fi)n being a completive, therefore
aspectual, and therefore, initially perhaps, being in the same slot as pe and thus
barred from co-occurring with it).
We are now almost ready to consider what would have been the repercussions
of an invasion by (fi)n of a classic creole system. First, however, we must note a
particular characteristic of TMA systems which, though seemingly obvious, has
been ignored by virtually all work up to and including Comrie’s (1976) influential
study of aspect. Meillet’s famous observation that “language is a system in which
everything keeps its place” has the corollary that if a new element intrudes, ev-
erything must shift its place somewhat; while the latter statement may not be
true of languages considered as wholes, it is certainly true for tight little gram-
matical subsystems like those of TMA. A TMA system may be compared to a
cake, a cake that is always the same size, for TMA systems, whether simple or
complex, all have to cover the same semantic area: every verb has to have some
tense, mood, aspect, or combination of these applied to it, for there are (pace
some creolists) no such things as “TMA-neutral” sentences.
But a cake may be split up into five, or eight, or ten slices, just as a TMA sys-
tem can divide its semantic area among five, or eight, or ten TMAmarkers and/or
combinations of markers. If a cake is divided into five slices, while another iden-
tical to it is divided into eight slices, there is no way in which each of the slices
in Cake A can contain exactly the same amount of material as each of the slices
in Cake B. In other words, how much, and exactly what, is contained in each
slice will be largely determined by the number of slices. This is exactly the state
13 When I wrote this paragraph, I was quite unaware that Baker had produced an extremely
interesting account of the historical development of MC, based in part on an analysis of all
currently known historical citations (Baker 1976), which provides a striking piece of indepen-
dent support for this analysis. While fini is recorded as a preverbal marker in 1780, ti is not
recorded until 1818; but the ti va combination is recorded in 1828, while the ti fin combina-
tion is not recorded until 1867! Granted that these dates are probably all late – nonstandard
speech phenomena tend to have a long and lively life before they tickle the bourgeoisie, cf.
olelo pa’i’ai (see Chapter 1) which blushed unseen in Hawaii for nearly a century – there is no
need to doubt that their order and spacing are substantially correct. Baker seems not to realize,
however, that the 1780 source derives, on both internal and external evidence, from a pidgin
and not a creole speaker.
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of affairs in TMA systems throughout language; what each marker of modality,
tense, or aspect means will be largely determined by howmany markers of these
things there are in the system and by what each of the others mean. Facts such
as these are, however, ignored by most scholars in the field, who strive to fit all
phenomena into the same conceptual straitjacket, and who, when this fails, as
fail it must, then seek, like Comrie, some kind of ideal type of the “Progressive”
or the “Perfective”.
The main point to be grasped here is that if you mark out a cake to be cut
into n slices, then change your mind and decide to cut n + 1, you can only get
your extra slice at the expense of one or more of the originals. Thus, if (fi)n were
introduced as a ninth term into the classic eight-term creole system, it could
only be accommodated by robbing the semantic domain of one or more existing
markers.
Since (fi)n conjoined first with ti, it is not surprising that ti was its main victim.
Admittedly, ti held its ground with statives, as we saw in (94),14 and in the non-
punctual ti pe structure; the picture with punctual nonstatives is more complex.
To clarify it, we need to refine the concept of anterior, which we can provision-
ally define as “prior to the current focus of discourse”. But current focus may
be explicit (where the times of an earlier and later event are directly contrasted),
or implicit (where the relationship between the earlier and later events is sim-
ply assumed), or there may be nothing prior to current focus. The situation will
become clearer with the following examples:
(103) Current focus, nothing prior:
a. English
Bill has come/came to see you
b. Guyanese Creole
Bil (don) kom fi sii yu
(104) Prior event, current focus implicit:
a. English
Bill came/*has/*had come to see you yesterday, too
b. Guyanese Creole
Bil bin kom/*don kom/*kom fi sii yu yestide an aal
14 Corne (1981) observes that “with state “Verbals” fin does not occur, since a state has by defini-
tion already been attained.” Thus, the failure of fin to take over anterior marking in statives is
a principled one, and not some inexplicable accident.
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(105) Prior event, current focus explicit:
a. English
When I got here, Bill had come/*has come/*came already
b. Guyanese Creole
wen mi riich, bil bin kom/*don kom/*kom aredi
In (104) current focus is on the present, second visit of Bill implied by too;
this, English can handle by one of the means available for (103), but the anterior
system of GC cannot. Example (104) has to be treated exactly like (105) in GC;
(105) must be treated differently from (104) in English. This illustrates just one of
the many differences between past-nonpast and anterior-nonanterior systems.
Corne (1977: 107) has an illuminating minimal pair which shows that SC be-
haves much more like GC than like English on “current focus, nothing prior”
cases like (106) and “prior event, current focus implicit” cases like (108); GC trans-














‘I have come here to explain (and I’m still here)’
(107) Guyanese Creole
mi (don) kom ya fi ekspleen …
(108) mô ti vin isi pur eksplik …
‘I came (on a previous occasion) to explain (and then went away again)’
(109) mi bin kom ya fi ekspleen …
The implicit current focus is of course the speaker’s most recent arrival, since he
could not say I came unless he were here again.
However, when current focus is explicit, SC andGC part company (SC example



























‘When I entered the room, he had finished eating his banana’
15 Here Corne falls victim to the First Law of Creole Studies, since he himself stated five pages
earlier (1977: 103) that ti is omitted from subordinate clauses. But I suspect that he was mostly
right on this occasion and that he had not made allowances for the nonhomogeneity of SC. I
would be prepared to bet that (110) came from a higher-class, more decreolized consultant.
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(111) wen mi kom iin di ruum, i bin finish (*bin don finish) nyam i banana
In other words, it is only where there is prior reference with explicit current
focus – i.e., when two past events have to be explicitly ordered with respect to
one another – that ti n encroaches on the domain of anterior ti. However, refer-
ence of this kind is probably the most perceptually obvious of anterior functions
(certainly it is the easiest to teach in creole courses), and its loss to a completive
cannot but serve to erode an anterior-based system and tilt it in the direction of
a past-based system.
Anterior is further eroded once one begins to get (ti) a n and (ti) pu n con-
structions. In the classic system, irrealis handles conditionals and there is no
distinction between probable and improbable conditions, so long as they are not
counterfactual conditions:
(112) Guyanese Creole
mi go tel am if mi sii am
‘I’ll tell him if I see him’ or ‘I would tell him if I saw him’
Counterfactuals are expressed by a combination of anterior and irrealis: anterior
because current focus in such cases is always on the consequences of not having
done whatever one didn’t do; and irrealis because the action or event in question
is an imaginary one:
(113) Guyanese Creole
if mi bin sii am mi bin go tel am
‘If I had seen him I would have told him’
In SC, ti a n (and less commonly, ti pit n) naturally takes over from a prior ti a,
the “pastest” among conditions: counterfactuals such as (113), yielding sentences





















‘I would have gotten married if I weren’t poor’
(115) Guyanese Creole
mi bin go mari if mi na bin puur
The result of this development is another change in the system. The coming into
existence of ti a n does not automatically remove the former expression of coun-
terfactuals, ti a; ti a remains in the language, and what remains in the language
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has to mean something. The consequence of the ti a n invasion is therefore the
shifting of ti a one step down the hierarchy of conditions, from impossible to




















‘If you bought some meat, he would eat it’
(117) Guyanese Creole
if yu bai miit, i go nyam am
A further erosion of anterior terrain is indicated by the structure of the subordi-
nate clauses in these examples. Note that the subordinate clause in counterfac-
tual (115) requires anterior marking but that the subordinate clause in the merely
improbable (117) does not; this is classic anterior marking. However, the subordi-
nate clauses in both counterfactual (114) and merely improbable (116) are marked
with ti, presumably because subordinate clause marking is dragged down, so to
speak, by the shift of ti a main-clause marking from counterfactuals to improba-
bles.
In other words, once you turn a completive loose in a classic creole TMA sys-
tem, the only consequence must be a drastic remodeling of that system. Some
creoles (SR, basilectal GC, HC) have kept their completives under control either
by keeping them out of Aux altogether or by allowing them in but not letting
them combine with other auxiliaries. It is not coincidence that these creoles are
ones which have kept the classic TMA system virtually intact. On the other hand,
creoles that have let the completive have the run of the house – such as SC, MC,
and Krio – have, in consequence, had to change their TMA systems to a point
at which reconstruction of the original system becomes quite difficult, although
not – thanks to the careful work of Corne and others – impossible.
The curious reader may well ask, “Why is it that some systems have let loose
their completives, while others have not?” I have no answer to that, at present.
Suffice it to say that doing so must remain an option within any theory of lin-
guistic change; if the option is taken, certain results must follow, as night, day;
if it is not, they will not. It would be interesting to know why, but the fact that
we do not can in no way affect the validity of the foregoing analysis.
The other main divergence of IOC from the classic model is the presence of
two “future” forms, a and pu. Several things are at issue here. One of them is
why either form should be limited to future, rather than being a true irrealis. In
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fact, on the evidence of Corne (1977: 103), pu retains conditional meaning, if only
















‘He didn’t know what he would do’
(119) Guyanese Creole
i na (bin) no wa i go du/wa fe du
TheGC translation is instructive in several respects. First, the optionality of bin
serves to underscore another characteristic of anterior as opposed to past mark-
ing. Expressions like he didn’t know are ambiguous between ‘he didn’t know, but
he knows now’ and ‘he didn’t know then and he still doesn’t know’. In the first
reading, bin is obligatorily present since this reading represents another instance
of prior event (or rather, prior state, in this case) with implicit current focus, i.e.,
upon the change in state of the person referred to. In the second reading, bin is
obligatorily absent since the state of not knowing is a continuing one, and there
is therefore nothing prior to refer to.
Second, we see again that the range of a true irrealis (GC go) parallels at least
part of the range of an SC marker. But the third point is perhaps the most in-
teresting. He did not know what he would do is semantically close to, if not quite
synonymous with, he did not know what to do. The GC sentence i na no wa fi du
more accurately translates the second of these sentences.
Fi (which often takes the form fu) derives from Eng. for, while pu derives from
Fr. pour ‘for’. Fi can also be a complementizer, as can pu. Fi can occur as an
auxiliary in its own right:
(120) mi fi go
‘I should/ought to go’
Note that fi is narrowly restricted to a meaning of obligation, while it is a
verbal auxiliary. When it is a complementizer, however, it and its cognates in
other creoles express irrealis meaning just as pu does, see examples (27)–(30)
and (35)–(37) above.
Fi in general does not combine with other auxiliaries, but in GC it does occa-
sionally occur with bin, and it is tempting to claim that it is starting to do just
what (fi)n did in IOC, i.e., combine first of all with the anterior marker. Thus one
can have GC (121):
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(121) mi bin fu nak am
‘I should have hit him’ or ‘I was about to hit him’
The construction is not common in GC, and native speakers are more or less
evenly divided as to which gloss is the more appropriate.
Thus, in basilectal GC, with a classic TMA system, only a slight increase in the
semantic range of fi and in the syntactic privileges of occurrence is needed for
the situation to begin to approximate that of SC andMC. All we have to assume is
that a process which is beginning in GC (and which must be latent in any creole
since all creoles, presumably – the most drudgingly comprehensive grammars
are all too often silent on this score – have an auxiliary of obligation which is
ipso facto +irrealis) has been taken a stage or two further in IOC, languageswhich
we already know have a predilection for expanding and complicating Aux.
The rest of the story is simple. As pu was graduating as a full-fledged com-
petitor to the original irrealis a, (fi)n was distorting the classic system in such
a way that the irrealis scope of both markers, a and pu, was losing some of its
conditional functions and thus was getting closer to a simple future. In any case,
when any two morphemes divide the semantic terrain of “future”, it is a highly
natural development that they should mark out their boundaries in some way,
and that those boundaries, while often vague, should generally distinguish rela-
tively likely from relatively unlikely events (cf. the discussion of go versus gon,
HCE’s first mesolectal replacement, Bickerton 1977: 23ff., 181ff.). In fact, the IOC
position is far from clear-cut, and MC and SC seem to have developed rather dif-
ferently. According to Corne (1977), pu in MC marks a more definite future. In
SC, on the other hand, the precise roles of pu and a are more vague, although the
fact that only pu can occur in the scope of negation suggests that here, pu may
be becoming the less definite of the two.
We have now seen how two very natural developments could have turned a
classic creole TMA system into the kind of system we see in IOC today. IOC
scholars will doubtless object that the account I have given is a purely conjec-
tural one. That may be; but if it is conjectural, that is only because those scholars
have not done the job of tracing the diachronic development of IOC through
synchronic residues, as was done in Bickerton (1975) for GC. The most anyone
can do who does not have direct and unlimited access to the IOC community is
to show that similar developments have occurred or are occurring elsewhere in
other creoles, which I have done. There is thus a prima facie case for the scenario
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outlined above; conclusive evidence can only come through the patient sifting
of the highly variable data about which all IOC scholars have complained, but
which none of them have yet exploited.
We can now turn to our final deviation – the split between habituals and pro-
gressives which, according to Taylor (1971), conflates the former with the “com-
pletive” (in the present terminology, zero-marked past punctuals) in JC and HC
and with the “future” (in the present terminology, irrealis) in CR and STSão
Tomense. Again, as with anterior versus past marking, we must first ask our-
selves if the data on which such claims are made are valid. Again, we must an-
swer that at least sometimes they are not.
For example, Hall (1953: 31) describes the HC aspect marker ap(e) as “indicating
action which is continuing, not yet complete, or future” – in other words, ap(e)
does not include habituals. This, if true, would indicate that the HC system is not
a classic TMA system since in that system the nonpunctual category embraces
both continuing and habitual actions. However, the First Law of Creole Studies
enables us to find, in Hall’s own texts, numerous sentences in which ap(e) marks

















‘Whatever they used to give it to eat, they used to give it to eat to
































‘Everyone on earth tries to live with a head well filled (with knowledge)’
Although some claims may be disposed of in this way, there remains, as with
anteriors, a residue of cases where genuine problems need to be resolved. In this
particular case, a new factor enters the system: areas of relative indeterminacy
in semantic space. In Chapter 4, where we will try to extract the very roots of
semantics, it will become apparent that Deviation E represents an inherent point
of weakness in the semantic infrastructure of the TMA system; we will see also
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that such points must exist if language is to change and develop. However, since
a full account of Deviation E depends on a prior analysis of the nature of semantic
space, it will have to be postponed until that chapter.
For the present, then, we can conclude that the bulk of so-called “counterexam-
ples” to our analysis of creole TMA systems arises from one of the three following
sources:
1. Inadequate data-gathering and/or acceptance of inaccurate data and/or
faulty analysis of data.
2. A slightly longer than normal antecedent period of pidginization, allowing
pidgin features to become fixed.
3. Linguistic change, internal or contact-stimulated, subsequent to creoliza-
tion.
In one or two cases, 2. would distort the normal process of creolization, although
we must note that only syntactic, and not semantic, aspects of that process are
affected: PP lo and CR ba retain their predicted meanings, even though they do
not assume their predicted place in sentence structure. Being a subsequent devel-
opment, 3. cannot have any relevance to the process of creolization itself. As for
1., one can only hope that this will disappear as the field continues to develop.
Finally, I shall examine three types of complementation in creoles: comple-
ments of perception verbs; factive, nonfactive, and related complement struc-
tures; and “serial verb” structures. My aim in doing so will be twofold. First,
as in the previous sections of this chapter, I shall seek to show that substantial
identities of structure exist throughout creoles, even where these may be masked
by ongoing change processes or other factors. But I also want to establish cer-
tain facts about the nature of creole syntax – facts which will assume a greater
significance when we meet them again in Chapters 3 and 4.
In English, the complements of perception verbs consist of nonfinite sentences
from which aspectual markers are excluded, and the subjects of which have un-
dergone raising:16
(125) I saw him leaving the building.
16 If you believe in raising. If you don’t, substitute “whatever rule marks the second NP as object
of the first V.”
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(126) We can hear them play trombones.
(127) * I saw he leaving the building.
(128) * I saw him was leaving the building.
(129) * We can hear them have played trombones.
While a superficially similar sentence, (130), is grammatical, it does not contain
a perception-verb complement, but a factive complement that has undergone
complementizer deletion:
(130) I saw he was leaving the building.
(131) I saw that he was leaving the building.
In creoles, perception-verb complements are finite, can contain aspectmarkers,












‘I heard drums beating’
(133) Guyanese Creole
dem sii i kom
‘They saw him come’
Although onemight be tempted to gloss (132) as ‘I heard that drumswere beating’
– along the lines of (130) – such a gloss would be incorrect; factive complements
are introduced by the obligatory particle se, which we shall return to later:
(134) Guyanese Creole
mi hia se drom a nak
‘I heard that drums were beating’
In (133), the nominative case of the 3rd person singular pronoun is obligatory;
the accusative case is ungrammatical:
(135) Guyanese Creole
* dem sii am kom
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Free occurrence of nonpunctual-aspect a and the ungrammaticality of an ac-
cusative form such as would result from raising indicate that the embedded sen-
tences in (132) and (133) are finite. At least two further arguments point in a
similar direction.
In English perception-verb complements, it is possible not merely to raise the
subject of the embedded S, but also to delete it. Thus, alongside (136) we can have
(137):
(136) I heard Bill singing.
(137) I heard singing.
GC will allow the equivalent of (136), but not of (137):
(138) mi hia bil a sing
(139) * mi hia a sing
It is characteristic of languages in general that while theymay allow zero subjects
in nonfinites, they cannot freely delete subjects in finite clauses, except of course
under identity, which does not apply here.
A second argument involves the Propositional Island Constraint (PIC) as pro-
posed by Chomsky (1977). The PIC affects structure of the form:
(140) … X … α[… Y …] … X …
and prevents any rule from moving a constituent from position Y to either po-
sition X just in case α marks a finite clause. Let us assume that, ignoring some
nonrelevant details, the structure underlying both (132) and its English equiva-
lent is something like (141).17 In the case of the English version of (132), this would
yield a derived structure something like (142). However, in the case of the GC
version of (132), (141) would represent the superficial as well as the underlying
structure.
17 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, it seems likely that in reality GC does not have VP as a
constituent at the basilectal level. The contrary is assumed here merely in order to simplify the
comparison between the English and GC processes, and is not meant to imply any substantive


















I Past V NP VP
hear drums beating
If we have analyzed these sentences correctly, then it should be possible to
extract from the circled node in (142), since such a move does not violate the PIC,
but impossible to extract from the circled node in (141), which would constitute
such a violation since the lower S dominates a finite clause. Extraction from (142)
is fine:
(143) It was drums that I heard beating.
(144) What did I hear beating?
(145) The drums that I heard beating never stopped.
Extraction from the circled node of (143), however, yields only sentences which
are ungrammatical in GC:
(146) * a drom mi hia a nak
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(147) * a wa mi hia a nak?
(148) * di drom-dem we mi hia a nak neva stap
Since there is no other possible reason for the ungrammaticality of these sen-
tences, we can only conclude that they are ungrammatical because they violate
the PIC, and that therefore the embedded sentence in (132) is a finite one.
Very fewwriters on creoles have discussed perception-verb complements specif-
ically, and fewer still have even attempted to analyze them. Thus, the most that
can be done at present is to point to a wide range of superficially similar struc-
tures and hope that scholars in the various regions will determine whether they
show the same constraints on subject deletion and extraction as did the GC exam-
ples. Similar structures are found in other English creoles, such as Belize Creole
(BC); in French creoles, such as HC andGuyanais (GU); and in Portuguese creoles
like ST:
(149) Belize Creole
i onli si di tar a flo:t ina di bailing wata




































‘He saw me swimming (lit., I was swimming)’
Before leaving perception-verb complements, we should note that there are also
some similar constructions which are nonfinite in English but clearly finite in at
least one English creole, GC; for example, causative imperatives:




(154) * mek am gowe
(155) na mek i na wok
‘Don’t prevent him from working’
(156) * na mek am na wok
Note the impossibility of clefting such sentences in GC:
(157) I prevented him from working.
(158) It was him that I prevented from working.
(159) mi mek i na wok
(160) * a i mi mek na wok
Example (160) is so bad that it is almost unpronounceable. However, the re-
striction does not apply to clefting per se since the subject NP may undergo the
process:
(161) a mi mek i na wok
‘It was I who prevented him from working’
The fact that complements of perception and causation verbs appear to con-
stitute finite sentences in creoles suggests the possibility that there might be no
such thing as a nonfinite structure in these languages. In fact, I doubt whether
there is any creole extant for which such an extreme statement would be true.
However, there is a good deal of evidence which suggests that at their earliest
stage of development creoles may not have had any nonfinite structures.
It should have become apparent by now that we are not going to get very far
with the study of creoles – or of child language acquisition, or of language ori-
gins – if we allow ourselves to remain trapped within the static, antiprocessual
framework which has dominated linguistics since de Saussure. The emergence
of creole languages is a process; language acquisition is a process; the original
growth and development of human language was assuredly a process. To apply
to processes those methods expressly designed to handle static-synchronic sys-
tems is simply absurd; in order to do this, you have to pretend that a process is
a state, and ignore exactly those characteristics that render it distinctive. Such
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a procedure is sometimes defended as an “idealization”, cf. Chomsky & Halle
(1968: Chapter 8), but the difference between “idealization” and “convenient fic-
tion” seems not to be grasped by these authors. In fact, static generativism, the
only kind we have had so far (although there is no a priori reason why there
should not be a dynamic generativism), has ignored creoles, ignored language
origins, and in the case of language acquisition – something it could hardly ig-
nore since the mystery of language acquisition was what it was originally set up
to explain – it has intervened with the sole result of turning off 90 percent of the
workers in the field, as we shall see in the next chapter.
If we are going to call a spade a spade and a process a process, we need to
make some basic assumptions. One is that previous changes in any language
inevitably leave their footprints behind them (Givón 1971). Another is that di-
achronic changes must be directly reflected in synchronic variation (Weinreich,
Labov & Herzog 1968; Bickerton 1975; Bailey 1973). Equipped with these, we
shall examine other types of complementation in creoles to determine whether
the current state of affairs in perception-verb and causative constructions may
at one time have been that of all complement types.
First let us look at a set of sentences which might appear to contain comple-
mentizers. In GC, there are three forms that might be taken for complementizers:
se, go, and fu/fi. We have already glanced at the second two in connection with
the realized/nonrealized complement distinction. The first, se, introduces com-
plements of verbs of reporting and “psychological” verbs:
(162) i taak se i na si am
‘He said that he didn’t see it’
(163) i tel mi se i na si am
‘He told me that he didn’t see it’
(164) mi no se i na si am
‘I know that he didn’t see it’
Clearly, the complements that se introduces are finite Ss, just as are those intro-
duced by Eng. that. However, it does not follow from this that se is a comple-
mentizer.
Doubt arises in the first place because se, unlike complementizers in general,
is nondeletable. A sentence like mi hia se i a kom means ‘I heard (that) he was
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coming’; mi hia i a kom, however, cannot be synonymous with this, but can only
mean ‘I heard him earning’. In other cases, such as mi taak se i a kom ‘I said that
he was coming’, deletion yields only ungrammatical sentences: * mi taak i a kom.
Further, there is the fact that se-clauses cannot be generated in subject position.
In English, that-clauses can be generated in subject position and then undergo
optional rightward movement by a rule of extraposition; thus, (165) would be
assumed to be closer to its underlying structure than (166), derived from the
same underlying structure via extraposition:
(165) That John has left isn’t true.
(166) It isn’t true that John has left.
However, a similar generalization could not be true for GC since while there is
grammatical equivalent for (166), there is no grammatical equivalent for (165):
(167) * se jan gaan na tru
(168) na tru se jan gaau
Not only can se-clauses not be generated in subject position, they cannot be
moved to sentence-initial position by any rule. There is no creole passive that
would turn Everybody knows that he won into That he won is known by everyone.
Clefting and pseudoclefting will front simple NP objects of verbs like no ‘know’
but not se-clause objects:
(169) mi no dis
‘I know this’
(170) a dis mi no
‘It’s this that I know’
(171) dis a wa mi no
‘This is what I know’
(172) mi no se dem gaan
‘I heard (that) he was coming’
(173) * a se dem gaan mi no
(174) * se dem gaan a wa mi no
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True, neither clefting nor pseudoclefting works in English either, unless there is
a head noun:
(175) * It’s that they’ve left that worries Bill.
(176) It’s the fact that they’ve left that worries Bill.
But English can front via topicalization:
(177) I knew already that they’d left.
(178) That they’d left I knew already.
GC cannot:
(179) mi no aredi se dem gaan
(180) * se dem gaan mi no aredi
Now, it is true that this datum, taken in isolation, says nothing directly about
the status of se. It merely suggests that se-clauses cannot be dominated by an NP
node since if they were, they would presumably be eligible for movement rules
that affect NPs and would also constitute possible expansions of subject NPs. If
we assumed that se-clauses were generated under an S̄ node which in turn was
immediately dominated by VP (or S0, if VP is not a constituent in GC grammar),
all the above data would follow.
However, there are some facts that suggest the possibility of an alternative
analysis. In English, there are pairs of sentences such as:
(181) I’m glad that they’ve left.
(182) That they’ve left makes me glad.
These sentences are perhaps slightly less than synonymous, and they certainly
would not be regarded as transformationally related; since we have already estab-
lished that se-clauses cannot be base-generated in subject position, it will come
as no surprise that the GC equivalent of (181) is grammatical, while the GC equiv-
alent of (182) is ungrammatical:
(183) mi glad se dem gaan
(184) * se dem gaan mek ml glad
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Yet (185) is grammatical:
(185) dem gaan mek mi glad
lit., ‘They’ve left cause I glad’
Example (185) cannot be derived from (184) by se-deletion since, as we saw, se
does not delete. It could only be derived by embedding S under the subject NP
node.
Again, these facts, taken in isolation, might not seem to constitute evidence
against the status of se as a complementizer. Since we have already suggested
that se-clauses could be introduced under S̄ not dominated by NP, all we need
in order to accommodate (185) is a rule that will expand NP as S, but not as S̄.
However, the picture would change somewhat if we could show one or both of
two things:
1. That GC required a rule NP → S̄.
2. That se-clauses could not be generated under S̄.
In order to examine these possibilities, let us look at another quasi-complementizer,
fi/fu (henceforth referred to as fi, for the sake of convenience, since fi is the more
basilectal, if nowadays rarer, form). In the GC lexicon, fi must be entered both
as a preposition and as a modal auxiliary of obligation:
(186) mi du am fi meri, na fi ayu
‘I did it for Mary, not for you (pl.)’
(187) mi fi go tumara
‘I ought to go tomorrow’
However, there are also sentences such as:
(188) mi waan fi go
‘I want to go’
(189) mi waan i fi go
‘I want him to go’
In (188), fi looks like a complementizer, more or less the equivalent of Eng. to.
The likelihood that, unlike se, fi is a genuine complementizer is increased by the
fact that fi in (188) will delete without change of meaning:
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(190) mi waan go
‘I want to go’
Unfortunately, (189) seems at first sight to suggest a quite different analysis.
Complementizers normally precede the sentences they introduce, but (191) is un-
grammatical:
(191) * mi waan fi i go
Complementizers may follow subjects of embedded sentences if raising (or
whatever you believe in if you don’t believe in raising) has taken place, as in I
want him to go; however, as with perception-verb complements, a morpheme-
for-morpheme translation of such sentences is ungrammatical:
(192) * mi waan am fi go
However, fi in its (189) location is nondeletable:
(193) * mi waan i go
This contrasts with the status of fi in (188), and suggests that while fi in (188) is a
complementizer, fi in (189) is a modal auxiliary.
There would seem to be two possible analyses of (188) and (189). In the first, fi is
really a modal auxiliary in both cases – in (189) for the reasons already given, and
in (188) because (188) is simply derived from (194) by equi-deletion (obligatory
since (194) is ungrammatical without it):
(194) * mi waan mi fi go
This first solution would be tempting but for (190): modal auxiliaries do not
normally delete without loss of meaning. We might then wish to choose the sec-
ond analysis, which would derive (189) from (195) via obligatory complementizer
deletion since without such deletion (195) is simply ungrammatical:
(195) * mi waan fi i fi go
However, there still lurks in the background the possibility that, despite (190)
and (195), the prepositional role of fi might somehow be involved (cf. the claim
by Koopman & Lefebvre (1981) that HC pu, a close relative of fi “can introduce
final complements, either infinitival … or tensed”).
To choose out of these three possibilities – complementizer, modal verb, prepo-
sition – we need to examine sentences in which constituents are extracted from
fi-clauses. Let us look first of all at a sentence such as:
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(196) Where did he want to go?
This has the GC equivalent:
(197) wisaid i waan fi go?
We should note also that sentences like (198) have exact English equivalents:
(198) wisaid i waan mi fi go?
‘Where did he want me to go?’
In all three sentences (196)–(198), a constituent, WH-place, is moved out of an
embedded S – in the case of (198) presumably a tensed S.
If fi in (198) is a modal verb, and no complementizer or preposition has been





i waan NP Aux V NP
mi fi go WH-place
WH-movement would then move WH-place under the COMP node. However,
such movement would violate the PIC, since it moves WH out of a tensed S. Sim-
ilarly, if a deleted prepositional fi introduced mi fi go in (198), the latter sentence
would have an underlying structure something like (200). Example (200) would
involve a rule which would expand PP as either P NP or P S; just such a rule
is proposed for HC by Koopman & Lefebvre (1981), on rather similar evidence,
involving prepositional pu and its tensed complements. However, movement of
theWH-constituent from the right-hand NP node to COMP would again involve
violation of the PIC.
If, on the other hand, fi is a complementizer, no violation need ensue. In this









NP Aux V NP
mi fi go WH-place
(201) S̄
COMP S
NP V S̄( )
i waan COMP S
(fi) NP Aux V NP
mi fi go WH-place
Complementizer deletion, optional in (188), is, as we have seen, obligatory in
(189) and (198). However, once fi is deleted, we have an empty COMP node (the
one dominating the fi in parentheses in (201)). Chomsky (1977) has argued that
WH-movement, being a cyclic rule, can move constituents from COMP to COMP,
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thus forming a “bridge” over the barrier of the PIC. In (201) – but not in (199) or
(200) – there is a lower COMP node to whichWH can be moved on the first cycle,
allowing the second cycle to move it to the higher COMP node, as indicated by
the dotted line in (201). Thus, in contrast with (199) and (200), WH-movement in
(201) does not violate the PIC.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, GC does contain an S̄ structure in some
complements. However, there was no motivation in (201) for assuming S̄ to be
dominated by NP, so we have yet to prove condition (1) (Page 99).
In order to prove condition (1), we need another set of fi-sentences. Unlike
perception-verb complements, which cannot have zero subjects (mi hia dem a
sing versus * mi hia a sing), fi-clause complements can:
(202) yu gafi kraas di riba fi miit tong
‘You have to cross the river in order to get to town’
(203) na bin iizi fi kech taiga
‘It wasn’t easy to catch a jaguar’
In both cases, the fi-clause can be moved:
(204) fi miit tong yu gafi kraas di riba
‘To get to town you have to cross the river’
(205) fi kech taiga na bin iizi
‘To catch a jaguar wasn’t easy’
However, since both Woolford (1979) and Koopman & Lefebvre (1981) give argu-
ments that Tok Pisin and Haitian Creole, respectively, have homophonous pairs
of complementizers and prepositions (TP long, HC pu), we cannot automatically
assume that fi is a complementizer in (202)–(205) just because it was in (198). To
show this, we have to question the NP in (103):
(206) a wa na bin iizi fi kech ?
‘What was it that wasn’t easy to catch?’
If fi were a preposition in (203), (203) and (206) would have the underlying struc-
ture of (200); but we saw in our analysis of (200) that if WH-movement were
applied to that structure, a violation of the PIC would result. To avoid such vio-
lation, fi would have to be a complementizer, and (203) and (206) would have to
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have the underlying structure of (201). Since (206) is grammatical, fi must be a
complementizer.
If this is the case, (205) must contain an S̄ directly dominated by NP, as in (207):
(207) S
VadjAuxNP
S̄ na bin iizi
COMP S
fi NP V NP
∅ kech taiga
Thus, the exclusion of se-clauses from subject position, which we noted in dis-
cussing (184) above, cannot be due to the absence of a rule rewriting NP as S̄
(COMP S). The ungrammaticality of (184) must, therefore, result from the fact
that se is not a complementizer, and consequently cannot be inserted in struc-
tures such as (207).
We can now turn to condition (2) (Page 99). The fact that se cannot be a com-
plementizer, suggested by the foregoing analysis, would of course also make it
impossible for se-clauses to be generated in S̄ complements. But let us assume
for the moment that se is a complementizer. If this were so, a sentence such as
(208) below would have a structure similar to that of (201):
(208) dem taak se i de a tong
‘They said that he was in town’
In other words, the complement S̄ would contain a COMP node which would
permit COMP-to-COMP WH-movement and hence permit questioning of the
rightmost NP. We would then have to predict that (209) would be grammatical:
(209) * wisaid dem taak se i de?
‘Where did they say he was?’
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Unfortunately, it is not. We can therefore only conclude that se is something
other than a complementizer.
The third quasi-complementizer, go, is even more restricted than se. Like se,
but unlike fi, it cannot be preposed:
(210) i tek i gon fi shuut taiga
‘He took his gun to shoot a jaguar (but did not necessarily do so)’
(211) i tek i gon go shuut taiga
‘He took his gun to shoot a jaguar (and did shoot one)’
(212) fi shuut taiga i a tek i gon
‘For shooting jaguars he used to take his gun’18
(213) * go shuut taiga i a tek i gon
Unlike both fi and se, go cannot occur with adjectival verbs:
(214) mi glad fi sii yu
‘I’m glad to see you’
(215) mi glad se yu kom
‘I’m glad you came’
(216) * mi glad go sii yu
As with se (but not fi), complement constituents cannot be extracted:
(217) i gaan a tong go sii dakta
‘He’s gone to town to see the doctor’
(218) * a hu i gaan a tong go sii?
‘Who did he go to town to see?’
(219) * di dakta we i gaan a tong go sii de bad an aal
‘The doctor he went to town to see is sick too’
18 It is interesting to note that while fi-clauses in complement position can refer to one-time
actions (as in (210)), and in consequence the higher verb can take punctual marking, preposed
fi-clauses can refer only to habitual actions, and in consequence the higher verb must take
nonpunctual marking. At the moment I have no idea why this is so.
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We can assume, as with se, that extraction is blocked because COMP-to-COMP
movement is impossible; therefore, go is not a complementizer either.
The claim that se is a serial verb in Krio has been argued strongly by Larimore
(1976), but since there are some minor differences between the grammars of Krio
and GC, not all her arguments apply to the latter language. I shall assume with-
out further argument that se and go are both serial verbs. If this assumption is
correct, then se and go, if not fi, really belong with the verbs that we will dis-
cuss in the next section on serialization. But because fi may be a complementizer
synchronically, it by no means necessarily follows that fi always was a comple-
mentizer.
Washabaugh (1979: Example 9) cites the following sentence: 19
(220) ah waan di rien kom fi ah don go huoam
‘I want the rain to come so that I won’t have to go home’
This sentence, from Providence Island Creole (PIC), a variety similar in many
ways to GC, is of a type claimed by Washabaugh to be “rare in most contempo-
rary varieties of [Caribbean English creoles] , but … frequent enough in older
texts.” Washabaugh does not analyze this sentence, so we do not know whether
the following sentence would be rejected by Providence Islanders:
(221) ? wisaid ah waan di rien kom fi ah don go?
It would almost certainly be rejected by speakers of other Caribbean English
creoles.
The most likely structure of (220) would be one similar to that of (185), repro-
duced here for convenience:
(185) dem gaan mek mi glad
That structure is illustrated in (222). Here, mek functions rather like the abstract
verb cause once posited by generative semanticists. In (220), fi would have a
meaning something like should cause, with di rien kom as its subject and ah
don go huoam as its object. On present evidence we cannot determine for sure
whether fi was once exclusively a serial verb. However, it seems reasonable to
19 Washabaugh’s analysis of fi differs radically from that made in the present chapter, although
there is no reason to suppose that the facts of PIC differ significantly from those of GC. How-




suppose that in GC and other creoles, serial verbs may be turning into comple-
mentizers. Such a process certainly exists in some West African languages (Lord
1976), and we shall shortly examine evidence from Sranan which indicates that




NP V NP V
dem gaan mi glad
The boundaries of serial verb constructions are not easy to define, nor is it
easy (or perhaps even desirable) to distinguish them from other superficially sim-
ilar constructions such as “verb chains” (Forman 1972). Here, I shall simply con-
cern myself with those serial constructions which are equivalent to multi-case
sentences, i.e., which mark oblique cases (dative, instrumental, etc.) with verbs
rather than with prepositions or with other types of formal devices. Examples of






















































‘He cut the meat with a knife’
Sentences such as (223)–(226) are by no means always the only ways in which














‘He cut the meat with a knife’
According to Huttar (1975), sentences like (227) occur more frequently in speech
than sentences like (226).
Which of such pairs represents the most conservative creole level? Serial verbs
form a more marked means of expressing case relations than do prepositions.
It is, therefore, relatively unlikely that a language which already had preposi-
tions to mark case would develop serial verbs (except in certain circumstances
which could hardly apply to creoles and which will be discussed later). On the
other hand, it is relatively likely that a language which originally had only se-
rial verbs as a case-marking device would subsequently develop prepositions,
either by a type of reanalysis already attested for West African languages (Lord
1976), or by direct borrowing from a high-prestige language with which it was
in contact (probably the case in any creole that has undergone even a relatively
small amount of decreolization). We are therefore justified in assuming that serial
verb constructions represent extremely conservative varieties of those creoles in
which they are found.
Serial verbs are usually interpreted as the result of African substratum influ-
ence on creoles, but creolists seldom if ever ask how those West African lan-
guages which have serial verbs (by no means all of them) happen to have come
by them. Despite lip service to linguistic equality, a dual standard is still applied
to creoles: if a creole has a feature, it must have borrowed it; but if a noncreole
language has the same feature, it is assumed to be an independent innovation – at
least in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary. In fact, I would claim that
creoles and West African languages invented verb serialization independently,
but for slightly different reasons.
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Wherever serial verbs are found outside creoles, a change in word order is al-
ways involved (see Li & Thompson (1974) for Chinese; Givón (1974) and Hyman
(1974) for West African languages; Bradshaw (1979) for Austronesian languages
in New Guinea). Sometimes the change may be contact-influenced, as in New
Guinea; sometimes it may come from purely language-internal developments,
as with the Kwa languages of West Africa. Precise explanations of why SOV-
SVO (West Africa) or SVO-SOV (New Guinea) changes involve serialization are
still controversial. Givón (1974) suggests that serialization results from the de-
cay of post positional case marking, an explanation challenged by Hyman (1974);
Bradshaw (1979) suggests serialization eases parsing problems in a period of tran-
sition by generating sentences that can be parsed as either SVO or SOV without
any semantic confusion (we shall return to this point at the end of Chapter 4).
However, there seems to be no serious ground for doubting that serialization and
word-order change are involved with one another in some kind of way.
Word-order change cannot have been a factor in creolization since most of the
languages in contact, as well as the resultant creoles, have been SVO. However,
the problem that word-order change creates – that of unambiguously identify-
ing case roles while the change is under way – must have been a problem in
creolization too, if we assume what must almost certainly have been the case in
at least some pidgins, i.e., that the latter did not contain (or at least did not con-
tain a full range of) prepositions. Without prepositions and without inflectional
morphology, how else could oblique cases be distinguished if not by serial verbs?
More specific doubts about the viability of substratal accounts, as well as the
seeds of an explanation as to why creoles differ so much in the extent to which
they exhibit serialization, are suggested by the following data on the Surinam
creoles (Djuka, Sranan, Saramaccan). In these languages, instrumental construc-
tions (as expressed via equivalents of ‘He cut the meat with a knife’) have the
following range:
(228) Djuka
a koti a meti anga nefi
(229) Sranan
a koti a meti nanga nefi
(230) Saramaccan
a koti di gbamba ku faka
(231) Djuka




a teki nefi koti a meti
(233) Saramaccan
? a tei faka koti di gbamba
A sentence similar to (233) – a tei di pau naki en, lit., ‘He took the stick hit it’,
i.e., ‘He hit it with the stick’ – is cited in Grimes & Glock (1970) but footnoted
to the effect that the authors have since become highly doubtful as to its sta-
tus in SA. In Glock (1972), which deals explicitly with case phenomena, there
is no mention of sentences like (233), although sentences like (230), as well as
serialization of other cases, are cited and discussed; nor is SA credited with tei-
serialization in Jansen, Koopman & Muysken (1978), although, again, there is no
explicit discussion. It is thus impossible to tell whether Saramaccan has this kind
of serialization, although the present balance of evidence seems to be against it.
Saramaccan is well known as being, among the three Surinam creoles (or,
for that matter, among all the Caribbean creoles), the one which best preserves
African lexical and phonological characteristics (note, in the preceding examples,
gbamba ‘meat’, a word of presumably African origin which preserves the coartic-
ulated and prenasalized stops characteristic of manyWest African languages but
of no other creoles, compared with DJ and SR meti from Eng. meat). This being
so, and if serial constructions also reflect African influence, one would expect
to find that SA had more of such constructions than DJ and SR, rather than the
reverse.
But while there is no explanation for the pattern in terms of substrate influence,
an explanation can be provided in terms of interaction between the antecedent
pidgin and its superstrate. It seems reasonable to assume that if a creole can
acquire prepositions from its antecedent pidgin (as HCE did), it will not need to
develop serial verbs for case marking. The only question is, why should some
antecedent pidgins acquire prepositions while others do not?
Clearly, one factor is population balance, while another factor is the type of
social structure; between them, these will determine the accessibility of the su-
perstrate language and hence help to determine how many superstrate items the
pidgin will absorb. However, these are by no means the only factors involved.
Other things, including social conditions, being equal, structural differences be-
tween superstrate features may determine whether a pidgin will or will not ab-
sorb these features.
For a superstrate feature to be accessible to a pidgin, that feature must be more
or less unambiguous with respect to meaning, more or less free from mutation
110
Passive equivalents
with respect to phonological structure, and as close as possible to the canonical
form of CV(CV). The superstrate prepositions of instrumentality available to the
three languages were: for SR and DJ, Eng. with; for SA, Eng. with and Pg. com
– phonetically, [kõ] or [kũ] in many contemporary dialects. The former, with
its initial semivowel (a marked segment) and final labiodental fricative (an ex-
tremely marked segment), is remote from the canonical pattern; the latter, in the
form in which it is perhaps most frequently realized, fits it exactly. The relative
difficulty of acquiring com and with may best be pictured if the reader imagines
that his linguistic competence is limited to African languages and then attempts
to segment the following synonymous utterances:
(234) vai com aquele homem
(235) go with that man
Word boundaries in the Portuguese utterance are fairly unambiguouslymarked;
in the English one, it would be hard to determine where the verb ended and the
preposition began, or where the preposition ended and the demonstrative began
– or even to be sure that there was a preposition there at all. It is hardly surpris-
ing, therefore, that neither Sranan nor Djuka could absorb with, but had to adopt
a serializing device in order to express instrumentality, and that only later did
they develop their own preposition, (n)anga, of uncertain origin; whereas, on the
other hand, Saramaccan, like all Portuguese creoles, easily acquired ku and thus
did not need a serial construction for instrumentality.
The underlying structure of serial-verb constructions has been a subject of
some controversy (see Williams (1971; 1975), Roberts (1975), Voorhoeve (1975),
Jansen, Koopman & Muysken (1978) for some differing views on this subject).
I suspect that varying analyses are due at least in part to inherent conflicts in
the data, and that these conflicts, in turn, are due to ongoing developments in
creoles which have the result of complicating the original creole syntax and intro-
ducing categories which formed no part of the original grammar. If we are to
understand what creoles are, and make comparisons between particular creoles
without allowing ourselves to be misled by subsequent and irrelevant accretions,
we must – to cite the words of Koopman & Lefebvre, on which I could not hope
to improve – “restrict the notion of syntactic expansion to changes leading to the
acquisition of features that are part of core grammar up to the time of creolization
and to consider the emergence of other features as regular cases of syntactic
change” (Koopman & Lefebvre 1981: 218).
Koopman & Lefebvre assume, as I do, that pidgins begin with nouns, verbs,
and very little else. They assume that VP is a pidgin category, but do not defend
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it as such. For reasons given in the discussion of GC movement rules above, I do
not think VP is a category in most early creoles, although of course creoles may
acquire it later, either through decreolization or regular syntactic change (reanal-
ysis). The only rule creoleswould then require to generate any of the complement
types, serial or other, discussed so far (with the exception of fi-clauses) would be
(236):
(236) S → NP Aux V (NP) (S)
If in fact VPs were developed initially, two rules would be required:
(237) S → NP Aux VP
(238) VP → V (NP) (S)
Not a great deal depends on which analysis is correct; therefore, since crucial
evidence will be taken from Sranan, and since Sranan scholars generally assume
a VP (although, once again, without explicit discussion), I shall accept (237) and
(238) as specifying the earliest and most basic level of creole syntax, while con-
tinuing to suspect that (236) may be a more accurate representation of it.
The evidence consists of judgments by native speakers of Sranan cited in Jansen,
Koopman & Muysken (1978). The parenthesized asterisks before certain sen-
tences indicate that while some speakers found them grammatical, others did
not.
(239) Kofi teki a nefi koti a brede
‘Kofi cut the bread with the knife’
(240) san Kofi teki koti a brede?
‘What did Kofi cut the bread with?’
(241) (*)san Kofi teki a nefi koti?
‘What did Kofi cut with the knife?’
(242) na a nefi Kofi teki koti a brede.
‘It was the knife that Kofi cut the bread with’
(243) (*)na a brede Kofi teki a nefi koti
‘It was the bread that Kofi cut with the knife’
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(244) na teki Kofi teki a nefi koti a brede
‘With the knife, that’s how Kofi cut the bread’
(245) (*)na koti Kofi teki a nefi koti a brede
‘Cut it, that’s what Kofi did to the bread with the knife’
In (241) and (243), some speakers can extract themost deeply embeddedNP,while
others cannot. In (244), a rule similar to the GC verb-focusing rule copies the
higher of the two verbs, for all speakers; but in (245), while some speakers can
copy the more deeply embedded verb, others cannot.
These facts can be accounted for if we assume that the two sets of speakers
have different types of underlying structures for these sentences, as represented
in (246) and (247), respectively:
(246) S
NP VP
Kofi V NP S





Kofi V NP VP
teki a nefi V NP
koti a brede
Speakers who rejected (241), (243), and (245) would have (246) as an underlying
structure. Here, both the Specified Subject Condition (SSC: Chomsky 1973) and
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the PIC would block movement out of sites dominated by the lower S. Speakers
who accepted these three sentences would have (247) as an underlying structure.
Since (247) contains no tensed S, specified subject, or bounding nodes that would
block extraction, all constituents could be moved without violating the SSC or
the PIC. The first set of speakers would have rules (237) and (238); the second set
would replace (238) with (248):
(248) VP → V (NP) (VP)
Greg Lee (p.c.) has pointed out that there is an alternative solution which
does not involve positing two different underlying structures: the two sets of
speakers could have different rule orderings for extraction and Equi. If the first
set ordered extraction before Equi, the lower occurrence of Kofi would still be
undeleted when extraction applied, the S-node would remain unpruned, and the
SSC and PIC would still apply. If the second set ordered Equi before extraction,
the offending S-node would be pruned to give (247) as a derived structure, and
no constraints would then inhibit movement.
This is true, but it means that both sets of speakers would then have the more
primitive phrase-structure rules – (237) and (238) – that would yield (246) as the
underlying structure for (239). I shall show in a moment that even if speakers
did not have underlying structures like (247) for serial teki sentences, they would
require them for other types of serial-verb constructions. In any case, I know
of no evidence that would point to differences in rule ordering among Sranan
speakers; indeed, it is very hard, in creole grammars, to find any clear cases in
which rule ordering is crucial.
A second set of native-speaker judgments concerns Sranan directional con-












Here, in contrast with the previous examples, there are no disagreements; either
verb can be fronted by the same verb-focusing rule that led to disputes over the
status of (245);
(250) na waka a waka go a wosu
‘He walked to the house (rather than ran to it)’
(251) na go a waka go a wosu
‘He walked to the house (rather than away from it)’
114
Passive equivalents
Thus there is no possibility that speakers could assign to (249) a structural de-
scription like that of (246), where the existence of a tensed S would prohibit
extraction of the lower verb; rather, (249) must have a structure similar to (247),






Finally, Sranan speakers disagree again over sentences involving datives and
benefactives expressed with gi, which has an independent existence as a main














‘Mary brought water for the plants’
(254) gi san Meri tek watra?
‘What did Mary bring water for?’
(255) (*)san Meri teki watra gi?
‘What did Mary bring water for?’
(256) Meri teki a buku gi mi
‘Mary gave me the book’
(257) (*)na mi Meri teki a buku gi
‘It was me Mary gave the book to’
(258) (*)na gi Meri teki a buku gi mi
‘Mary gave the book to me’
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Sranan does not strand prepositions, For those who find (255) and (257) un-
grammatical, gi must be a preposition, and they must have, instead of (248), the
rule (259):
(259) VP → V (NP) (PP)
For those who find the two sentences grammatical, gi must be a verb, and such
speakers must have rule (248). The verb-focusing rule that applies in (258) cannot
front prepositions, so, again, those who find (258) ungrammatical must consider
gi as a preposition, while those who find it grammatical must consider gi a verb.
Differences of this kind are only comprehensible if the set of speakerswho find all
three sentences grammatical assigns to (253) and (256) a structure similar to (252),
with VP expanded as in (260) below; while the set of speakers who find all three
sentences ungrammatical (and therefore regard gi as a preposition) analyzes the





















(262) VP → … (S) (some speakers for teki instrumentals)
VP → … (VP) (some speakers for teki instrumentals; all speak-
ers for go directionals; some speakers for gi da-
tive/benefactives)
VP → … (PP) (some speakers for gi dative/benefactives)
If the first of these stages represents the most primitive level of creole develop-
ment, as we have given reason to believe, then the data shown here, drawn from
a synchronic analysis of Sranan verb serialization, represent at the same time the
diachronic development of Sranan, from an original state in which presumably all
serial verbs were full verbs in tensed sentences to a stage in which these verbs
are beginning to be reduced to mere prepositions. Note that this process serves
to bring Sranan structurally closer to the high-prestige language, Dutch, with
which it has been in continuous contact for over three centuries.
Thus, there is good reason for claiming, across creole languages generally, that
the vast majority of embedded sentences are finite and tensed, and that where
exceptions to this generalization can be found, they constitute developments that
have taken place subsequent to creolization. The second half of this claim would
be hard to prove convincingly because of the inaccessibility of evidence; but I
know of neither facts nor arguments that would point in an opposite direction.
With regard to the types of complementation featuring serial verbs, it would
seem that the strongest constraint on such developments was the availability of
superstrate prepositions for case-marking purposes. Where prepositions were
available, even if African influence was strong (as with Saramaccan), they would
be chosen over serial models. In the absence of superstrate prepositions, seri-
alization would always be chosen. I suspect that it was reinvented, rather than
selected, in most if not all cases; but if not, if it was indeed selected out of a range
of substrate alternatives, the present theory would remain unaffected. This the-
ory claims that verb serialization is the only answer to the problem of marking
cases in languages which have only N and V as major categories. Thus, if such
structures were selected from a substratum, they were selected because they of-
fered the only answer, not merely because they happened to be present in the
substratum; and, in those cases where they were not present in the substratum
(as may have been the case in creoles that drew heavily on Guinean or Bantu
rather than Kwa languages), readers of Chapter 1 should have little doubt as to
the power of creole children to invent such structures, should the language they
were developing require these.
However, before leaving serial verbs, a word is in order on HCE. Substrato-
maniacs will naturally wish to attribute the absence of serial-verb constructions
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in HCE to the absence of an African substratum rather than to the presence of
prepositions. In fact, though no true serial constructions have developed as a con-
sistent part of the synchronic grammar, sporadic residues of such constructions
are to be found both in synchronic speech and in the literature. For instance, in-
strumental and directional uses of verbs would occur occasionally in the speech
of the very oldest HCE speakers:
(263) dei wan get naif pok yu











‘They went to school on foot’
Moreover, decreolization in Hawaii began so early and progressed so rapidly that
there is good reason to believe that other similar forms were already lost by the
early seventies. For instance, in basilectal GC, take it and bring it are regularly
rendered as ker am go (lit., ‘carry it go’) and bing am kom, a fact usually explained
by pointing to a similar structure in Yoruba. Smith (1939), listing the commonest
“mistakes” made by children in Hawaii – most early sources of HCE have this
deplorable pedagogical bias – mentions take om go and bring om come, only this
time the origin is given as Chinese! (In fact, the majority of children listed as
using it are non-Chinese.) However, similar forms did not occur in any of our
recordings (although the children of Smith’s study would only have been in their
forties when those recordings were made), and they would seem today to have
disappeared entirely. Yet their existence, for however brief a period, can leave
little doubt that HCE could have and would have invented regular serial-verb
constructions if no other means of marking case had been available.20
20 It would seem highly likely, indeed, that the inadequacies of existing creole descriptions, often
referred to in this volume, have served to diminish, rather than exaggerate, the degree of creole
similarity. To give just one very recent instance, it was long held that the verb-focusing rule
discussed earlier in this chapter was not found in the grammars of any of the Indian Ocean
creoles. Substratomaniacs could point to the nature of the substratum – Eastern Bantu, Mala-
gasy, and Indian languages – as an explanation of this. Now Corne (1977) reports the finding
of verb-focusing structures with a copied verb identical to those discussed in this chapter. Sub-
stratomaniacs will now doubtless seize on the claim by Baker (1976) that in 1735, 60 percent of
the nonwhite population of Mauritius was from West Africa. However, this finding is strongly
challenged by Chaudenson (1979) on the basis of historical documents which he claims Baker




We have now surveyed a wide range of creole structures across a number of
unrelated creole languages. We have seen that even taking into account the, in
some cases, several centuries of time that have elapsed since creolization, and
the heavy pressures undergone by those creoles (a large majority) that are still
in contact with their superstrates, these languages show similarities which go far
beyond the possibility of coincidental resemblance, and which are not explicable
in terms of conventional transmission processes such as diffusion or substratum
influence (the ad hoc nature of the latter should be adequately demonstrated by
the opportunism of those who attribute a structure to Yoruba when it appears in
the Caribbean and to Chinese when it appears in Hawaii). Moreover, we find that
the more we strip creoles of their more recent developments, the more we factor
out superficial and accidental features, the greater are the similarities that reveal
themselves. Indeed, it would seem reasonable to suppose that the only differ-
ences among creoles at creolization were those due to differences in the nature
of the antecedent pidgin, in particular to the extent to which superstrate features
had been absorbed by that pidgin and were therefore directly accessible to the
first creole generation in the outputs of their pidgin-speaking parents. Finally,
the overall pattern of similarity which emerges from this chapter is entirely con-
sonant with the process of building a language from the simplest constituents –
in many cases, no more than S, N, and V, the minimal constituents necessary for
a pidgin.
In theory, given these basic constituents, there are perhaps not infinitely many
but certainly a very large number of ways in which, one might suppose, a viable
human language could be built – at least as many ways as there are different
kinds of human language. This would certainly be the conclusion to which any
existing school of linguistic theory would lead one. It would, however, be an
incorrect conclusion. The fact that there appears to be only one way of building
up a language (with some, but relatively few and minor variations, of course)
strongly suggests that when this problem was originally faced, whether thirty
thousand years or thirty thousand centuries ago, it might have had to be solved
in a very similar way, and we shall further explore this possibility in Chapter 4.
In fact, the outcome of the disagreement is rather irrelevant to the real issue. Baker’s “60 per-
cent” contained 66 percent of speakers from Guinea, and Guinean languages differ markedly
in structure from the Kwa languages which are usually claimed as the source of creole struc-
tures. On Baker’s own figures, the Kwa speakers in Mauritius in 1735 must have amounted to
about 130! Within a few years, the population of Mauritius topped the 10,000 mark, swelled by
recruits from India and Madagascar (Baker admits that hardly any Kwa speakers arrived after
1735). The question that substratomaniacs have to answer is: how did 130 people manage to
impose their grammar (assuming they had a common one, which is a big assumption) upon a
population in which they were outnumbered 100 to 1?
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Our original aim in this chapter was to show that the “inventions” of HCE
speakers illustrated in Chapter 1 were not peculiar to them, but followed a regu-
lar pattern of “invention” which emerged wherever human beings had to manu-
facture an adequate language in short order from inadequate materials. Now, if
all children can indeed do this – and it would be bizarre indeed if the capacity
developed only when it was needed – they can only do so as the result of the fac-
tor which is responsible for all species-specific behavior: genetic transmission of
the bioprogram for the species.
The idea that there is a bioprogram for human (and other species) physical de-
velopment is wholly uncontroversial. No one supposes that human beings have
to learn to breathe, eat, yell when they are hurt, stand upright, or flex the muscles
of finger and thumb into what is the purely human, species-specific “precision
grip”. We speak of children “learning to walk”, and we characteristically help
them in their first stumbling efforts, hut no one seriously imagines that if we ne-
glected to do this, the child would go crawling into maturity. The term “learning”
is used here in a purely metaphorical sense.
Yet the idea that there is a bioprogram for human mental development still
meets with massive resistance, despite the fact that Piaget and his disciples have
shown how human cognitive development unrolls in a series of predetermined
and invariant stages,21 and despite the fact that, at an ever-increasing rate over
the last few decades, experiences long believed to be due to some unanalyzable
entity called “mind” – if they were indeed more than subjective illusions – have
been shown to be conditioned and in some cases entirely determined by electro-
chemical events in the brain. The mind-body dualism that has so long dominated
Western thought is beginning to seemmore and more like an artifact of armchair
philosophers operating in blissful ignorance of the laws of reality; and yet the
idea that there is an innate bioprogram that determines the form of human lan-
guage is still vigorously if often quite illogically resisted, threatening, as it seems
to, free will, mental improvement, and the whole galaxy of human dreams and
desires.
21 I am only too well aware that Piaget draws conclusions from his studies quite contrary to
those drawn here. That he does so, however, has always seemed to me baffling in light of the
fact that the developmental stages he posits bear a nativistic explanation much more easily
than they do an experiential one. But there is not space here to attempt a reinterpretation
of Piagetian findings, desirable though such an activity might seem. We will see in the next
chapter, however, that some linguistic findings of Piaget’s disciples can very easily (and very




I shall return to these fears in the final chapter. In the next chapter I want to
pursue what would appear to be an inevitable corollary of the language biopro-
gram theory. If it is the case that the creole child’s capacity to create language is
due to such a bioprogram, then, as noted above, it would be absurd to suppose
that this bioprogram functions only in the rare and unnatural circumstances in
which the normal cultural transmission of language breaks down. Forces that are
under genetic control simply cannot be turned on and off in this way. Therefore,
if our theory is correct, it should be the case that the acquisition of language
under normal circumstances should differ considerably from what has hitherto
been supposed.
Briefly, the theory predicts that instead of merely processing linguistic input,
the child will seek to actualize the blueprint for language with which his biopro-
gram provides him. We should note from the outset that there are numerous
differences between the present theory and earlier Chomskyan theories of lin-
guistic innateness, although the latter are often so vague that such differences
are not always clear. One point that should be made is that in the present theory,
the child is not supposed to “know” the bioprogram language from birth – what-
ever that might mean – any more than we would suppose that a child at birth,
or even at six months, “knows” how to walk. Rather, the bioprogram language
would unfold, just as a physical bioprogram unfolds; the language would grow
just as the body grows, presenting the appropriate structures at the appropriate
times and in the appropriate, preprogrammed sequences (I shall have more to
say about the mechanisms by which this might be accomplished when we come
to Chapter 4).
However, the vast mass of human children are not growing up in even a par-
tial linguistic vacuum. There will be a ready-made language which their elders
will be determined that they should learn. Thus, almost (but not quite) from the
earliest stages, the evolving bioprogram will interact with the target language.
Sometimes features in the bioprogram will be very similar to features in the tar-
get language, in which case we will find extremely rapid, early, and apparently
effortless learning. Sometimes the target language will have evolved away from
the bioprogram, to a greater or lesser extent, and in these cases we will expect
to find common or even systematic “errors” which, in orthodox learning theory,
will be attributed to “incorrect hypotheses” formed by the child, but which, I
shall claim, are simply the result of the child’s ignoring (because he is not ready
for it) the data presented by speakers of the target language and following out
instead the instructions of his bioprogram.
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Clearly, then, it should be possible to examine existing studies of child lan-
guage acquisition and reinterpret them in light of the theory outlined above. If
that theory is correct, we expect to find a wide variety of evidence that would
arise directly from the interaction of bioprogram and target language, and hope-
fully, be able to account for phenomena of acquisition which have remained mys-
terious in all previous theories. Accordingly, the next chapter will present just
such a survey of the existing literature on language acquisition.
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In recent work, a number of scholars (e.g., Bruner 1979; Snow 1979) have sum-
marized the development of acquisition studies over the last two decades. In the
mid-sixties, the field, which had previously been atheoretical and somewhat un-
derdeveloped, came to be dominated by a type of innatist theory. This theory,
derived largely from generative grammar, and in particular from works such as
Chomsky (1962), held that the child acquired language through simple exposure
to linguistic data, much of which was “degenerate” – i.e., consisted of sentence
fragments, mid-sentence reformulations, and many types of performance error
which would render natural speech a very unreliable mirror to mature native-
speaker competence. Somehow the child had to sift the wheat from the chaff,
and he could only do this, it was claimed, if he had some kind of inbuilt Lan-
guage Acquisition Device (LAD). A LAD would contain a set of linguistic univer-
sals, presumed to be innate and genetically transmitted. These universals would
not, however, precisely specify a particular potential language, as in the theory
described at the end of the last chapter; rather, they would define somewhat
narrowly the limits on the forms which human language might take, thereby
drastically reducing the number of hypotheses that the child could make about
the structure of his future native tongue and rendering it correspondingly easy
for him to select the correct hypothesis.
Since it is well known that children, whatever else they may do, do not in
fact instantly and unerringly make correct hypotheses about adult structures,
but rather approximate to those structures by means of a fairly regular and well-
defined series of stages, the innocent observer might have expected the next step
to consist of an examination of the initial (and often incorrect) “hypotheses”made
by the child, to determine why it was that particular hypothesis, rather than any
other, was originally selected. Further steps might have consisted of determining
in what ways the child discovered the falsity of his original hypothesis and how
he subsequently modified it (or selected an alternative) in order to approximate
more closely to the linguistic models available to him.
Unfortunately, nothing of the kind was done. The founders of generative the-
ory remained grandly aloof from the hare they had started, claiming that real-
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world acquisition processes were still too chaotic and ill understood to constitute
a legitimate object of study and taking refuge in the “idealization of instantane-
ity” described in Chomsky & Halle (1968: Chapter 7). Workers in the field were
not simply left to their own devices; they were continually harassed by endless
revisions of the theory. Doing acquisition work along Chomskyan lines became
rather like playing a game in which every few minutes the umpires revise the
rules.
Bearing this in mind-and bearing in mind too that workers in the field not only
had no training in the analysis of variability and dynamic process generally but
also had been given no reason even to think that such trainingmight be necessary
– it is not surprising that their results were somewhat unrevealing. In general, as
shown, for example, in Brown & Hanlon (1970), Brown (1973), Bowerman (1973),
etc., the predictions that generative theory seemed to make about acquisition
were simply not borne out: young children did not show conclusive evidence
that they knew S→ NP VP or other basic PS rules; syntactic structures were not
acquired in the order that was dictated by their relative complexity, and so on.
At the same time, and inspired at least in part by themeager results of generative-
oriented work, many scholars began to question the assumptions on which this
work was based. Was the input really degenerate? Was learning as rapid as had
been claimed? Did it take place in the cognitive vacuum that at least seemed to be
implied, if not actually asserted, in most generative writing? Upon examination,
a number of these assumptions appeared to be partly or even wholly incorrect.
Thus, there came about in the early seventies a very rapid and extreme swing of
the pendulum, leading to an all but universal consensus among those working
directly on acquisition which persists, with relatively minor variations, up to the
present.
This consensus, while not ruling out entirely the possibility that some kinds of
innate mechanisms may be involved in acquisition, systematically plays down
and degrades the role of such mechanisms, often regarding them as constituting
no more than a “predisposition” to acquire language, whatever that might mean
(they never do say). The consensus holds, however, that prelinguistic communi-
cation and extralinguistic knowledge (acquired, naturally, through experience)
play crucially important roles in acquisition, but that perhaps the most critical
role of all is that of the interaction, paralinguistic as well as linguistic, which
takes place between the child and the mother (or other caregiver). The mother, it
is claimed, models language for the child, adapting her outputs to his linguistic
level at every stage. Far from being degenerate, the data she provides are highly
preadapted, highly contextualized, and patiently repeated. “Mothers teach their
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children to speak,” Bruner (1979) states. When all these factors are taken fully
into account, the consensus claims, the need to posit an innate component in
language acquisition shrinks to near zero or even disappears altogether.
Unfortunately, the whole position of this consensus is based on a fallacy – a
fallacy that should be readily apparent to all readers of the two previous chapters.
That fallacy is perhaps most concisely expressed by Snow (1979: 367) when she
remarks that “Chomsky’s position regarding the unimportance of the linguistic
input was unproven, since all children, in addition to possessing an innate linguis-
tic ability, also receive a simplified, well-formed and redundant corpus” (emphasis
added). This is quite simply untrue. The input that the first creole generation in
Hawaii received was over-simplified rather than simplified, and was as far from
being well formed as anyone could imagine; and we can assume that in other
areas where creoles formed the same state of affairs must have existed. Mother
could not teach these children to speak, for the simple and inescapable reason
that Mother herself did not know the language – the language didn’t exist yet.
But even so, without Mother, those children learned how to speak.
In addition to this fallacy of fact, the Bruner-Snow position is based on a simple
logical fallacy. If we accept that in the vast majority of circumstances mothers
do teach and children do learn, it by no means follows that children learn be-
cause mothers teach. It would be logically quite possible to argue that there is no
connection whatsoever between mothers’ teaching and children’s learning, any
more than there is between children’s walking and uncles’ dragging them around
the room by their fingertips. If it could be shown that without well-formed input
from the mother the child could not learn to speak then we might indeed assume
a causal connection. In fact, we have shown the reverse: well-formed input from
the mother cannot constitute even a necessary condition for children to acquire
language; for, otherwise, creoles could not exist.
But our argument, though logically correct, need not be pushed to its logical
extreme. I am perfectly willing to accept that if mother did not teach her child
English, that childmight have amuch harder time learning it – even that the child
might never acquire a perfected form of the language, but might significantly
distort it in the direction of the kind of pattern we reviewed in the last chapter.
All I want to claim is that if we persist in believing that the child must have
input in order to learn, we shall continue to misunderstand completely the way
in which he does learn a developed, natural language. Just as the child does
not need mother in order to learn, so he could not learn even with a myriad of
mothers if he did not have the genetic program that alone enables him to take
advantage of her teaching.
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In fact, the evidence we reviewed in the first two chapters of this book has
simply never been taken into account in studies of child language acquisition.
The vast majority of scholars in the field evince no awareness whatsoever of the
existence, let alone the possible significance, of pidgins and creoles; an honorable
exception is Slobin (especially Slobin 1977). Unfortunately, the data available to
Slobin at the time were by no means as ample as those given in the present
volume; moreover, he makes the common mistake of supposing Tok Pisin to be
paradigmatic of normal pidgin-creole development. Still, even limited access to
pidgin-creole data is better for acquisitionists than none, and in consequence
we shall find the work of Slobin and his associates illuminating on a number of
points in the pages that follow.
Meanwhile, in the absence of the insights provided by creolization, the current
paradigm has provided us with much information that we lacked before – on the
nature of input to the child and of child-caregiver interaction; on the acquisition
of turn-taking, conversational routines, and the kind of social appropriateness
summed up under Hymes’s concept of “communicative competence”; “on acqui-
sition strategies” based on contextualization, semantic and pragmatic clues to
the function of novel structures, etc., etc. – and yet, as more and more thought-
ful scholars are realizing, the gathering of this information has merely served to
conceal the fact that the central question of acquisition, the question with which
the early generativists did at least struggle, however unsuccessfully, is simply
not being answered:
How can the child acquire syntactic and semantic patterns of great arbitrari-
ness and complexity in such a way that they can be used creatively without
making mistakes?
Cromer (1976: 353), for instance, observes that the concept of “acquisition strat-
egy” “has made us aware of some of the ways by which the child may possibly
“get into” the linguistic system. It has shown us the importance of perceptual
mechanisms for interpreting utterances, and how as adult speakers with full lin-
guistic competence we nevertheless rely on a number of short cuts to under-
standing … The concept of language acquisition strategies has told us much –
except how the child acquires language.” Bowerman (1979), who cites this pas-
sage with approval, further points out that while such strategies may enable chil-
dren to understand utterances which still lie outside their developing grammars,
those strategies do not and indeed cannot, in and of themselves, assign struc-
tural descriptions to these novel utterances. Yet children must achieve this kind
of structural knowledge if they are subsequently to use such utterances them-
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selves in a productive and creative way – understanding something is miles away
from manipulating that something freely and voluntarily. In other words, strate-
gies belong in the realm of performance, and the problem is, how do you get
from performance to competence? Small wonder that so many supporters of the
current consensus seek to downgrade, ignore, or even abolish the competence-
performance distinction. But real problems cannot be defined away.
I propose, therefore, to review the literature on acquisition as it concerns cer-
tain core syntactic and semantic structures, in particular some that we have had
occasion to deal with in earlier chapters, to see whether what we know of the
acquisition process supports or fails to support the hypotheses advanced at the
end of the last chapter. To the extent that these hypotheses are supported, the
general theory of a human language bioprogram will tend to be confirmed. To
the extent that these hypotheses fail to be supported, doubts will be cast upon
the theory, although the reader should perhaps be reminded that not even the
most thorough refutation, in the arena of child language, would make the initial
problem which led to the theory – the fact that creoles are learned without ex-
perience – miraculously go away. At worst, such refutation would merely drive
us back to a reconsideration of that problem.
But before commencing this review, three words of caution are in order: the
first concerning the data; the second concerning the reviewer; the third concern-
ing the theory.
From our point of view, the data suffers from two defects. First, much of it
has been presorted in ways that automatically diminish its utility. There are a
variety of reasons for this, but I shall deal with only one in detail, since it is fairly
typical. Around 1970, when acqusitionists were still concerned with proving (or
disproving) generative predictions about acquisition, it appeared that one way
of doing this would be to see whether features of a language were acquired in
an order which conformed to some kind of hierarchy of grammatical complexity
– simplest first, most complex later on. But in order to do this, it was necessary
to determine exactly what one meant by “acquisition of a feature.” Children are
such messy creatures; instead of quietly going to bed one night without a feature,
and waking up with it, as the Chomskyan idealization of “instantaneous acqui-
sition” suggests they should, they stubbornly insist on alternating presence and
absence of that feature in appropriate contexts, not to mention absence and pres-
ence of that feature in inappropriate contexts, for periods of weeks, months, and
occasionally even years.
Not only that, but the little beasts do not even proceed as reason dictates they
should, gradually and cumulatively diminishing inappropriate usages as they in-
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crease appropriate ones; on the contrary, a graph of their appropriate produc-
tions zigzags up and down like a malaria victim’s temperature chart, before fi-
nally leveling off at or near the 100 percent mark. The innocent observer might
think that the most interesting thing you could do in acquisition study would be
to figure out why this happens, but as usual, he would be disappointed. Fashion
and expediency dictate that order must be imposed on disorder: to determine
the order of acquisition – a “need” dictated merely by current theory – Brown
(1973) established a purely arbitrary “criterion” for acquisition, i.e., a 90 percent
production rate in appropriate environments, maintained over three consecutive
recording sessions. The reign of the criterion merely reinforced what has always
been a trend in acquisition studies, and a deplorable one: to look to the goal rather
than the path, to ask “What has the child acquired?” rather than “How has he
acquired it?” In consequence, masses of potentially valuable data, which would
be required by any interesting acquisition theory, were simply flushed down the
drain.1
In addition to deficiencies of this nature, we have to remember that all the
data collected to date were collected for very different purposes than the present
one. It is a general law applicable to all research that one tends to find what one
is looking for, and not to find what one is not looking for. Hence, it would be
unrealistic if we expected to find massive quantities of unambiguous evidence
pointing toward the truth of our theory, which had yet somehow been missed
by previous observers. The most that one can ever hope for from data collected
under other assumptions and for other purposes than one’s own are oblique hints,
gaps that one’s own hypotheses might fill, puzzles set aside that might begin to
make sense in the context of a different framework. However, if one finds any
of these at all, it is a reasonable assumption that a purposeful search of raw data
sources would reveal much more-something comparable to the invisible eight-
ninths of the iceberg.
With regard to the second word of caution, I can lay claim to no special exper-
1 Even today, I know of no study of child language acquisition in any language which follows the
simple and obvious procedure of noting the very first emergence of a given form or structure
in a child’s speech, then following the development of that feature until Brown’s “criterion”
is reached – meanwhile noting what that form or structure alternated with in those contexts
where it was inappropriate, as well as those where it was appropriate, with the aim of figuring
out why variation occurred and what the form or structure might mean to the child. Nor-
mally, second-language acquisition trots along obediently in the footsteps of first-language
acquisition, but here roles are reversed, as my student, Tom Huebner, is about to complete a
dissertation which applies the above approach to the acquisition of English by an immigrant
Hmong speaker (see also Huebner 1979). The field is wide open for similar first-language stud-
ies, which should help to revolutionize our understanding of acquisition.
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tise in the field of child language. In creoles, I have fourteen years’ experience,
most of them spent in direct contact with native creole speakers, so that I can
speak in that field with some degree of confidence. In language acquisition, I
can claim to be no more than an assiduous reader of the literature, and in conse-
quence, both my knowledge and my understanding may be at fault sometimes.
On the credit side, I can only offer complete uninvolvement in any of the con-
troversies that have racked the field (for, as we shall see, my position, although
innatist, is really no closer to the orthodoxChomskyan one than it is to the “moth-
erese” school), and the freshness of perspective that a novel viewpoint may on
occasion bring. So be it: the facts will decide.
Finally, a word of caution about the theory. Straw-man versions of innatist the-
ories abound, and in particular, those which claim that to stress the function of an
innate component in acquisition is automatically equivalent to completely writ-
ing off all other modes of learning and all other aids to learning. In the present
case, this particular straw man has even less substance than usual. The language
bioprogram theory is, as we shall see in Chapter 4, an evolutionary theory, and
the bioprogram itself is an adaptive evolutionary device. Now, it is the nature
of such devices that they are facilitatory, not pre-emptive; that is to say, their
whole adaptive function is lost if they force a species into a position where that
species is dependent upon them and upon them alone, by inhibiting the action
of other adaptive processes. In addition to whatever we may have in the way
of innate language equipment, we also have a wide variety of learning strate-
gies and problem-solving routines which are applicable to a range of situations
far broader than language. It would be absurd to suppose that in the presence
of data classified as “linguistic,” all these routines and strategies should simply
switch off.
It would be equally absurd to suppose that they and the innate language com-
ponent would be always and necessarily at war with one another. Sometimes
their respective promptings may combine, sometimes theymay point in opposite
directions; which way is an empirical issue at any given point. But their interac-
tion must form the core of any complete description of language acquisition. If I
have ignored other resources in the present study, and have concentrated solely
on the innate component, that is for strategic purposes only; besides, general
cognitive processes have had far more than equal time in the last decade, and
the turn of hardcore syntax and semantics has come around again. But I believe
that in order to acquire language – a feat which is, so far as we yet know, with-
out parallel in the entire universe – we need every ounce of help, particular or
general, innate or acquired through experience, that we can get.
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To pit one kind against another simply demonstrates a failure to understand
how complex language really is.2
With these preliminaries disposed of, we can begin our review. The evidence
we shall consider will fall into two quite separate classes. One class will consist
of the “incorrect hypotheses” which, in the course of language acquisition, chil-
dren often make, yet which often seem to have no simple explanation either in
the structure of the input the child receives or in any general theory of acquisi-
tion. The similarity between such “hypotheses” and the structures which actually
emerge as part of the grammars of creole languages is often quite striking, and
when I first contemplated writing this chapter, I felt certain that examples drawn
from this class would constitute by far the strongest evidence in favor of the bio-
program theory. After writing the first draft of this chapter, however, I became
much less certain, not so much because of the weakness of the original evidence
– although there are some phenomena, as I shall show, which may allow alterna-
tive explanations – but because of the growing impression that a much subtler
and less obvious class of evidence made on me.
As the “incorrect hypotheses” suggested, there were many things in language
which children seemed to find quite difficult to learn, often spending years before
they acquired full control over the structures concerned. On the other hand, there
were certain other things which seemed to give them no trouble at all, which they
learned very early in the acquisition process and/or without any of the “mistakes”
which arose so frequently in other areas. On principle, one might suppose that
these differences correlated with some kind of scale of relative difficulty, and yet
it was extremely difficult to see exactly what objective factors might constitute
such a scale. Indeed, from a commonsense linguistic viewpoint, some of the
things that were easily and effortlessly acquired looked a lot more difficult to
learn than some of the things that gave so much trouble.
But obviously, to talk about things being “difficult” or “easy” from an adult
standpoint is totally irrelevant in an acquisition context. What is “difficult” or
2 In fact, rather than such a conflict, the present theory entails a division of labor. The innate
component is necessary in order to get the child into a position where he can learn any human
language, for as Fodor (1975) argues (see below), it is impossible to learn a language unless you
already know a language. Some other kind of component is necessary to get the child from
the innate creole-like grammar to the idiosyncratic grammars of Italian, Yoruba, Akawaio,
Walbiri, or whatever language that particular child is going to have to learn as part of his
socialization. Because I have not discussed this second component in the present volume, the
reader should not conclude that I deny its importance. My failure to say anything about it is,
as I said, strategic; until we know where the innate component stops, we cannot know where
any other devices start.
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“easy” for the child is all that is of interest and one might therefore conclude
that what seems “difficult” to us might seem “easy” to the child, and vice versa.
However, a moment’s thought should show that it was not so much the adult
viewpoint as the use of the words “easy” and “difficult” themselves that was at
fault in our original formulation.
Terms like “easy” and “difficult” imply an act of evaluation which in turn de-
pends on the capacity to compare one task with another, which in turn depends
on prior experience of tasks with differing levels of difficulty. Thus, when we
acquire a second language, we can say that its derivational morphology, for ex-
ample, is difficult to learn, while its relativization processes, say, are relatively
easy. Such remarks are meaningful only because we already know a language
and can measure features of the second language against those of the first. If we
had not previously learned a language, we would have no standard of compari-
son; moreover, it is at least in part the nature of what we have already learned
that determines whether what we are now about to learn will turn out easy or
difficult for us.
Now, if we say that something is easy for a two-year-old to learn, we can-
not possibly mean any of this; all we can mean is that the child is somehow
preadapted to learn that thing, rather than other things, or that in terms of the
present theory, he is programmed to learn it. If, as we shall see is the case, the
things that children learn early, effortlessly, and errorlessly turn out repeatedly
to be key features of creole languages, which the children of first creole genera-
tions acquire in the absence of direct experience, we can then assume that such
early, effortless, and errorless learning results, not from characteristics of the in-
put, or from the efforts of the mother – since the features involved are often too
abstract to be known to any but the professional linguist – but rather from the
functioning of the innate bioprogram which we have hypothesized.
I find evidence of this second class to be evenmore convincing than that drawn
from systematic error, and will accordingly begin by considering some exam-
ples of it. The first concerns the learning of the specific-nonspecific distinction
(henceforth SNSD) by English-speaking children. This distinction, as we saw in
Chapters 1 and 2, is explicitly represented in all creole grammars by the opposi-
tion between zero and realized determiners. It is expressed in English too, but
much more obliquely, as we will see.
The most comprehensive study of the acquisition of English articles is that of
Maratsos (1974; 1976), who confirmed bymeans of ingenious experiments the nat-
uralistic observations of Brown (1973), i.e., that the article system is mastered at
a very early age. Some of Maratsos’ findings have been questioned in subsequent
131
3 Acquisition
work (Warden 1976; Karmiloff-Smith 1979), but such criticisms relate only to the
earliness with which the definite-nondefinite distinction is acquired. No one has
challenged Maratsos’ finding that the SNSD is handled virtually without error
by three-year-olds, well ahead of the earliest date by which the child masters the
definite-nondefinite distinction.
At first sight, this is an odd finding since the latter distinction is clearly marked
in English, while the SNSD is not. In English, “definite” really means presumed
known to the listener, whether by prior knowledge (“the man you met yester-
day”), uniqueness in the universe (“the sun is setting”), uniqueness in a given
setting (“the battery is dead” – cars do not usually have more than one battery),
or general knowledge that a named class exists (“the dog is the friend of man”).
“Indefinite” really means presumed unknown to the listener, whether by absence
of prior knowledge (“a man you should meet is Mr. Blank”), nonexistence of a
nameable referent (“Bill is looking for a wife”), or nonexistence of any referent
(“George couldn’t see an aardvark anywhere”). In other words, the two classes
are systematically distinguished by the distribution of the and a/an.
Specific and nonspecific, however, are not systematically distinguished. Con-
sider the following:
(1) If you’re sick, you should see the doctor (NS).
(2) Call the doctor who treated Marge (S).
(3) The doctor may succeed where the priest fails (NS).
(4) Dogs are mammals (NS).
(5) The dog is a mammal (NS).
(6) A dog is a mammal (NS).
(7) A dog just bit me (S).
(8) Mary can’t stand to have a dog in the room (NS).
In fact, the onlyway inwhich English distinguishes specifics from nonspecifics
is in constructions with at least two articles. If a given referent is specific, it will
receive a on first mention and the on second and subsequent mention:
(9) Bill bought a cat and a dog, but the children only like the dog.
If a given referent is nonspecific, it will receive a on first mention and on second
and subsequent mention:
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(10) Bill wanted to buy a cat and a dog, but he couldn’t find a dog that he
really liked.
Maratsos constructed an ingenious set of stories which his child subjects were
asked to complete. In some of the stories, reference was made to a specific entity;
in others, to a nonspecific entity; in both cases, naturally, the entity was intro-
duced into the story as a NP. However, the completion task required the child to
produce a NP just in case the entity was nonspecific, and the NP just in case the
entity was specific, in accordance with the rule illustrated in (9) and (10) above
(for full texts of the stories and a more complete description of the experiments,
see Maratsos 1976).
The success rate in this experiment was almost 90 percent for three-year-olds
and over 90 percent for four-year-olds. In order to maintain these high rates,
the children had to determine that out of some NPs identically marked, half had
specific real-world referents and half had not. The stories were original and con-
tained no contextual clues as to the status of the referents. How did the children
succeed so often?
Maratsos himself was surprised and impressed by his subjects’ capacities, and
he discusses the implications of his experiments at some length and with great
insight. He notes that the high frequency of articles in adult speech is often
regarded as an adequate explanation of the relative earliness and lack of error
shown in the acquisition of articles. He points out, however, that “although the
frequency of [articles’] usemay somehow serve to bring them to the child’s atten-
tion and provide data for him, he must still select and attach to the articles just
those abstract differences in the circumstances of their use that correspond to
the specific-nonspecific distinction. One clear requirement is that he have avail-
able some conceptual understanding of such matters as the difference between
the notion of any member (or no member) of a class and that of a particular class
member. This understanding must be sufficiently well articulated for the child to
perceive just this difference in the circumstances of use of the definite and indef-
inite morphemes and construct the meaning of the terms accordingly” (Maratsos
1974: 453).
Let us try to reconstruct the process or processes by which the child might
arrive at this perception. We will ignore the problems that arise from the child’s
original isolation and recognition of articles, although these are far from trivial
(especially with a, so frequently reduced to an unstressed schwa and so closely
linked to its following NP that morpheme boundary perception becomes quite
difficult), and deal solely with how, having recognized them, he determines their
functions. If the conventional accounts are correct, the child can do this in only
two ways – through linguistic context or through extralinguistic context.
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The nature of the problems involved can be better understood if we compare
the acquisition of articles with the acquisition of plural marking, which occurs
at roughly the same age (a very few weeks later, according to Brown 1973). The
plural morpheme marks a single, straightforward distinction – one/more than
one – and it does so biuniquely, that is to say, in a one-morpheme, one-meaning
relationship: when the morpheme is present, one meaning is entailed; when it
is absent, the other meaning is entailed. Articles are, from a purely formal view-
point, much more complex than that. Three articles, the, a, and zero, represent
two distinctions – supposed-known-to-listener / supposed-unknown-to-listener
and specific-referent / no-specific-referent – but without the biuniqueness that
relates semantics to surface representation in the case of plurals. Instead, with
regard to the second distinction only (the SNSD), there are two morphemes with
one meaning (both a and the can have specific reference) and one morpheme
with two meanings (a can be both specific and nonspecific).
Let us suppose that the child can first factor out the distinction between a and
the (although in fact he cannot even rely on this aid; Warden (1976) and Karmiloff-
Smith (1979) show that it will be several years before he is able to overcome this
potential distraction). He then has to distinguish specific from nonspecific a. One
might think he could do this by distinguishing between linguistic environments.
For instance, the scope of negation is often crucial in determining whether a
given occurrence of a NP is specific or nonspecific: the difference between I saw
a dog (S) and I didn’t see a dog (NS), for instance. So is the scope of desiderative
verbs: the difference between I want a dog (NS) and I have a dog (S). Those who
put their trust in extralinguistic context will, however, point out, quite correctly,
that things like desiderative scope and negative scope are themselves extremely
abstract relations, unlikely to be capturable by two-year-olds.
But in fact the problem is even tougher than we have suggested; there are
many cases in which a mere tense switch marks the SNSD:
(11) When you see a dog (NS), are you frightened?
(12) When you saw a dog (S), were you frightened?
Since the child’s control of tense is, at the appropriate age, highly questionable
at best, it is implausible to suppose that he could utilize such clues.3 Again, there
are cases when desiderative scope alone is insufficient to mark the distinction:
3 Or at least it is implausible to suppose that he could utilize them if he did not have some overall
conceptual framework in which past tense (punctual, in our treatment) was associated with
unique events and present tense (nonpunctual, in our treatment) was associated with generic
events. How such an arbitrary framework could be derived from experience is totally opaque
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(13) Your little sister wants a dog – any kind of dog (NS).
(14) Your little sister wants a dog – and it’s that one (S)!
In fact, the only reliable indicator of the SNSD is not a single article use, but a
series of articles uses; an a-a sequence, as in (10) above, as opposed to an a-the
sequence, as in (9) above.
However, as Maratsos (1976: 95) again points out, it is at least highly ques-
tionable whether the child can take advantage of clues provided by sequences,
especially when members of such sequences are not necessarily adjacent – as
they are in (9) and (10) – but may be separated by several sentences: “It is easy to
forget that the child, to the best of our present knowledge, does not have an ex-
tensive corpus of data at any one time with which to work. He probably cannot
record numerous long stretches of conversation and all of the contextual infor-
mation that accompanied them, as can an adult linguist investigating a novel
language.”
We must therefore conclude that a child would be, at best, highly unlikely to
derive the SNSD from analysis of purely linguistic context.
Yet is it any more likely that he could learn it from physical experience or any
other kind of extralinguistic source? As noted above, recent studies have con-
centrated heavily on the here-and-nowness of speech aimed at children, and on
the child’s prelinguistic experiences in the world of objects. It is hard to see just
how either of these could help with the SNSD. As Maratsos (1976: 94) remarks,
“specific and nonspecific reference are connected in no clear way with external
physical attributes or relations of perceived objects.” For example, nonspecific
reference is usually (although not always) made in the absence of any member
of the referent class: we don’t have a doggy, Daddy’s looking for a doggy for you,
a doggy would be nice to play with, wouldn’t it? and so on. But specific reference
is made just as often in the absence of the referent : a dog bit Jessie yesterday, I
saw a dog you’d really have liked in town today, and so on. How does the child
determine that of the two absent sets of referents one is concrete while the other
is only hypothetical? If he did not do so, he would score no better than chance
on Maratsos’ tests.
While it is true that many concepts are formed by the child prior to language
learning, these are generally concepts which relate to physical objects which
the child can see, touch, etc. Moreover, it is reasonably clear that such concepts
are arrived at by interaction with experience rather than by merely processing
to me. But it might be derivable from species-specific or even genus-specific neural wiring,
along the lines suggested in Chapter 4.
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language input. If the child only processed linguistic tokens of dog, for example,
he would presumably apply the term only to members of the appropriate species;
whereas, as is well known, the initial meaning of dog, for the child, is likely to
be ‘any four-legged mammal’. Thus, we know that the child reaches out ahead
of linguistic experience, so to speak, in order to derive ways of talking about the
world.
But how could the child derive knowledge of purely abstract relationships from
direct experience? A comparison with plural-marking acquisition is again very
much to the point. Plural marking is directly associated with relations that the
child is physically able to observe. He can see and feel at any given time whether
he has one toy or several, whether he is allowed only one cookie or more than
one; the grammatical marking of nouns correlates directly with manifest and
obvious differences in his perceptual field. But the distinction between an ac-
tual member of a class (which more often than not is not physically present)
and an imaginary representative of that same class is in no way one that can
be determined by the organs of perception, or inferred from any kind of direct
experience. The SNSD involves comparisons, not between physical entities, but
between purely mental representations; one can only marvel that a child, for
whom the boundaries between real and unreal are notoriously vague, should be
able to make it at all, by any means.
Indeed, that he should even hypothesize such a distinction – as would, pre-
sumably, be claimed by those who believe in a hypothesis-forming, hypothesis-
testing LAD – is highly implausible. Even about possible functions of a and the,
there are many possible hypotheses that might be made. Since definites tend to
be subjects while indefinite tend to be objects, one might hypothesize that the
marks agents and a marks patients. Since the often co-occurs with NPs that are
physically present and a with NPs that are physically absent one might hypoth-
esize that the and a mark poles of some kind of proximal-distal distinction. In
fact, so far as we know, such hypotheses are never made. In any case, they would
affect only a and the; with regard to a alone, why on earth should the child even
start by hypothesizing that there are really two kinds of a? Moreover, since two-
year-olds use few or no articles, and the SNSD is acquired by about the age of
three, it would have to be just about the first hypothesis the child makes – there
would hardly be time to frame and discard any other. To say that the child invari-
ably forms a correct hypothesis about the SNSD as his first hypothesis is simply
an issue-dodging way of saying that he is programmed to make the SNSD.
Indeed, we can only conclude that the SNSDwould be quite impossible to learn,
by means of linguistic data, or of experience, or of any hypothesis-forming pro-
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cess, or of any feasible combination of these. For the child to make the SNSD
as early and as successfully as he does, he would have to be somehow prepro-
grammed to make it.
This proposal is strongly supported by the creole data reviewed in Chapters 1
and 2. We saw there that the SNSD was made by the first creole generation in
Hawaii (even though none of their HPE-speaking parents made it) and that it is
made consistently, and always by the same means, in all creole languages. If we
assume a language bioprogram that includes the SNSD in its specifications, the
problem of how the child acquires that distinction in English becomes a manage-
able one. The child knows of the distinction in advance and is therefore looking
out (at a purely subconscious level, of course) for surface features in the target
language that will mark it. If no other feature is pre-programmed for NP, which
is likely, then the fact that the SNSD constitutes the child’s first “hypothesis” is
no longer bewildering, but an automatic consequence of the theory.
The skeptical reader may, however, ask: if creole children following the bio-
program universally mark the SNSD by allotting zero marking to nonspecifics,
how is it that children learning English, prior to correctly interpreting the two
as, do not mark, or at least attempt to mark, nonspecifics with zero, as creole
children do? The answer is that we do not know that they do not.
Earlier, I referred to deficiencies in the data due to excessive concentration
on the goals rather than the paths of acquisition. Here is a case in point. Even
as conscientious and insightful a scholar as Maratsos confesses (1974: 450) that
“only full noun phrases of the form article plus noun were counted; answers
which included no article, such as boy, were not counted in the analysis.” Another
careful investigator, Brown (1973), who allots some sixteen pages to a discussion
of articles in early child speech, makes no reference to zero forms, and in what
he claims is a “full list of errors in definite and nondefinite reference for Adam,
Eve and Sarah from Stages IV and V” (1973: Table 51) includes only cases of a
where the is indicated, and cases of the where a is indicated – no zeros at all. Yet
from what Maratsos says, and from mere common sense, one knows there must
have been zeros; after all, the child has no articles at the two-word stage, and
obviously does not acquire the surface forms overnight.
The present theory predicts that when a substantial body of early child lan-
guage is properly examined, there will be found to be a significant skewing in
article placement, such that a significantly higher percentage of articles will be
assigned to specific-reference NP, while zero forms will persist in nonspecific
environments longer than elsewhere. Such examination affords a simple and
straightforward means of empirically testing the claims made about the innate-
ness of the SNSD in this chapter.
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We will now examine another distinction which is made even earlier and with-
out, apparently, even a single reported case of error. This is the distinction be-
tween states and processes, including under the latter rubric verbs of experienc-
ing as well as action verbs (hereafter referred to as the state-process distinction,
or SPD).The SPD is directly involved in the acquisition of the English progressive
marker -ing.
In general, the acquisition of novel morphology by the child is attended by
cases of over-generalization, a number of which are discussed in Cazden (1968).
Thus, the consistency in the final segments of possessive pronouns leads to pro-
duction of the aberrant form *mines, while plurals such as *sheeps, *foots (or
*feets), *mouses, etc., and past-tense forms such as *comed, *goed (or *wented),
*buyed, etc., occur in the speech of most, if not all, child learners of English.
The -ing form is acquired even earlier than the -ed form (before any of the
other thirteen morphemes studied in Brown (1973), and as early as the second
year in at least some cases). Also, just as there are verbs that do not take -ed,
there are verbs that do not take -ing (with certain qualifications, see Sag 1973),
such as like, want, know, see, etc. These verbs are quite common in children’s
speech, probably as common as many of the irregular verbs to which children
incorrectly attach -ed. Yet, apparently, children never ever attach -ing to stative
verbs.
Kuczaj (1978) has argued that the two cases are not really commensurate since
with the past tense there are other ways of marking than -ed (just as with plurals
there are other ways of marking than -s), whereas in the case of -ing, English has
no alternative way of marking progressive aspect. This argument is somewhat
disingenuous since zero can be a term in a subsystem, and it is hard to see what
the difference would be between, on the one hand, adding -s to sheep to make
sheeps or -ed to put to make putted, and, on the other hand, adding -ing to like to
yield I am liking you. A more pertinent observation would be that verbs which
do not take -ing, as opposed to verbs which do not take -ed or nouns which do
not take -s, constitute a natural semantic class; we shall return to this point in a
moment.
In fact, Kuczaj undercuts his own argument by observing that children do in-
deed over-generalize -ing, but not to stative verbs – rather, to nonverbal items,
as in (15):
(15) Why is it weathering?
(presumably, ‘Why is the weather so bad?’)
Note that, in fact, weather is a plausible candidate for admission to the list of
“climatic” verbs that yield expressions such as it is raining / snowing / thundering,
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etc. But all these verbs have in common the fact that they are nonstatives, as
weather would be also if it were a verb in the sense of (15). The fact that children
will generalize -ing even to nouns if and only if such nouns have a plausible
nonstative reading makes their abstemiousness with respect to stative verbs
even more significant.
Brown (1973: 326ff) rightly regards it as remarkable that children should be
“able to learn a concept like involuntary state before they [are] three years old”,
and explores several hypotheses which might account for such learning. In the
case of one child, Eve, he was able to show that many nonstatives, as well as
statives, were unmarked by -ing, and that the unmarked nonstatives were pre-
cisely those which Eve’s mother seldom used with progressive aspect; on the
other hand, the nonstatives which the mother did use frequently with -ing were
precisely those which appeared with -ing in Eve’s speech. However, a similar
relationship did not hold for the other children in Brown’s study; and as Brown
himself pointed out, even if it had held, it would not have provided a solution.
For anyone who claimed that children delayed applying -ing to a verb until they
learned from experience that it was “-ingable” would then be forced to explain
why a similar caution and restraint was not applied to other morphemes, like -ed
and -s, where over-generalizations abounded.
Brown next considered the possibility that the SPD was learned from impera-
tives and transferred to progressives, since the verbs that will not take -ing are
just those that cannot be used in the imperative. Against this possibility, Brown
argued that it would depend also on imperative usage being errorless; and it was
simply impossible to tell whether this was the case since, especially in Stage I,
children’s imperatives are often formally indistinguishable from their declara-
tives (want cookie looks like an imperative, but is probably no more than the
child’s version of ‘I want a cookie’).
A stronger argument against the “imperative transfer” hypothesis, not made
by Brown, involves first recognizing that Brown’s argument is in error; children
could learn imperatives through trial and error and, having learned at last the
list of verbs which could not be imperatives, simply apply that knowledge to the
learning of -ing. But trial-and-error learning of imperatives is more implausible
than errorless learning of imperatives, and for the following reason: in trial-and-
error learning, the child must correct himself simply through observing that oth-
ers produce forms different from his (we know that overt correction of grammar,
as opposed to content, is rare among parents). Thus, the child who says drinked
eventually becomes aware that others say drank, and revises his grammar ac-
cordingly. If such things did not come to his attention, he would presumably go
on saying drinked indefinitely.
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But negative evidence cannot function in this way. Let us suppose that the
child who said want cookie really was urging someone else to desire a cookie.
Would the fact that he did not hear others saying *want some chocolate or *hate
naughty bunny deter him? It is hardly likely. I know of no facts which would
indicate that a child needs positive reinforcement, as well as an absence of coun-
terexamples, in order tomaintain his current grammar. The childmay be diverted
from that grammar by the existence of contradictory forms to which he is obliged
to pay attention; we can hardly expect him to pay attention to something that is
not happening.
Moreover, on a purely pragmatic basis, trial-and-error learning of imperatives
is unlikely. A child’s early imperatives are all action-oriented, aimed at getting
people to pick him up or put him down, bring nice things to him and take nasty
things away. It would be bizarre if he sought instead to influence the thought-
processes and emotions of others by commanding them to want, need, know, etc.
In fact, the likeliest possibility is that children do not acquire the SPD from im-
peratives, either errorlessly or by trial and error, because they themselves would
only ever need nonstative imperatives for pragmatic reasons. They would not
know whether statives could be used as imperatives because the opportunity for
such use would simply not have occurred – unless of course they were already
programmed with the SPD, and thus “knew” that such uses were impossible,
without requiring experience to prove it.
But whereas the use of imperative statives might seem bizarre, the use of pro-
gressive -ing with statives would surely appear, to a child not programmed with
the SPD, to be the most natural thing in the world. For -ing is applied to verbs
with present reference, and when a child wants or sees or likes something, it is
right now that he does it.
*I wanting teddy (now) or *I seeing pussy (now) would surely appear, to such a
child, every bit as grammatical as I playing peekaboo (now) or I sitting potty (now).
Nobody could claim that the distinction emerged from experience, or from con-
text; on the contrary, both experience and context would point in a contrary
direction.
Finally, Brown considered the possibility that the distinction is innately known.
However, he rejects this possibility because of what he claims are “fatal diffi-
culties”. Since neither he nor other scholars who have discussed the issue (e.g.,
Kuczaj 1978; Fletcher 1979) have advanced any serious alternative to the innatist
suggestion, we should examine Brown’s “difficulties” – bearing in mind that they
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arose out of a theory of innateness quite different from this one – and seewhether
they are really as “fatal” as he believes.
The first difficulty is that, according to Brown, children do not behave as in-
natist theory predicts with respect to categories other than state-process. If they
came equipped with a full set of syntactic and/or semantic subcategories, “they
ought to attempt to order regular and irregular inflections in terms of one or
another of the innate subcategories. They should test the hypothesis that verbs
that take -d [sic] in the past are all transitives and the others intransitives or that
those that take -d are animate actions and the others not, or something of this
kind” (1973: 328). Of course, this does not happen, and because it does not hap-
pen with distinctions other than the SPD, Brown concludes that the SPD cannot
be innate.
Now this argument makes sense only if you assume, first, that children are
born with all the subcategorization features of anAspects grammar in their heads
(a view Brown specifically attributes to McNeill 1966), and second, that children,
like junior linguists, acquire grammars by formulating and testing hypotheses.
The present theory assumes neither of these things. Thus, the fact that other
distinctions were treated differently from the SPD could never constitute an ar-
gument against the innateness of the SPD, unless it could be shown that those
other distinctions also formed part of the bioprogram. To do that, it would be nec-
essary to show that those distinctions were formally marked in creole languages.
In creoles, animate actions are not formally distinguished from other types of ac-
tion, and transitive verbs are not formally distinguished from intransitive verbs –
quite the reverse, indeed, aswe saw in the section on Passive Equivalents in Chap-
ter 2, and as we shall see again later in this chapter. Thus, the child hypotheses
Brown suggests would not make any kind of sense in light of the present theory,
even if that theory supposed that children test hypotheses-which it does not.
Brown’s second difficulty is that the SPD is “a poor candidate for innateness”
because it is “very far from being universal in the world’s languages”. The prob-
lems foreign learners have with English progressives and a claim by Joos (1964)
that English is “unique or almost unique” in possessing the SPD are adduced as
evidence for this contention.
Again, in the present theory, whether or not a given feature is common to all
the world’s languages is quite irrelevant. All previous universals theories have
been static theories, which assume that language is always and everywhere the
same; if one accepts this, it follows that only features that occur in all languages
can really qualify as candidates for innateness. But the present theory is a dy-
namic, evolutionary theory which assumes that language had a starting point
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and a sequence of developments, which are recycled, in rather different ways, in
both creole formation and child acquisition, as well as perhaps in certain types
of linguistic change (consideration of which would take us beyond the scope of
the present volume). What is innate is therefore what was there at the begin-
ning of the sequence, and thus there is not the slightest reason to suppose that
innate features will automatically persist and be found in the structure of all syn-
chronic languages – indeed, given the nature of dynamic processes, this would
be an extremely unlikely result.
In other words, the SPD is presumed to be innate, not because of its universal-
ity, which may well be as low as Brown suggests, but because it plays a crucial
role in creole grammars. There, statives are distinguished from nonstatives by
the fact that the nonpunctual marker never attaches to the former; but that is by
no means the only significant difference between the treatment of the two cate-
gories. The SPD causes a characteristic skewing of the creole TMA system, not
explicitly treated in the present volume, but discussed at some length in Bick-
erton (1975: Chapter 2). Briefly, there is a significant difference between cre-
ole and Indo-European systems which takes the following form. In the latter,
the same morphological marking applies to both statives and nonstatives in any
given tense; this seems so obvious that it is never even remarked on. In creoles,
however, present-reference statives and present-reference nonstatives cannot be
marked in the same way, and the same applies to past-reference statives and non-
statives. The pattern for GC, whichwemay take as typical in this respect, is given
in Table 3.1 below:
Table 3.1: Stative-nonstative distinctions in GC
Stative Nonstative
Present reference Ø a
Past reference bin Ø
Thus, without a clear understanding of the SPD, the creole TMA system would
be quite unworkable.
Since Brown believed that universality was the criterion for innateness, while
the criterion for the bioprogram theory is emergence in creole grammar, his sec-
ond objection to the innateness of the SPD is also deprived of its force.
However, Brown’s claim that, if a distinctionwere genuinely innate, it might be
generalized to inappropriate environments (cited above in discussion of his first
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objection), is a reasonable one if it is made with respect to distinctions found in
the bioprogram (as opposed to distinctions supposedly innate by the standards
of other theories). An example which looks, from the data available so far, some-
what like an inappropriate generalization of the SPD is found in data on the
acquisition of Turkish in Slobin & Aksu-Koç (1980).
Turkish has two morphemes used for marking past-reference verbs: -dI and
-mIs. These are used in adult speech to mark direct experience (events personally
observed by the speaker) and indirect experience (events reported to or inferred
by the speaker), respectively. According to Slobin & Aksu-Koç, -dI is usually
acquired by age 1:9, and -mIs about three months later (i.e., about the same age
as -ing is acquired). But “at first the -dI and -mIs inflections differentiate between
dynamic and static events … . (C)lear differentiation of the two forms [according
to their adult meanings, D.B.] is not stabilized until about 4:6”.4
The delay in acquisition is even more significant since most features of Turk-
ish verb morphology are fully acquired at age 3:0. Although “evidential” tenses
are found elsewhere (for example, in some American Indian languages such as
Hopi), they are completely unknown in all creoles. From these two facts, we may
conclude that the direct/indirect experience distinction does not form part of the
bioprogram, and we may further hypothesize that non-bioprogram distinctions
that have emerged in natural languages are particularly vulnerable to reinter-
pretation in the course of the acquisition process. Such reinterpretation would
naturally involve the assumption that the surface markers of a non-bioprogram
distinction were really marking a distinction established in the bioprogram –
which is exactly what seems to be happening in the Turkish case. Certainly, any
case of unusually delayed acquisition may turn out to be evidence as conclusive
of the workings of the bioprogram as are cases of early and errorless acquisition,
once themechanisms of interaction between bioprogram and target language are
adequately understood.
We may therefore place the SPD alongside the SNSD as a second semantic dis-
tinction (with important syntactic consequences) which is innately programmed.
But consideration of the SPD naturally prompts the question: since among the
most distinctive features of creoles is their distinctive TMA system, should it not
be the case that this or a similar system emerges at some stage of acquisition, if
indeed a universal genetic program generates such a system?
4 Students of the acquisition of Turkish please note: it would be most revealing to analyze 43
hours of a single child’s speech (one hour at three-week intervals from 2:0 to 4:6) in order to
determine exactly how he moves from a state-process to a direct-indirect analysis, along the
lines indicated in Note 1 above.
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This question will serve to focus more sharply on the nature of bioprogram-
target interaction, briefly mentioned two paragraphs above. In the present vol-
ume, emphasis is placed on the first member of the pair, for obvious reasons:
until students of acquisition are convinced that a bioprogram is really operative,
it is premature to talk too much about how such a bioprogram might interact
with other components of the acquisition process. But such emphasis can lead
all too easily to a familiar strawman: the innate component which is supposed to
roll like some irresistible juggernaut through the years of acquisition, sweeping
all other influences aside. After the all too easy demolition of this travesty, the
empiricist thinks he has disposed of innatism.
In fact, no innate program could or should behave in this way. From one view-
point, the child is a biophysical organism evolving along the genetic lines laid
down for its species, but from another and equally valid perspective, the child
is a sociocultural organism growing up into membership of a particular human
community. The pressures from the second side of being human must inevitably
mold the impulses of the first – the more so since biophysical characteristics are
typically more general and cultural characteristics more highly specified. Thus,
from an early age – certainly from age two upward – we would expect that in a
“natural” acquisition situation, as distinct from a pidgin-creole one, the pattern of
the bioprogramwould be gradually shifted in the direction of the target-language
pattern.
Such shifting must inevitably affect the formation of a TMA system. Since
virtually all the relevant literature deals with acquisition of particular pieces of
such systems, rather than with such systems as wholes, it is difficult to say at
what age the child fully controls the TMA system of his mother tongue; but it
is highly doubtful whether such control is achieved prior to age four, and likely
that it may come considerably later than that. This means that the acquisition of
TMA must spread over at least two years, two years during which the pressure
of the target grammar on the evolving bioprogram is steady and continuous. It
would therefore be highly unrealistic to expect any child at any stage of acqui-
sition to exhibit anything like a fully-developed creole TMA system. The most
that we could expect would be that acquisition of the earlier features of TMA sys-
tems would be influenced in rather oblique ways. However, if the results of such
influence should prove mysterious to other theories of acquisition, yet follow
logically from the present one, even such oblique evidence would be significant.
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Accordingly, I shall re-examine two of the most influential papers on the ac-
quisition of tense: Bronckart & Sinclair (1973) and Antinucci & Miller (1976); and
I shall show that some puzzling features of those studies become immediately
clear once we assume that while the subjects of these studies appear to be merely
learning French and Italian, respectively, the bioprogram decisively influences
the progress of their acquisition.
One point must be made first, however. With few exceptions, students of ac-
quisition assume that when a child uses a past-tense form, he uses it because he
fully understands, and deliberately intends to mark, pastness of reference.5 True,
it is often admitted (e.g., by Antinucci & Miller 1976) that the child’s concept of
past may be restricted as compared with the adult’s, and may extend only to
past events that leave presently-observable consequences; but it is still assumed,
without question, that where past marking appears, some sort of concept of past
must be there too.
This by no means necessarily follows. All we can say is that during the pe-
riod in which past tense is being acquired, some past-reference verbs are tense-
marked while some are not. There are several possible explanations of why this
is so, none of which can be ruled out a priori. The child may have acquired a full
past rule but may apply it unpredictably because of lapses of attention, phonolog-
ical difficulties, etc. The child may have acquired a partial past rule which applies
only to a subset of past-reference verbs. The child may have acquired a rule that
has nothing at all to do with pastness or non-pastness, but which just happens,
coincidentally, to mark a certain percentage of past-tense verbs. Which of these
explanations is the correct one can only be determined by empirical investigation
in each individual case.
5 One of these exceptions is Miller (1978). In a brilliant flash of insight, Miller suggests that
“perhaps the difference between go and went is used to mark something else, like momentary
happenings as opposed to persisting states”; and, in discussing forms like wented, adds that
“if they did not understand went as incorporating a concept of pastness, then adding pastness
with -ed would not seem redundant.” However, a stiff dose of Reichenbach and formal logic
enables him to climb back into the sheepfold of the conventional wisdom. It should be noted,
however, that one of his presuppositions – that forms like wented are quite uncommon in
child speech – fails to take into account forms like did he went?, he didn’t went, etc., which
are semantically identical and much more common. These forms are discussed in Hurford
(1975), Kuczaj (1976), Fay (1978), Maratsos & Kuczaj (1978), and Erreich & Winzemer (1980); but
unfortunately, it seems not to have occurred to any of these writers to look at the sentences
with “double pasts” and the sentences with “single pasts” in their appropriate contexts and
see whether, semantically or pragmatically, there are any differences between them. This is
the first thing that an investigator should do, as a matter of simple routine, whenever he is
confronted by variable data of this kind.
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Since the study of variable data is much further advanced in decreolization
than it is in acquisition, it should be instructive to look at another situation
where variable past-morpheme insertion takes place. In creoles, past tense is
not a category. But when creoles begin to decreolize, past-tense markers begin
to be introduced, occurring sporadically just as they do in child acquisition.
At first, one might interpret such data just as similar child language data have
been interpreted the speakers have an established past category but do not al-
ways mark it. However, analyses of decreolization in both Guyana and Hawaii
(Bickerton 1975: 142–161; 1977: 36–51), with a data base of a thousand past-refer-
ence verbs in both cases, suggest quite a different picture.
On the assumption that speakers had a past category, one would have to con-
clude that decreolizing GC speakers randomly inserted past morphemes 27 per-
cent of the time while decreolizing HCE speakers did so 30 percent of the time.
However, when all past-reference verbs were divided into two categories – those
that referred to single, punctual events, and those that referred to iterative or
habitual events – insertion rates were shown to vary widely between the two
categories, as shown in Table 3.2. In other words, what was being marked in
both sets of data was not really pastness, but rather punctuality.
Table 3.2: Past versus punctual in decreolization
Punctual Nonpunctual
Past-marking rate
GC 38% 12 %
HCE 53% 7%
The punctual-nonpunctual distinction (henceforth PNPD) is related to, yet dis-
tinct from, the SPD, and is of equal importance in creole grammar. Since both
decreolization and acquisition involve the introduction of “past” marking where
none was before, it should at least be worthwhile examining acquisitional data
to see whether punctuality plays the same role in the second as it does in the first.
We should certainly do well to bear this possibility in mind while we reconsider
previous findings on past-tense acquisition.
We may now turn to the first of the two papers cited above, Bronckart & Sin-
clair (1973). The authors’ starting point was their informal observation that when
children were asked to describe past events, their choice of tense often seemed to
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be influenced by the nature of the event: if the latter was one of some duration,
like washing a car, they would tend to use il lave la voiture ‘He washes/is wash-
ing the car’, rather than il a lavé la voiture ‘He washed the car’; whereas if the
event was a punctual one, like kicking a ball, they would use il a poussé la balle
‘He kicked the ball’, and seldom if ever substitute il pousse la balle ‘He kicks/is
kicking the ball’.
Normally, the opposition between il lave and il a lavé is treated as a simple
past–present opposition, but of course this is not the case. The “present” tense in
French is in fact a nonpunctual aspect which does not extend into the past (unlike
that of creoles); but, like a creole nonpunctual aspect, it embraces both iterative
and durative events. Similarly, the “past” is not a simple past in the sense of
English simple past. English simple past is applicable to past-punctual and past-
iterative (but not always to past-durative) reference; French avoir + participle is
limited to past punctuals, while past iteratives and past duratives are rendered
by the so-called “imperfect” form, e.g., il lavait rather than il a lavé.
In other words, when French children use different verb forms for different
kinds of past events, they are doing exactly the same as creole speakers, who
always mark nonpunctual pasts differently from punctual pasts.
Bronckart & Sinclair confirmed and quantified their original observation by
asking 74 children to describe (after the event) different types of actions which
the investigators performed with the aid of a series of toys. Ages of the children
ranged from under 3 to nearly 9. Eleven actions were performed. Of these, six
were actions which had a clear goal or result (e.g., “a car hits a marble which rolls
very rapidly into a pocket”), while two were actions which had no perceptible
goal or result (e.g., “a fish swims in the basin [circular movement]”). The three re-
maining “actions,” which consisted merely of cries of differing types or duration
supposedly uttered by various toys, can be disregarded for our purposes.
Of the six goal-directed actions, somewere durative and otherswere not. While
the French passé composé was used more frequently for these six than for the
two goalless actions, there was a significant difference (p < .01) between dura-
tive and nondurative actions, the former having a much higher probability of
being marked with a nonpast (= nonpunctual) verb. The authors concluded that
“the distinction between perfective and imperfective events seems to be of more
importance than the temporal relation between action and the moment of enun-
ciation. Imperfective actions are almost never expressed by past tenses, and for
perfective actions the use of présents is the more frequent the greater the proba-
bility of taking into account the unaccomplished part of the action. This probabil-
ity is partly determined by duration, frequence [sic], and maybe other objective
features we have not investigated.”
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In terms of the present study, Bronckart & Sinclair have clearly shown that the
PNPD overrides the past-nonpast distinction until at least the age of six. How-
ever, the situation in French acquisition may be even more creole-like than the
authors suggest.
First, they fail to mention the possibility that even when their subjects seem to
be marking +past, they are in fact marking +punctual. French-speaking children,
like all other children, start out using the bare stem of the verb for every kind
of reference, past or nonpast, punctual or nonpunctual, realis or irrealis. Then,
at an age when developmental studies suggest that they have only the vaguest
idea of past time, they encounter a form (the passé composé) which has exclu-
sively punctual reference. Note that, semantically, the categories of past and
punctual overlap. While all pasts need not be punctuals, all punctuals must be
pasts – if they were not, they would still be happening, and if they were still hap-
pening now, they would be nonpunctual by definition. Which is likelier – that
they would interpret passé composé in terms of a distinction that they barely yet
grasped (past-nonpast), or that they would interpret it in terms of a distinction
which would be apparent to them from their own direct observation of actions
and events (punctual-nonpunctual)?
Second, there are a number of facts about the Bronckart & Sinclair data that the
authors themselves either skim over or ignore altogether. In order to understand
the significance of these facts, we shall have to re-examine their study rather
minutely.
Let us begin by describing the six goal-oriented actions used in the study and
then coding them in terms of type of action, duration, and iteration (where ap-
plicable). The actions (Bronckart & Sinclair’s 1-6) are as follows:
(16) A truck slowly pushes a car toward a garage.
(17) A car hits a marble which very rapidly rolls into a pocket.
(18) The farmer jumps over ten fences and reaches the farm.
(19) The farmer’s wife jumps in one big jump over ten fences and reaches
the farm.
(20) The cow jumps over five fences and does not reach the stable.
(21) The horse jumps over one fence and does not reach the stable.
Sentences (19) and (21) are single jumping movements which take two seconds
and one second, respectively, so we will call them J-2 and J-1; (18) and (20) are
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repeated jumping movements which take ten seconds and five seconds, respec-
tively, so we will call them Jx-10 and Jx-5; (16) and (17) are single pushing move-
ments which take ten seconds and one second, respectively, so we will call them
P-10 and P-1.
The authors present (their Figure 1) a graph which shows the percentages of
passé composé used to describe each of the different actions by members of five
age groups, average ages of each group being as follows: 1, 3:7; 2, 4:7; 3, 5:6; 4, 6:6;
5, 7:8. Like all the acquisition charts I have ever seen, this one does not show a
consistent and steady rise from low to high percentages of correct forms; rather
it shows the familiar fever-chart zigzags before coming to rest, at age 7:8, with
fairly uniform percentages of past marking across all action types. In Bronckart
& Sinclair’s presentation, I think quite unintentionally, the amount of zigzagging
is reduced by showing two different graphs for durative and nondurative events;
thus, certain very interesting crossover phenomena, which are not accounted for
in the authors’ conclusions, may very easily be overlooked.
In order to display these phenomena, I shall recast Bronckart & Sinclair’s data
into the form given in Table 3.3. In this table, the six actions, (16)–(21), are ranked
for each of the first four age groups. Rank order is based on percentage of past-
tense assignment; thus, in each column the event at the head of the column is
that which is most frequently assigned past marking, while the event at the foot
of the column is that to which past marking is least frequently assigned. The
nondurative items are circled in the table for easier reference.
Table 3.3 presents a picture rather different from that which appears in Bron-
ckart & Sinclair’s tables and analyses. At the earliest age, actions seem to be
ranked entirely on the basis of their duration, the shortest being the most likely
to be past-marked. The authors’ Figure 1 shows that the difference between the
three highest ranks in the first column (i.e., those actions that have a duration
of two seconds or less) is less than ten percentage points, while there is a gap
of over twenty percentage points between the lowest of the nondurative actions
and the highest of the durative actions (Jx-5).
However, this picture gradually and progressively changes, through the next
three age groups: jumping actions irrespective of duration tend to rise in rank,
while pushing actions sink to the bottom of the table. The final column shows
durative and nondurative actions regularly interspersed, but the four jumping
actions are now all placed higher than the two pushing actions. The authors’ Fig-
ure 1 shows that the stratification between jumping and pushing is quite sharp:
while the four jumping actions in the 6:6 column are grouped in a narrow range
around the 90 percent past-insertion mark, the higher of the two pushing ac-
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Table 3.3: Rank orders for past-marking frequency
Rank
Age Group
3:7 4:7 5:6 6:6
1 P-1 P-1 J-1 J-1
2 J-2 J-1 J-2 Jx-5
3 J-1 Jx-5 Jx-5 J-2
4 Jx-5 J-2 P-1 Jx-10
5 Jx-10 Jx-10 P-10 P-1
6 P-10 P-10 Jx-10 P-10
tions is separated from the lowest jumping action by a span of more than twenty
percentage points.
Far from there being an overall rise in past marking of pushing actions, past-
marking percentages for these show an absolute decline between ages 4:7 and
6:6, at the same time as past-marking percentages for jumping actions are rising
fairly steadily. It stretches the imagination to suppose that children between
these ages begin to perceive pushing actions as less past and jumping actions
as more past; yet if we really believe that past tense is all that the children are
acquiring, we have no alternative but to believe in improbabilities such as this.
Bronckart & Sinclair note some of the fluctuationsmentioned here, but attempt
to account for only one of them, and that, perhaps, the least significant: the drop
in rank for J-2 (their “event 4”) between ages 3:7 and 4:7. The explanation they
offer is that “this action took objectively more time (2 sec.) than the others (1
sec.).” By “the others” the authors mean, presumably, J-1 and P-1, but they are a
little disingenuous here because they fail to note that the past-marking rate for
J-2 also falls below that for Jx-5 – which takes more than twice as much
time as J-2! Moreover, the rate for J-2 is only a point or two higher than that for
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Jx-10, which is five times longer! Relative length of time, therefore, cannot be the
factor involved.
Let us see if we can really determine what underlies the phenomena illustrated
in Table 3.3. From the first column, it would appear that children in the lowest
age group do indeed discriminate between events on the basis of pure length.
However, as they grow older, the criterion of durativity is replaced by another
which is also related to the PNPD.
For the punctual-nonpunctual opposition must also be marked in the semantic
features of individual verbs. That is to say, some verbs are inherently punctual,
while others are inherently nonpunctual. If you hit something for five minutes,
it must be that you hit it many times; similarly, if you jump for five minutes, you
must jump many times; both hit and jump express inherently punctual actions.
But on the other hand, if you push something for five minutes you do not nec-
essarily push it more than once, and if something rolls for five minutes, it does
not necessarily roll more than once; both push and roll express inherently non-
punctual actions (although of course a compound verb like roll over is inherently
punctual).
In other words, although the PNPD is crucial throughout the acquisition of
past-tense marking, the way in which punctuality and nonpunctuality are in-
terpreted changes as children mature. At first, they merely register the relative
length of events, and do not distinguish either the inherent characteristics of
different actions or any difference between iterative and durative events. Note
how, in column 1 of Table 3.3 the two Jx events, which are sequences of punc-
tual events, are grouped with P-10, the only truly durative event. Thus, their
judgment of what is nonpunctual at age 3:7 accords with the commonest creole
judgment of what is nonpunctual: that is, a merger of the iterative (habitual) with
the durative (progressive).
However, as time goes by, the two Jx events are reinterpreted as sequences of
events, each one of which, considered individually, is brief and inherently punc-
tual. Thus, iteratives are removed from the nonpunctual category (which now
contains only duratives) and reassigned to the punctual category. This judgment
– merging of iteratives with punctuals – corresponds to the minority creole pat-
tern found in Jamaican Creole and perhaps a few others referred to under the
heading of Deviation E in Chapter 2 (Page 72). It is certainly intriguing to specu-
late that at least some of the relatively few real differences in creoles could result
from their having been “finalized,” so to speak, at slightly different age levels by
the inventing generation – but of course we can only speculate at this stage.
What is of more immediate interest is the insight that we can derive, from
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the process described above, into the way in which a bioprogram would evolve.
Some scenarios for Chomskyan innatism seem to suggest that every neonate
already has a full Aspects grammar curled up in Broca’s region. This literalistic
reading of “innate” has no place in a bioprogram theory. A true bioprogram
would grow, develop, and change just as the physical organism that houses it
grows, develops, and changes. Increases in the child’s cognitive abilities (which
of course also form part of the bioprogram in its widest sense) would interact
with the linguistic component and progressively modify it.
For the French-speaking child, the shift in the nature of the nonpunctual cat-
egory would have the effect of moving more events into the punctual category,
thus making more events available for past marking. It would, in other words,
help the child in his transfer from predominantly punctual marking to predom-
inantly past marking – although whether this result issues from the hand of a
beneficent providence, or is merely an accidental bonus, it is far too early to tell.
The suggestion that children may have been marking punctuality when they
seemed to have been marking pastness may still seem bizarre to some readers.
Let us, therefore, see how well it stands up in light of another well-known study
of tense acquisition – that of Antinucci & Miller (1976). Antinucci & Miller found
that the earliest tense form used by their sample of Italian-speaking children
was the past participle. At first this always agreed in number and gender with
the sentential object, suggesting that the children regarded the participles as ad-
jectives rather than verbs. Then, around age two, they dropped the agreement
rule and began to use the participles in ways suggesting that they now perceived
them as true past-tense verbs (the usual past tense in Italian consists of auxiliary
plus participle, ho venuto ‘I came’, but the children almost always omitted the
auxiliary).
However, the verbs which children used in this way appeared to be somewhat
restricted in number. The authors divided verbs into three classes: activity verbs
(where the action has no end result), stative verbs, and change-of-state verbs
(such as close, fall, give, etc.) which describe actions as a result of which “an
object changes its state.” They found that with very few exceptions, children’s
past forms were found with verbs of the last class only, and they concluded that
the child could only assign past tense to an action when something presently in
his physical environment – a toy that had been broken, some milk that had been
spilled – remained behind as a concrete result of that action.
Now, it happens to be the case that change-of-state verbs are all inherently
punctual; the rare, apparent exceptions are often due to purely technological de-
velopments, as in the abandoned astronaut fell toward the planet for several hours.
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But even sentences like that can be seen to be underlyingly punctual if we apply
another test for inherent punctuality: the question, “If you stop halfway through
Ving, have you Ved?” Thus, if you stop halfway through closing, you have not
closed, and if you stop halfway through giving, you have not given; similarly,
if the abandoned astronaut stopped halfway through falling, he would not have
fallen, although he might have lost altitude. But with activity verbs, which are in-
herently nonpunctual, the converse applies: if you stop halfway through playing,
you have played, if you stop halfway through writing, you have written, and so
on. If, as the Bronckart & Sinclair study suggests; the more an action is regarded
as punctual, the more likely it is to be given past-tense marking, then the verbs
in Antinucci & Miller’s change-of-state list may be given past marking because
they are punctual, rather than for the reason the authors suggest.
It is true that in the Bronckart & Sinclair study the first criterion for the PNPD
was raw duration, and that inherent characteristics of verbs did not become dom-
inant until an age long past that of the Antinucci & Miller subjects. However, the
Bronckart & Sinclair data are drawn from experiments, whereas the Antinucci
& Miller data are drawn from naturalistic observation; moreover, Bronckart &
Sinclair do not include any change-of-state verbs in their study. The two studies
are therefore not comparable at the fine-grained level of, “Just how do children
interpret punctuality at age X?”; they do, however, seem to be in agreement that
some kind of PNPD is involved.
There are other clues in Antinucci & Miller’s study which suggest that a punc-
tual analysis may account for the facts better than a change-of-state one. Early in
their third year, Italian children generally acquire a second Italian past tense, the
imperfect. This is used with activity verbs, but is not extended to change-of-state
verbs, which continue to be past-marked with participial forms (with or without
auxiliary):
(22) Italian ( (Antinucci & Miller’s 82); )
Mamma e andato (participial) al parco e io stavo (imperfect) a casa
‘Mommy went to the park and I stayed home’
(23) Italian ( (Antinucci & Miller’s 90); )
Li ha messi (participial) nel saco e dopo gli altri bambini piangevano
(imperfect)
‘He put them in a sack and then the other children cried’
In other words, imperfects and participials are in complementary distribution,
the first being used for punctual verbs, the second for nonpunctual ones. Note
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that this does not reflect anything in Italian grammar; all Italian verbs, whether
punctual or nonpunctual, activity or change-of-state verbs, have both perfective
and imperfective past tenses.
Antinucci &Miller’s explanation for this state of affairs is far from satisfactory.
They note that the imperfect appears first during story-telling, and suggest that
the child uses it to distinguish “pretend” from real events. But if this were really
the case, wewould expect use of the imperfect to be extended to all types of verbs,
including change-of-state verbs; for surely change-of-state (or punctual) verbs
can be used to describe imaginary events as easily as activity (or nonpunctual)
verbs. Moreover, in the examples that Antinucci &Miller themselves cite, such as
(22) and (23) above, the events of staying and crying, rendered by the imperfect,
are nomore (or less) “pretend” events than the events of going and putting, which
are rendered by the participial form.
It is therefore highly possible that the connection observed by the authors
between “pretend” events and the imperfect is merely a partial and coincidental
one. It is hard to tell, since they present no statistical data that would serve
to quantify the distribution of participial and imperfective forms in realis and
irrealis contexts. And if their hypothesis is falsified even by the few sentences
they themselves choose to cite, and if both tenses are past-reference in adult
speech, then there is nothing but the PNPD to prevent children from generalizing
themore regular, imperfect form to change-of-state verbs just as English children
generalize -ed to irregular pasts.
Indeed, how is it that English children generalize in this way when Italian chil-
dren do not? If everyone has the same bioprogram, how come everyone doesn’t
learn the same way? Let us explore this problem in some depth, for by so doing
we will not only answer these and other questions, but we will also better under-
stand how the same bioprogram can yield superficially different results when it
interacts with two languages that differ in structure.
First, let us dispose of a possible objection. It might be argued that the two
processes – Italian-speaking children learning first participles, then imperfects;
English-speaking children learning first irregular, then regular pasts – are not
really commensurate. So they are not, from an adult point of view. But the child
does not have an adult point of view, and for the child they must be completely
commensurate. The adult knows that Italian has two tense forms with different
meanings, whereas English has only a single form, expressed in diverse ways.
But there is no way a child could know this unless he were born with a com-
parative grammar of Indo-European in his head, as well as Aspects. Remember,
the children we are talking about are under three. Not only can they not have
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the slightest idea what the mature tense system of their languages will eventu-
ally look like, but even on the most favorable accounts, they can have only the
vaguest notion of what past means, and by some accounts, they can have no
notion at all.
What must really happen is something like the following. Around age two,
the child who happens to be learning Italian becomes aware of a set of rather
irregular forms, which are past-reference forms in adult grammar (the Italian
participles), whereas the child who happens to be learning English also becomes
aware of a set of rather irregular forms, which are also past-reference forms
in adult speech (the English “strong” past tenses). Shortly afterward, the child
learning Italian encounters a set of quite regular forms, once again past-reference
forms in adult speech (the Italian imperfective), while, around the same time,
the child learning English also encounters a set of regular forms that are past-
reference forms in adult speech (the English “weak” past tenses).
Up until this point, the experiences of the two children have been, from their
point of view, identical. I defy anyone to explain how those experiences could be
differently interpreted by the two children – except in a single respect, which we
shall deal with shortly. From the child’s point of view, in both cases he has begun
by finding some irregular forms that mean past (from the traditional perspective)
or punctual (from the perspective of this volume), and he has gone on to find some
regular forms that also mean past (from the traditional perspective).
But now, the Italian learner and the English learner part company. The Italian
learner keeps the two sets of forms, the regular and the irregular, completely sep-
arate, applying one set to one class of verbs and the other to another. The English
learner, on the contrary, proceeds to generalize the regular set to the irregular
set, applying “weak” tense endings to “strong” verbs in defiance of adult gram-
mar rules. Why? Why doesn’t the Italian learner make a similar generalization?
Or, to put it differently, why doesn’t the English learner make the same kind
of distinction as the Italian learner, maintaining the irregular forms (like came,
went, bought, sold, gave, broke – all good changes-of-state, note) for punctual
verbs, and saving the -ed affix for activity verbs?
To understand the answer, we have to get used to looking at the acquisition
process in a way it has not been looked at hitherto – even though everything we
know about language points to that way as the most logical and fruitful. Alas,
the “order of acquisition” gambit set child language studies back fifteen years by
concentrating exclusively on the acquisition of isolated features. Small wonder
if, as we have seen, the sterility of this approach sent acquisitionists gamboling
off across the meadows of pragmatics, cognition, “motherese”, etc., which were
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not much more irrelevant to the central problem of syntax acquisition, but a
good deal less dull. For what both groups forgot was that language is a tight
system composed of even tighter subsystems. Children do not learn individual
morphemes in isolation from one another; they build up subsystems and at the
same time integrate those subsystems into an overall system.
The situation was not helped any by the primitive state of the art in TMA
studies, in spite of (I would prefer to say, because of) work in the field from Re-
ichenbach (1947) to Comrie (1976) and Woisetschlaeger (1977). We shall return
to this issue in Chapter 4; for the moment, suffice it to say that an approach
like Comrie’s, which tries to extract some kind of Platonic core meaning from
terms like “perfective” and “imperfective”, totally ignores the fact that the units
of grammatical subsystems cannot be defined independently of those systems –
that, in consequence, what “perfective” and “imperfective” mean, in any subsys-
tem where such labels are applicable, is entirely determined by how many other
units that subsystem has and what the other units mean.
Once this viewpoint is established, we can proceed to look at the acquisition
of TMA systems as systems, bearing in mind all the while the injunction of the
bioprogram; “Make sure that punctuals and nonpunctuals are adequately differ-
entiated.” We may then represent the acquisition process for English and Italian
learners as in Figure 3.1.
Both English and Italian learners beginwith a single undifferentiated base form
which at first has to cover all intended forms of TMA reference (in fact, the Italian
base form is really a series of forms differentiated for person, but this and similar
details will be ignored here for the sake of clarity of presentation). As new forms
are added, the semantic scope of this base form contracts until it evolves into
the adult, so-called “present tense” in both languages. Note, however that the
scope of this “present tense” differs in English and Italian; in English it includes
habitual and iterative reference only, whereas in Italian it includes progressive
and durative reference also. The child, needless to say, cannot foresee these facts,
but they exert a profound influence on the acquisition process, as the following
paragraphs will show.
The question of what determines the order in which new forms are acquired is
too complex to be explored fully here.6 However, it seems likely that the differ-
6 The question is the more interesting in that the form auxiliary + past participle – the first to be
acquired by French and Italian learners – is among the last to be acquired by English learners.
Maratsos (1979) observes of the latter that “its late acquisition, coming after children hear it
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Figure 3.1: Comparative TMA acquisition (Italian versus English)
the case that the meaning of the “composite past” in French or Italian (a punctual meaning) is
easier for the child to grasp than the meaning of the English perfect (a completive meaning).
But this only opens up a host of other issues. For instance, if the meaning of English perfect
is “relevance to present state”, and if, as Antinucci & Miller suggest, the child assigns his early
past marking on the basis of “relevance to present state”, why should the meaning of perfect
be so “subtle” in the child’s view, and why should it not be the first, rather than the last, verb
form to be acquired? Further, is it a matter of mere coincidence that perfect should be the last
form to be acquired by both children learning English and speakers of an English creole in the
course of decreolization (see Bickerton (1975: 126ff.) for details on the latter process)? If, as
suggested later in this chapter, decreolization and the later stages of acquisition are processes
which show a principled relationship, then there is no coincidence, but rather a joint reflection
of one of the difficulties involved in getting from the bioprogram to English.
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ence between Italian and English present tenses determines the first addition to
the system. English has a distinct (and frequent) form for present progressives;
Italian has not. Therefore, the first new term that English learners add is a non-
punctual one. But since there is no similar form in Italian, the first new form
that Italian learners add is a past form – the participle – which they interpret as
a punctual one.
The second new form acquired by English learners is the irregular past, which
they interpret as marking punctuality. They are therefore now able to mark both
sides of the PNPD. But shortly afterward they become aware of a third form –
regular past -ed. Since they already have markers for punctual and nonpunctual,
they cannot accommodate this new form by assigning to it its own semantic
scope; they therefore assume they were wrong in choosing irregular past as a
punctual marker, and proceed to extend -ed to those past punctuals which had
previously been allotted irregular forms.
However, the second new form acquired by Italian learners is the imperfect.
This, like the past participle, is used for past reference by adults, and if Italian
learners were really using participles to mark past reference, they would surely
generalize the imperfect form to verbs of all types, just as English learners gener-
alize -ed – for, as noted above (p. 155), the Italian participial/imperfect opposition
and the English irregular/regular past opposition must look formally identical to
the child learner. The reason why they do not do this can stem only from the
unique difference between the situations of the two the sets of learners: English
learners have already marked both sides of the PNPD, while Italian learners have
marked only one side. For them, nonpunctuals are yet to be marked, so instead
of generalizing the imperfect, they seize on it as their nonpunctual marker and
keep it carefully separate from their marker of punctuality, the participial form.
Note that without the bioprogram the differences in behavior between Italian
and English learners are quite inexplicable. In virtually identical circumstances,
the English learner over-generalizes, while the Italian learner under-generalizes.
However, once we see that English and Italian learners are equipped with an
identical program, but still satisfying the requirements of that program in a dif-
ferent order – an order determined by the interaction of the bioprogram with
two different languages – such differences are not merely explicable, but follow
inevitably from the theory presented here.
Now we can better understand what the child of a first creole generation does.
When that child is around 18 to 21 months old, his TMA “system” and the TMA
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“system” of his parents’ pidgin exactly coincide; both consist of the “universal
base” shown at the left-hand side of Figure 3.1. The only difference between the
child’s trying to learn a pidgin and the child’s trying to learn French or Italian is
that the latter will be offered a variety of verb forms which he can then interpret
according to the specifications of his bioprogram, while the former will not be
offered anything new in the way of forms. The creole child therefore decides to
mark the nonpunctual side of the opposition.
Two questionsmay be asked here: why does the creole child decide, apparently
without exception, to mark nonpunctuals rather than punctuals, and why does
he not mark both terms of the opposition, as I have claimed that both English
and Italian children do?
I think that nonpunctuals rather than punctuals are marked because, from a
pragmatic viewpoint, nonpunctuals represent the marked case in a Jakobsonian
sense: in the real world, more actions are punctual than nonpunctual; punctual
actions constitute the background against which nonpunctual actions stand out.
Regarding the second question, we should rather ask, why do noncreole chil-
dren mark both terms? The answer to that clearly is because noncreole children
receive, if anything, too great a variety of forms – greater, certainly, than any
two-year-old can incorporate into a coherent system. The child feels obliged to
assign some kind of significance to termswith which he is constantly bombarded,
so he assumes that in the language confronting him both sides of the PNPD are
formally marked.
But, of course, both sides of an opposition do not have to be formally marked
– it serves to distinguish them if you formally mark one term and zero-mark the
other. Considerations of parsimony alone would indicate such a choice, if the
opportunity presents itself (and for the creole child, it does). It is quite enough
trouble for the creole child to select, from the pidgin, one content-word (like HPE
locative stei) to mark one term of the opposition, without having to search out
another to mark the other. In both cases, albeit by different means, the demands
of the bioprogram are satisfied.
I have little doubt that when acquisitionists begin to study TMA acquisition
from a dynamic, systems-oriented standpoint, and with the tools of variation
analysis already available from decreolization studies, many more of the effects
of the bioprogram will become visible. For the present, we must leave that area
and survey rather more briefly some others in which resemblances between cre-
oles and acquisitional stages are to be found. We shall look at just four areas:
complement Ss, questions, negatives, and causatives.
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A recent overview of complex sentence acquisition (Bowerman 1979) draws
heavily on Brown (1973) and Limber (1973), which appear to be the major, if not
the only, sources in this area. If true, this is surprising, since Brown devotes
less than a page (page 21) to sentential complements, and Umber’s only slightly
longer (six-page) treatment leaves many crucial questions unasked. However,
much of what is said by these scholars is highly suggestive.
Brown cites four examples only of complement Ss produced by children:
(24) I hope I don’t hurt it.
(25) I think it’s the wrong way.
(26) I mean that’s a D.
(27) You think I can do it?
Brown comments that “the embedded sentence appears exactly as it would if it
stood alone as an independent simple sentence.” He observes that there are other
types of complement S of which this is not true, such as:
(28) It annoys the neighbors for John to play the bugle.
He does not state whether or not the children in his sample produced sentences
like (28), but the implication is that they did not. He does observe, however, that
“there is also a complementizer that” which can occur in sentences like (24)–(27);
but “the children did not use it.”
Limber’s data are more problematic in that it is not always clear from his treat-
ment whether a given example is an actual child utterance or one presented for
heuristic purposes. Thus, although Limber states that “marked ” is acquired early,
this is not clearly the case from the example given: I want to go. If, as seems prob-
able, this is just an orthographic regularization of the actual utterance, I wanna
go (a likelihood increased by the fact that Limber himself includes a similar form,
hafta, in his Table 1), then it is not at all clear from the viewpoint of what the child
(as opposed to the adult) knows that the child has acquired marked infinitives.
Consider the following sentences, which few children can have failed to hear or
failed to produce themselves:
(29) I wanna cookie (unambiguous noun).
(30) I wanna drink (ambiguous between noun and verb).
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(31) I wanna go (unambiguous verb).
Faced with such data, the most reasonable conclusion on the part of the child
would be that the canonical form of the verb was wanna rather than want –
or that, at the very least, hafta, liketa, wanna should be entered in the lexicon
as variant (perhaps phonologically conditioned) forms of the verb stems con-
cerned. Such, certainly, is the assumption made by Brown (1973: 54) when es-
tablishing rules for the calculation of mean length of utterance: “gonna, wanna,
hafta … [were] counted as single morphemes rather than as going to or want to
because evidence is that they function so for the children.”
The following series of examples represents, with one exception, all the sen-
tential complement forms cited by Limber which we can assume to be examples
of actual child speech:
(32) I want mommy do it.
(33) I don’t want you read that book.
(34) Watch me draw circles.
(35) I see you sit down.
(36) Lookit a boy play ball.
If we look at these five examples together with the four cited by Brown (and
these, strange to say, seem to be virtually the only complement-S constructions
cited in the literature), we will note first that not one of them has an overt com-
plementizer, and second, that with the exception of (34) the complements could
stand on their own as independent simple sentences. Moreover, since me as sub-
ject has been widely reported for black children, it is by no means certain that
for the speaker of (34), me draw circles would be ungrammatical; and even if it
were, the analogy with watch me, mommy! – an utterance surely developmen-
tally prior to (34) – may be what is operative in this case.
It is true that we cannot point to the same kind of evidence we used in Chap-
ter 2, when the same question of finite versus non-finite analysis was at issue;
we cannot point to the presence of markers of tense or aspect in the embedded
sentence. But it would be illegitimate to expect such evidence, since at the ages
from which Limber’s examples are taken (1:6 to 3:0), the vast majority of chil-
dren’s verb forms consist of unmarked stems anyway.
The only example of Limber’s which was not cited above is:
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(37) I all done eating.
This might at first seem like a clear case of a nonfinite complement S. But Limber
himself explicitly observes that in his recordings there is no trace of “a variety
of -ing complements; for example, I like eating lollipops in contrast to the very
common I like to eat lollipops” (which, as already suggested, is more probably a
case of a quasi-modal liketa). He further comments that nonfinite -ing forms (as
distinct from the “finite -ing” discussed in a previous section) occurred only in
sentences like (37), i.e., “with finish or all done.” Although Limber himself does
not explicitly draw it, it would seem legitimate to draw the conclusion that finish
and all done are interpreted by the child either as quasi-modals followed by “finite
-ing” or as main verbs followed by NP. Either way, (37) would not be relevant to
the present discussion.
Limber goes on to “informally summarize” the major developments in complex
sentences prior to age three in the following manner: “An N-V-N sequence is
the common simple sentence … . [Children] expand (or substitute) an N-V-N
sequence for certain noun phrases … [but] do not apply syntactic operations to
any subject NPs.” Brown (1973: 21) also observed that sentences of the type of
(38) below did not occur in child speech:
(38) That John called early annoyed Bill.
Stated more formally, Limber’s study would suggest that children have only the
following major PS rule (assuming that Aux is not yet established and that there
is no evidence, as there seems not to be, for any VP constituent):





Similarities between the foregoing account of complement Ss in child speech
by Limber and Brown and the account of complement Ss in creoles given in
Chapter 2 are quite striking. They include:
1. The absence of embedded sentences in subject position.
2. The absence of complementizers.
3. The identity of form between embedded and nonembedded sentences.
4. The absence of nonfinite and subjectless embeddings.
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In addition, we may note the similarity of (39) to the major creole PS rule (236),
Chapter 2, hypothesized on quite independent grounds for all early-stage creoles,
and repeated here for convenience as (40):
(40) S → NP Aux V (NP) (S)
Rule (40) is merely a slightly more sophisticated version of (39), as would befit
its more mature users, differing only in that it admits an established Aux and
allows for object NP as well as complement S in the same sentence, instead of
only admitting these as alternatives.
Of the similarities listed, the first three are self-explanatory, but perhaps a
word should be said about the fourth, which relates to the absence from child
speech of sentences like I like eating lollipops and from creoles of sentences like
(41) or (42):
(41) Guyanese Creole
*mi hia a sing
‘I heard singing’
(42) Guyanese Creole
*mi laik a sing
‘I like singing’
(Sentences whose complements have overt subjects, such as mi hia i a sing ‘I
heard him singing’, are of course in another class entirely.) In fact, more is in-
volved here than there is space to discuss – (42) involves equi-deletion while (41)
involves deletion of an unspecified subject, so the reasons for their ungrammati-
cality cannot be the same – but I would like to suggest a reason why both creoles
and children should reject sentences on the model of I like doing X.
If children learned language primarily on the basis of analogy, the absence
of such sentences would be mysterious. The child would observe some specific
questions and answers:
(43) What are you eating? Cookies.
(44) What are you playing with? My ball.
Answers to such questions fit well into the frame, I like … :
(45) I like cookies.
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(46) I like my ball.
Once the child had acquired “finite -ing”, he would be able to answer slightly less
explicit questions with -ing forms:
(47) What are you doing? Eating cookies.
(48) What are you doing? Playing ball.
By analogy with (45), (46), these ought to yield:
(49) I like eating cookies.
(50) I like playing ball.
Of course, children do not learn primarily by analogy; analogical forms may
crop up from time to time, but not when (as here) they would conflict with impor-
tant structural aspects of the grammar. For eating cookies in (47) is not the same
as eating cookies in (49). In (47), it expresses a particular nonpunctual action in
realis time; in (49), it expresses the abstract concept of an action, not necessarily
either punctual or nonpunctual, in irrealis time. The superficial identity of the
forms involved is an illusory one, and the child, for all the little he is supposed
to know of language, is not fooled by it. For both child and creole, nonpunctual
means nonpunctual, nothing more, and because of the form-meaning biunique-
ness that characterizes both child speech and creoles, the form chosen to mark
nonpunctual cannot be assigned any other function.
We may justifiably conclude, then, that the mechanisms of child language and
creoles for incorporating sentences within sentences are highly similar, with one
exception: children show no evidence of verb serialization (at least in existing ac-
counts; I would not rule out the possibility that it might turn up if people started
looking for it). But then, the reasons why child language doesn’t have verb se-
rialization are probably the reasons why some creoles don’t have it: because
prepositions are available in the input, and therefore serialization is not needed
to differentiate case roles.
Let us now turn to questions. Children acquire questions early – certainly by
the two-word stage, and probably earlier even than that. The acquisition of ques-
tion forms was first studied intensively by Klima & Bellugi (1966), and although
some subsequent observers have found more variation in question development
than these authors recognized, their principal findings have not been seriously
challenged.
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Among English learners, yes-no questions are at first distinguished from state-
ments only by a rising intonation contour, andWH-questions only by a sentence-
initialWH-word; in neither type is there any trace of Subject-Aux inversion. This
state of affairs changes only very slowly. Sentences grow longer and more com-
plex, all the question words are acquired, but yes-no questions retain the form
of (51) and (52):
(51) This can’t write a flower?
(52) You can’t fix it?
At a later stage, when inversion begins to appear in yes-no questions, it is still
absent from WH-questions:
(53) Why he don’t know how to pretend?
(54) Where the other Joe will drive?
This last stage is all themore puzzling because childrenwho remain in it are often
at the same time producing sentences which indicate mastery of rules seemingly
more complex than those required for correctly forming English WH-sentences,
such as the following:
(55) You have two things that turn around (relativization).
(56) I told you I know how to put the train together (double complement
embedding plus embedded nonfinite WH-clause).
(57) Let’s go upstairs and take it from him because it’s mine (coordination
and subordinate-clause causative construction).
Why do children at this level of development persist in using structures so dif-
ferent from the many well-formed questions which they must have heard?
Clark & Clark (1977: 354) suggest that “WH-questions may be more difficult
because they require two rearrangements: movement of the WH from where it
would have been to initial position in the sentence and inversion of the subject
and auxiliary verb” (emphasis added). This claim assumes (rather uncharacter-
istically for these authors) that children actually carry out, in the processing of
sentences, the operations which a generative grammar of English would apply
to derive WH-questions. Erreich & Winzemer (1980), writing from an orthodox
generative standpoint, make the same assumption. However, the latter note that
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if children do really derive WH-questions in this way, one would expect to find
errors resulting from incomplete application of the process, such as you doing
what? or what you doing what? in place of the expected what you doing? ;7 with
a candor as rare as it is commendable, they observe that such errors have not as
yet been reported and that it will constitute counterevidence to their claims if
those errors do not in fact occur. If indeed there is no evidence to support the
two-rearrangement argument, the only reason for supposing thatWH-questions
are psychologically complex is that they take longer to acquire. In other words,
the whole explanation becomes circular.
An alternative explanation is suggested by Ruth Clark, who claims that unin-
verted WH-questions are modeled on the embedded clauses produced by moth-
ers and other caregivers (Clark 1977). For example; the child who asks where
Teddy? may often be answered by I don’t know where teddy is. Clark argues
that children are sure to listen with special attention to the answers to their own
questions; in this way, they acquire the uninverted structures which they subse-
quently use to form questions of their own. Clark’s explanation is implausible
on several grounds.
First, the productive use of analogy it entails has little support in acquisition
studies generally, and we have just noted one specific case (“nonfinite -ing”)
where the predictions it makes are not in fact fulfilled. Second, if there is any-
thing children can do with language, it is to tell the difference between a question
and a statement; according to Halliday (1975), they learn to do this productively,
by applying appropriate intonation contours to some of their earliest one-word
utterances, around the age of fifteen months. In the two years or so that may
elapse between that time and their final mastery of English WH-questions, they
must receive countless well-formed tokens of the type to which – since the con-
sequences of inattention may in some cases be acutely dysfunctional for them
– they must listen as acutely as they do to answers to their own questions. It
is well known that children try, wherever possible, to maintain “one form, one
function” in the very teeth of “natural” languages which insist on having two
forms for one function and two functions for one form. In the face of all of this,
why should children take a form that clearly belongs in answers and use it to
make questions?
7 For instance, “double pasts” of the kind discussed in Note 5 above are assumed in orthodox
generative accounts (e.g., Hurford 1975) to stem from a process which copies the past-tense
marker in Aux onto the verb-stem, as in the familiar “Aux-Hopping” rules, but then fails to
delete the original occurrence of past tense under the Aux node (but see Maratsos & Kuczaj
(1978) for criticism of this proposal). The fact that “double pasts” occur so frequently while
“double-WHs” don’t occur at all casts strong doubt on the assumption that children’s mistakes
stem from incomplete applications of standard transformational processes.
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If we assume a language bioprogram, however, a much more reasonable ex-
planation emerges. The bioprogram would enjoin just that biuniqueness in form-
function and form-meaning relationships which children strive for and which
creoles, with a large measure of success, attain. In this, it merely follows the
pattern of genetic programs in general, which do not prescribe sets of alterna-
tive routines, but leave open the possibility of adapting given routines for other
purposes.
One resource in the bioprogram is constituent movement. We will not directly
consider movement rules in this chapter, although we considered them in the
first two, simply because not enough work has been done on the acquisition of
movement rules for any valid comparisons to be drawn. But it would appear
from creoles that movement has, as the overall model would suggest, only one
function – expressing shifts from the expected pattern of focus and presupposi-
tion. Certainly no creole rule that I know of moves any constituent for any other
reason than this.
English, therefore, goes contrary to the bioprogram when it uses a movement
rule – subject-aux inversion – to distinguish between questions and statements.
The child, therefore, either fails to hear correctly or simply ignores the sentences
that depart so radically from his expectations. Eventually (perhaps as a result of
misunderstandings; it would be interesting to have some “caregiver interaction”
data on this) the child observes that subject-aux inversion is required in yes-no
questions. Two factors could reasonably be expected to delay the generalization
of this rule toWH-questions. First, WH-questions are unambiguously marked by
the initial WH-word, so that misunderstanding is correspondingly less likely to
occur. Second, the fact that WH-questions are already formally distinguishable
from statements could well deter the child from applying what, to him, would be
a quite redundant rule – why mark a question as a question twice over?
Finally, of course, he has to capitulate; the child learning a creole does not.
The yes-no questions of children in Klima & Bellugi’s second stage and the WH-
questions of children in their third stage are identical with the yes-no and WH-
questions cited in Chapter 2.
Let us turn to negation where, again, the findings of Klima & Bellugi (1966)
have hardly been superseded (except, again, that they may not have paid enough
attention to individual differences). At the earliest stage of negation, a negative
morpheme – occasionally not, most often no – is placed at the beginning or end
of the utterance. These forms persist into the second stage, but here, one or
two specialized negative forms, such as don’t or can’t, are also acquired. Since
cannot and do not never appear at this stage, we can conclude that for the child,
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can’t and don’t constitute monomorphemic utterances. Also these forms seem
to be more restricted in distribution than they are in adult language; don’t seems
to be confined (in Klima and Bellugi’s examples, at least) to stative verbs and
imperatives.
Can’t and don’t are, presumably, superimposed on the bioprogram by sheer
force of parental repetition; I know of no statistics on the subject, but casual
observation alone suggests that these must be among the most frequent words
addressed to small children – perhaps to creole speakers too; for I cannot resist
interrupting this account to describe two striking similarities between acquisi-
tion and, this time, decreolization.
It may seem illogical at first to compare acquisition with decreolization in a
study whose main thrust is the comparison of acquisition and creolization; but
regarding later stages of acquisition, such comparisons are apt and pertinent.
The position of the bioprogram-activating child vis-a-vis the target-language-
enforcing adult is highly comparable to the position of the creole speaker vis-
a-vis the superstrate speaker. Both adult and superstrate speaker believe that
both child and creole speaker are speaking merely a “broken” form of their own
“proper” language. Both child and creole speaker are eventually forced to modify
their natural behavior by the bombardment from above.8 With regard to changes
in negative forms, the results seem to be identical. Both basilectal GC and basilec-
tal HCE order Neg before Aux in surface structure; in the decreolization of both
languages, the thin end of the wedge of English negative placement (i.e., in sur-
face structure as the second member of Aux) consists of adoption of the negative
form of can (GC kyaan, HCE kaenat) to replace, respectively, GC na kyan, HCE
no kaen. Kyaan and kaenat are both perceived and treated as monomorphemic
units. In GC, kyaan is first acquired, and doon (the equivalent of don’t) is ac-
quired second and some time later in the decreolization process; in HCE, kaenat
and don are acquired around the same time. In GC, exactly as in child language,
8 In other words, creolization and decreolization correspond to the two (overlapping) halves of
the acquisition process proposed at the beginning of this chapter. The first half, dominated
by the bioprogram, corresponds to creolization, but the second half, dominated by other com-
ponents, in which the child bridges the gap between bioprogram and target language, corre-
sponds to decreolization. The only significant difference would seem to be that creolization and
decreolization cannot overlap, while the evolution of the bioprogram and the pressure from
the target language can, do, and indeed must overlap. However, since this difference stems di-
rectly from purely pragmatic differences between the circumstances of the “normal” child and
the circumstances of the creole-creating child, it can in no way invalidate the correspondence.
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doon is initially applied to statives, imperatives, and little else (see Bickerton 1975:
Table 3.9), where these two types account for 84 percent of the output of early
doon users); comparable figures are, unfortunately, unavailable for HCE.
We return now to the normal evolution of child negatives. Around the time
that don’t and can’t make their first appearance, there also appear sentences such
as the following:
(58) That no fish school.
(59) He no bite you.
(60) I no want envelope.
These sentences find exact parallels not in decreolization, but in the classic
form of creole negative sentences. As in creoles, the negative morpheme is iden-
tical with the morpheme of denial. As in creoles, the negative morpheme is in-
serted directly after the subject, before any verbal or auxiliary element, rather
than sentence – externally (as in the first phase of child negation) or after a first
auxiliary or verbal constituent (as in English). This second similarity is main-
tained even after no begins to be replaced by not:
(61) He not taking the walls down.
(62) Ask me if I not made mistake.
In part, at least, these developments are natural, perhaps inevitable. At the
two-word stage there is nowhere the child could put a negative except sentence-
externally. Moreover, since no is heard as an isolated unit with heavy emphasis,
while not often occurs in contracted forms which may be unrecognizable to the
child, it is hardly surprising that no rather than not is selected for sentence nega-
tion.
It is less clear why negative placement in longer sentences takes the position
it does. To judge from the examples cited above, that placement involves post-
subject, rather than preverbal, placement – inapplicable in (58) which has no verb
– or second position in sentence – ruled out by (62) where a subordinate clause
is negated. Yet there is no support for a “post-subject” hypothesis in English.
One might claim that the child knows roughly where the negative should go but
doesn’t yet have any auxiliary to place in front of it, so he arrives at post-subject
placement by default, so to speak. This may sound plausible at first. But note that
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post-subject placement is arrived at before the child acquires not – not merely
usurps the place staked out by no. Just howwould the child know “roughlywhere
the negative goes” in English if that child has not yet succeeded in even iden-
tifying not? Recognition of the “English position” for Neg-placement depends
crucially on the ability to realize that not (all that ever occurs in that position)
is the marker of negation. Those who would argue for the “commonsense” ex-
planation of how children acquire negative placement will have to explain how
you can learn what a form means and where it is placed without actually
learning the form itself.
There is empirical evidence, too, to confirm that people can’t and don’t learn in
this way. I have already suggested some ways in which child acquisition is some-
what like decreolization: or, to put it more precisely, the child’s actuation of the
bioprogram is like creolization, and the child’s modification of bioprogram spec-
ifications is like decreolization. Now, as I abundantly demonstrated in Bickerton
(1975), decreolization proceeds by acquiring new forms first and new functions
later.9 Newly acquired morphemes are at first assigned meanings and functions
that already exist in the speaker’s grammar; in other words, these morphemes
have to be stripped of the meanings and functions which they had in the super-
strate before they can be incorporated into the existing creole grammar. Only
later, as that grammar itself changes, do they reacquire all or part of their orig-
inal superstrate meanings and functions. I know of no counterexamples to this
empirical finding, nor has it been challenged in the literature. We should there-
fore be highly skeptical of any claims about child acquisition which involve the
assumption that meanings and functions can be acquired in the absence of the
formal units which act as bearers of those meanings and functions.
Another puzzle concerns the slow spread of don’t. If don’t acquired at the
same time as post-subject no, how is it that the child does not straight away
adopt the hypothesis that don’t is the “real” negative marker, and spread its use
to all environments? In fact, don’t must be perceived simply as an alternative to
no, rather than do + negative, since the child has no independent do at this stage
or for some time to come. If a child applied this hypothesis just to the examples
(58)–(62), he would score two almost correct sentences out of the five – he don’t
bite you, I don’t want envelope –as opposed to only three incorrect ones: * that
don’t fish school, * he don’t taking the walls down, * ask me if I don’t made mistake.
This is better than five out of five incorrect, which is what he now has.10
9 See also the theoretical discussion of this process in Bickerton (1980).
10 Why children don’t do what they don’t is often even more mysterious (for the conventional
wisdom) than why they do what they do, so that questions such as the one at the beginning
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Resemblances to creole structures are not exhausted even when the child has
fully mastered the negative placement rule. McNeill (1966) reports the case of
a child who uttered (63) on eight consecutive occasions, despite overt parental
correction:
(63) Nobody don’t like me.
Such sentences, though not reported from all children so far studied, are by no
means uncommon at age four or thereabouts. We saw in Chapter 2 that the use of
negative subjects with negated verbs is common to a number of creole languages,
although it would appear to be uncommon in languages generally.
It could be argued that sentences like (63) are nothing more than a result of the
order in which somebody, nobody, and anybody are acquired. It is hardly surpris-
ing that somebody, the only one that can have a concrete referent, is learned first.
In consequence, children slightly younger than those who produce sentences
like (63) often say things such as I don’t see somebody rather than I don’t see any-
body. Since nobody is learned before anybody, it tends to replace somebody in
sentences like this, giving I don’t see nobody. At the same time, when nobody is
used in subject position, it would be unrealistic to expect the child to realize im-
mediately that no further formal marker of negation is required; unreasonable,
too, to expect him to abandon at once, in sentences like (63), the system of verbal
negation which, as we have just seen, cost him so much difficulty to acquire. On
this showing, sentences like (63) would issue, not from some command of the
bioprogram to produce multiple negatives, but rather from factors inherent in
the process of learning English.
This argument stands up much better than most others which seek to explain
away creole-like structures in child language. However, it is by no means im-
mune to question. It depends crucially on independent motivation for the fact
that nobody is acquired before anybody, which may be as common or more com-
mon than nobody in adult input. It leaves mysterious both the frequency of
negative subject/negative verb in creoles and the greater frequency of double
predicate negation in languages generally. There must be some way in which
multiple negation is more natural than single negation, despite the pedagogues
and logicians.
Here is a case where fuller and more carefully collected data may help to re-
solve the issue. In creoles, negative subject/negative verb is by no means re-
of this paragraph are studiously avoided. However, there is no need to avoid such questions
with the present model; why they don’t do what they don’t is in fact loaded with clues as to
why they do do what they do.
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stricted to generic indefinites like nobody, no one, nothing. It also involves Neg +













‘No dog bit any cat’
I have not seen any reports of sentences like (64), but that in itself is no indi-
cation that they never occur in child language. If they do not occur, then the
“commonsense” argument given above could well be the answer. If they do oc-
cur, then an argument based on the order of acquisition of negative indefinites
cannot account for all the data, and in light of the creole evidence, the workings
of the bioprogram must again be suspected.
For our fourth and final area of creole acquisition comparison, we will look at
the acquisition of causative constructions.
First (for we shall be drawing evidence from the acquisition of more than one
language in this area), we must bear in mind that there are many different ways
of making the causative-noncausative distinction (henceforth the CNCD). This
distinction may be marked on the subject (as in ergative languages) or on the
verb. In either case, there may be several different types of marking, especially
where verb-marking is the option chosen. English excludes subject marking, but
marks the CNCD on the verb in several ways.
The simplest way of marking the CNCD is by using the same verb for causative
and noncausative versions of the same event – i.e., for cases where the subject
must be the causative agent but also for cases where the subject is the patient,
experiencer, or whatever. These cases are differentiated only by transitivity ver-
sus intransitivity: causative-agent cases will have both subject and object NP,
noncausative cases will have only subject NP.
(65) The door opened.
(66) Bill opened the door.
There are other cases in which the same verb is used for both causative and
noncausative versions, but where the noncausative version must be marked by
use of the passive:
(67) * The tree planted.
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(68) The forester planted the tree.
(69) The tree was planted (by the forester).
In yet other cases, a different lexical verb is required for causative and non-
causative versions:
(70) The sheep ate (noncausative).
(71) John ate the sheep ( ̸= John caused the sheep to eat).
(72) John fed the sheep (causative).
In a fourth set of cases, no appropriate lexical alternation exists, and for caus-
ative versions a periphrastic structure must be used:
(73) Mary suffered (noncausative).
(74) John suffered Mary ( ̸= John caused Mary to suffer).
(75) John made Mary suffer (causative).
Yet another verb-marking method, not used by English but found, for example,
in Turkish, is to employ the same lexical verb in both cases but differentiate them
by means of a verbal affix. Ergative languages, too, generally use the same lexical
verb, but mark causative subjects only with the ergative case-marker; subjects
of noncausatives are marked, like objects of causatives, with the accusative case-
marker. The particular strategy or selection of strategies chosen by any language
to make the CNCD will, of course, reflect the typology of that language. But the
function of all of these varying devices is identical.
Somemethods of expressing the CNCDwould seem to be more easily acquired
than others. Slobin (1978) reports a cross-linguistic experiment on the interpre-
tation of causative constructions in which the subjects were child learners of
English, , Serbo-Croat, and Turkish. Subjects were required to act out with toy
animals sentences such as the horse made the camel run. In English, Italian, and
Serbo-Croat, such sentences have rather similar structures, involving two dis-
tinct verbs, one of them a lexical causative like make (Slobin did not include
examples of the three other English ways of marking the CNCD). Turkish, how-







‘The horse made the camel run’ (lit., the horse ran the camel)
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The task was performed with almost 100 percent accuracy by Turkish-speaking
children before the age of three. Serbo-Croat speakers, however, did not reach
this level until they were four or over, while even at age four the English and
Italian speakers averaged between only 60 and 80 percent.
This finding is hardly surprising in light of the fact that the Turkish causative
suffix is learned and used productively and correctly by the age of two – an-
other of those cases of “errorless learning” we discussed earlier in this chapter.
Equally early and errorless marking of the CNCD is reported by Schiefflin (1979)
for Kaluli, an ergative language of Papua-New Guinea. Here, the suffix which is
applied to causative agents is fully acquired and appropriately used by age 2:2,
without ever being generalized to nonagentive subjects.
The fact that CNCD strategies that involve marking of causatives by bound
morphemes and single-clause structures (the case in both Turkish and Kaluli)
are acquired earlier and more easily than structures involving two clauses and
a causative verb casts strong doubts on those generative-semanticist analyses
that would assume something like Bill caused the door to become open as the
underlying structure of sentences like (66). We shall return to this point shortly
when we discuss the treatment by Bowerman (1974) of the acquisition of English
causatives.
First, however, we should ask how the cases of Turkish and Kaluli relate to the
creole case. We saw in Chapter 2 that out of the six potential strategies for ex-
pressing the CNCD described above (case-marking, verbal affixation, causal-verb
periphrasis, passivization, lexical alternation, and simple transitive-intransitive
alternation), creoles use only the last named. The examples given – (86)–(91),
Chapter 2 – were identical in structure with the English examples in the present
chapter, i.e., (65)–(66). Notoriously, creoles avoid bound-morphology solutions.
Is it not then counterevidence to the language bioprogram that the bound-mor-
phology solutions of Turkish and Kaluli are so quickly acquired?
The answer is: not in the slightest. To provide counterevidence of any value,
onewould have to show that Turkish-type or Kaluli-type solutionswere acquired
before the simple transitive-intransitive alternations of the kind that creoles
make. This is a most unlikely finding because, in fact, the Turkish and Kaluli so-
lutions are already transitive-intransitive alternations which are simply under-
lined, as it were, by the addition of a further marker. Moreover, English causa-
tives of the door opened/Bill opened door type are certainly acquired at an equally
early age; it is the three other types of causative that create problems, as we shall
see.
Far from being counterevidence, the Turkish and Kaluli cases are confirma-
tory. If there is a language bioprogram, then children are programmed with a set
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of basic distinctions which they expect that their native tongue will implement
somehow. It is less clear whether, or to what extent, they are specifically pro-
grammed with the means to realize these distinctions should their native tongue
fail to meet their expectations (as is the case, most drastically, if they are born
into a pidgin-speaking community). I suspect that the bioprogram may turn out
as follows: both distinctions and means for implementing them are programmed,
but are not necessarily conjoint in the program. We have already claimed that the
bioprogram is not present at birth, but unfolds progressively during the course
of the first four years or so of life. The distinctions would then be programmed
to emerge prior to two, possibly around eighteen months or earlier, while the
means of implementation would not necessarily emerge until the third or fourth
year. Thus, children would start early searching for means to express the distinc-
tion, and only if they failed to find any would they need the implementation part
of the program.
Put like this, without any supporting evidence, the structure of the biopro-
gram may look too much like some bizarre kind of providentiality, as if a well-
meaning deity had foreseen the consequences of European imperialism and spe-
cially equipped his creatures to circumvent them. However, the picture will
change considerably in the next chapter, when I shall discuss the ways in which
the bioprogram may have come into existence. Creole languages will then ap-
pear not as a case of divine foresight and beneficence, but rather as the quite
accidental consequence of a much vaster design.
As for those who claim that the causative-noncausative distinction is one that
is salient to the child and important in his interaction with his environment (and
therefore easily learnable from experience), it does not follow, even if the claim
is correct, that he can learn from this alone that the CNCD is marked in the
language he is learning. There are innumerable facts about the real world that
a child has learned by age two, and many of them are extremely important to
him, but extremely few of them are explicitly coded in language. How, without
prior knowledge, can he know which is to be coded and which is not? And this
is without even considering other kinds of problems involved in correct learning
of the various CNCD expressions, some of which we will review after discussing
English acquisitions.
One of the things that facilitates acquisition of Turkish and Kaluli causatives is
that they are uniform; there is but oneway to form causatives, and themorpheme
involved is unique and undergoes only phonologically-conditioned forms of vari-
ation. The picture in English, with its four ways of expressing the CNCD, is at an
opposite extreme. Since conflicting evidence is not much better than no evidence
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at all, the theory would predict that English learners would treat English, in this
respect, just as creole children treat a pidgin; that is, having failed to extract from
their input a consistent way of expressing the CNCD, they would generalize the
simplest transitive-versus-intransitive solution, already available to them from
open-type verbs, to other classes of verbs. And this is, in fact, exactly what they
do.
Bowerman (1974) observed that from around 2:3 on, but more particularly
around the age of three, children would employ intransitive (noncausative) verbs
in causative sentences:
(77) Mommy, can you stay this open?
(sc., make this stay open, keep this open)
(78) I’m gonna fall this on her.
(sc., make this fall on her, drop this on her)
(79) She came it over there.
(sc., made it come over there)
(80) How would you flat it?
(sc., make it flat, flatten it)
Note that this creative process extends to adjectives as well as verbs (80), and
that the line between adjectives and verbs may therefore, at this stage, be as thin
as it is in creoles.
This process does not limit itself to intransitives. Transitive verbs like eat
which are restricted to noncausative meanings (see (70, refex:3:71) above) and
hence, except where cannibalism is practiced, to nonhuman objects are also
treated as if they were potential causatives:
(81) Child (pretending to feed doll): See, she can’t eat!
Mother: Just pretend, honey.
Child: But I can’t eat her!
(sc., make her eat, feed her)
Clark & Clark (1977: 511), in discussing these developments, explicitly compare
them with the child’s over-generalization of regular plural forms. Indeed, what
is significant about these cases is precisely that they constitute a generalization
to English of the regular creole strategy. But a good deal more is involved than
that.
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Let us suppose that children learn language by adopting a series of “strategies”;
whether learned or innate is immaterial here. Such strategies would clearly in-
clude generalization, one of the best-attested concomitants of acquisition. The
strategy of generalization might be informally defined as follows:
Step 1: Look for any regular form with a consistent core of meaning.
Step 2: Apply that form in all possible environments.
Step 3: Compare output with input, and note cases (if any) where these do not
match.
Step 4: Remove the exceptions (if any) which appear when Step 3 is applied.
This strategy would be applied in a wide variety of cases: in English pluraliza-
tion, past tense, and, again, in causatives. The child would note the existence of
a number of pairs like X opened/Y opened X (Step 1); he would generalize this,
yielding pairs like X ate/Y ate X (Step 2); he would note counterevidence such as
Y fed X (Step 3); he would then gradually substitute “irregular” forms like Y fed
X for false “regular” forms like Y ate X (Step 4).
Let us suppose that the Kaluli learner applied a similar strategy. He would fast
observe that a number of nouns in subject position had an ergative affix (Step
1); he would then generalize the affix to all NPs in subject position (Step 2); he
would then note that in fact a number of subjects had a different kind of affix
(Step 3); he would then work toward a correct distribution of the ergative and
accusative affixes (Step 4).
Unfortunately, while the generalization strategy provides an exact description
of what English learners do about causative marking, it provides a completely
inaccurate description of what Kaluli learners do about their causative marking.
If Kaluli learners applied the same strategy, then we should find large numbers of
ergative case-markers applied to experiencer or patient subjects which, accord-
ing to Schiefflin, we do not do. Why is the generalization strategy chosen in one
case, but not in the other?
A simplistic answer might be: because the two cases are not really comparable.
In Kaluli, there is a semantic and pragmatic distinction between subjects that
cause things to happen and subjects that do not. In English, no such distinction
is involved. The sets of verbs that take simple transitive-intransitive alternation,
as opposed to those that take lexical alternation, passivization, or causal-verb
periphrasis, is not a natural semantic class; nothing but experience could tell one
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that the jockey walked the horse and the jockey galloped the horse are grammatical,
but * the jockey ran the horse is not.
It is true that the two cases are not comparable from the standpoint of an
adult who knows something of the grammar of both languages – but from the
child’s viewpoint? How is the child supposed to recognize that semantic sets
are involved in one case, but not in the other, unless he already knows what the
relevant semantic sets are? He cannot construct semantic sets from experience
alone until he has at least experienced the full range of semantic classes that the
language contains (if then!). Each lexical item has so many parameters of mean-
ing, could fit into so many partially overlapping classes, that one could never say
for certain, given any body of partial data, whether semantic classes did or did
not coincide with the formal differences perceptible in those data. But production
does not stand still until the child has mastered possible semantic classes in the
language confronting him. The child is under pressure to talk, whether he is
ready or not.
If the child formed hypotheses, as so many suppose, then there would be many
different hypotheses that the Kaluli child might make. He might assume that
ergative and accusative case-markers are merely subject markers that happened
to be in free variation, or that the ergative marker marked subjects that happened
also to be topics, or that stativity was involved somehow (since many causatives
are non-statives, while many statives are noncausatives, this hypothesis might
be a very attractive one). But wrong choices of hypothesis would inevitably yield
misplaced case-markers, and this does not seem to happen. Miraculously, some-
how the first “hypothesis” is the right “hypothesis”. Similar considerations ap-
ply to the acquisition of Turkish, except that here the child’s task is made more
complex by the fact that the causative marker is only one of a string of verbal
suffixes which frequently co-occur: suffixes which indicate reciprocity, negation,
person, number, tense, and the direct/indirect knowledge distinction which, as
we saw above, is the only one that seems to cause problems. These strings of
suffixes present two quite distinct kinds of problems. The first is a problem of
segmentation, which the child presumably solves by some kind of substitution-
in-frame process. The second – figuring out what each of the suffixes means,
once they have been segmented – is less often considered, perhaps because it
looks easy to the adult, who can “look in the back of the book,” so to speak. In
fact, it is much more difficult than the first, and the fact that speech to children
is strongly oriented toward the here-and-now, often urged as a reason why chil-
dren do not need an innate component, in reality makes the task harder rather
than easier; every situational context is composed of innumerable factors, any
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of which, for all the child is supposed to know, could be directly reflected in lin-
guistic structure, and sets of contextual features are seldom constant from one
situation to another. The child who tried to figure out which semantic factors
were marked grammatically – assuming that a two-year-old mind would be re-
motely capable of this, even at an unconscious level – would be in the position
of someone who tries to solve a maze problem; he would have to take the most
promising-looking path, pursue it until it was blocked, then retrace his steps
to the beginning again and repeat the process. But when we consider that the
same semantic factors are marked grammatically over and over again across the
range of human languages, that in effect languages select out of a very short
list of semantic primes the ones that they are going to mark, much as they se-
lect their phonological inventory from the set of distinctive features, it becomes
more reasonable to assume that the child has advance knowledge of the con-
tents of the category “grammatically-markable semantic feature.” Thus, both a
“strategies” approach and a “hypothesis-forming” approach fail to account for
the learning of the CNCD in English, Turkish, and Kaluli. A “strategic” approach
fails to explain why the child over-generalizes in the case of English causatives
but not in the case of Kaluli causatives – unless it introduces some “hyperstrate-
gic” device which would tell the child which strategy to use in which case.11
A “hypothesis-forming” approach fails because it cannot show how, out of a
wide range of hypotheses that the child could form about the nature of Turkish
and Kaluli morphemes, that child invariably picks the correct one the first time
around. A language-bioprogram approach is able to deal with both problems. It
has no strategies, so the first problem is a ghost problem. It specifies the set of
distinctions to be marked, so the second problem does not arise.
However, before leaving causatives we should consider an observation made
in Bowerman (1974) that while “correct” causatives like Mommy open door are
acquired before periphrastic causatives like Billy make me cry, “incorrect” causa-
tives do not appear until after the emergence of correct make sentences. From
these facts, Bowerman argued (and the argument sounded a lot better in the days
when generative semantics was still alive) that although the child at an early
stage might produce sentences like Mommy open door, he would not yet be able
11 It should not need to be emphasized that, first, there is no evidence for “hyperstrategic” devices
as such, beyond the problems whose solution might seem to call for them, and second, that if
they did exist, they would constitute an innate component no less surely (although with far
less justification) than does the bioprogram proposed here.
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to “break down” such sentences into “a cause proposition and an effect proposi-
tion.” However, once he had acquired make sentences, which do formally divide
the sentence into these propositions, he could then analyze sentences with open,
etc., in just the same way; and, once this reanalysis was complete, it could be
generalized to both transitive and intransitive causatives, as we saw in examples
(77)–(81).
There are several problems with this argument. It is far from certain that two
distinct propositions do underlieX-open-Y sentences; themere existence ofmake-
X-do-Y sentences is not itself evidence one way or the other. Certainly, the re-
sults of Slobin’s experiments, discussed above, suggest that the latter sentences
are perceptually more complex than the former, therefore intrinsically unlikely
candidates for underlying forms.
But a more serious objection stems from Slobin’s (1978) work. Slobin found
that even at age four, English learners often could not act out make-X-do-Y sen-
tences correctly, which suggests that even at that age, they understood them
only imperfectly. If this is the case, then it is hardly likely that children a little
over two could understand them structurally in the way that Bowerman claims.
Of course, Bowerman could not be expected to foresee Slobin’s results, but she
assumes that children understand make sentences on the basis of no evidence
whatsoever.
Let us suppose that children could analyze sentences as she suggests. In that
case, why do they not generalize make-X-do-Y to newly acquired noncausatives,
instead of going back to X-open-Y and generalizing that? If they took this surely
very plausible step, they would produce perfectly grammatical sentences like
can you make this stay open?, I’m gonna make this fall on you, etc., in place of
the ungrammatical (77)–(81). The fact that they do not do this, viewed in light
of Slobin’s results, suggests that the earliest periphrastic make causatives are
acquired as idiomatic chunks which are not yet analyzed and therefore not yet
generalizable. If they are not analyzed, their analysis cannot be what triggers the
spread of incorrect open-type causatives. Bowerman’s argument is simply the
logical post hoc, ergo propter hoc.
As for the alleged delay in the appearance of incorrect open-type causatives,
this could be due to nothing more complex than the interaction of communica-
tive need with available vocabulary. As long as the child can handle his needs
with a relatively small vocabulary, the need to “invent” new causatives simply
will not arise. But when the number of things he wants to (and potentially can)
say is expanding more rapidly than his vocabulary, which is the case as he gets
deeper into his third year, he will need to express concepts like those expressed
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by drop, flatten, etc., before he has had the opportunity to acquire the appropriate
lexical items. And it is from this period, say 2:6 to 3:3, that most of Bowerman’s
examples are drawn.
We have now reviewed a wide range of evidence, dealing with the acquisition
of a number of widely different features in several different languages, which can-
not easily, if at all, be accounted for by existing theories of language acquisition,
but which follow naturally if we assume the existence of an innate bioprogram
for language. Moreover, the view of acquisition which this assumption provides
is more satisfactory on a commonsense level. Hitherto, we have had to assume
that small creatures who could barely control their own bowel movements were
capable of learning things – whether you choose to call them “rules” or “behav-
ior” is quite irrelevant at this level – of such abstractness and complexity that
when brought to the level of consciousness, mature scholars often misanalyze
them. This paradox was not very often alluded to, but of course it was always
there whether it was alluded to or not. Now we can see that children can only
learn language because, in effect, they already know a language.
Interestingly enough, a similar view was arrived at by Fodor (1975), arguing in
a completely different way from a completely different starting point. Accord-
ing to Fodor, it is not just common sense improbable, it is logically impossible
for anyone to learn a language unless he already knows a language. “Learning a
language (including, of course, a fast language) involves learning what the pred-
icates of the language mean. Learning what the predicates of a language mean
involves learning a determination of the extension of these predicates. Learning
a determination of the extensions of the predicates involves learning that they
fall under certain rules (i.e., truth rules). But one cannot learn that (P)redicate
falls under (R)ule unless one has a language in which P and R can be represented.
So one cannot learn a language unless one has a language” (Fodor 1975: 63–64).
Thus, to give a concrete example from the first case we looked at in this chapter,
a child cannot know which members of the class a NP are specific and which are
nonspecific unless he knows what specific and nonspecific mean, and he cannot
know what they mean unless he has, in some sense, a language in which that
meaning is somehow represented. As to how it might be represented, that must
be reserved for the next chapter.
Marshall (1979) notes that “no-one has yet brought forth a convincing counter-
argument” to Fodor’s claim, although most people agree “that this conclusion is
untenable.” I find it bizarre that a strictly logical conclusion should be regarded
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as untenable, especially when neither Marshall nor anyone else has been able to
suggest any cogent or coherent reasonwhy it should be untenable. I find it doubly
bizarre now that Fodor’s claim can be supported by the large body of empirical
evidence surveyed in the preceding chapters – evidence arrived at by methods
totally different from Fodor’s and, at the time of gathering, in total ignorance of
his claims. When two such dissimilar approaches agree so completely in their
results, neither coincidence nor folie à deux provides a convincing explanation.
However, there is tremendous emotional resistance to the idea that language is
innate, some of the reasons for which I would like to glance at briefly in Chapter 5.
In part, this emotional resistance is rationalized by some curious ideas about
what is entailed in the making of innatist claims. Typical are the following:
It is not very helpful, however, to stop with the conclusion that linguistic
universals spring from innate predispositions (Clark & Clark 1977: 517).
… to assume that deep structures are “innate”makes a postulate out of a
problem and this in itself means that all further study can lead us nowhere
(Luria 1975: 383).
Similarly, I am quite certain that many students of acquisition who have read
this farwill at themoment of reaching this very paragraph be thinking something
along the following lines: “Sure, he says that the problems of accounting for
acquisition are much simpler if you assume an innate bioprogram. Of course
they are; you can simply avoid them by making a completely untestable claim.
Everybody knows that children learn; the real job is finding out how they do it,
and he’s just shirking that.“
There are so many replies to this, one hardly knows where to start. Let me
begin by saying that students of acquisition have shirked two tasks, not just one:
the task of accounting for how creoles were learned, and the task of accounting
for how the first human language, whatever that was, was learned. If they think
that these two tasks are somehow different in kind from, or irrelevant to, the
processes of “normal” language acquisition, the onus is now squarely on them to
prove this.
Next, nobody is denying that children learn. Children learning English learn
the difference between English and the bioprogram language, and I am sure that
they use a whole battery of learning strategies, inductive processes, etc., in the
course of doing this. Students of learning in the traditional sense need have no
fears that the rug will be pulled out from under them; their field is still ample,
and, if narrower, at least better defined than before.
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All that is threatened is the assumption underlying their attitude: that lan-
guage cannot be innate. This is in fact an a priori assumption for which the
only evidence ever advanced is the ostrich-like pooh-poohing typified by Luria’s
comment. What is more, it is an inherently improbable assumption in view of
the fact that the vast majority of behavior by animate creatures, especially be-
havior as crucial to a species as language is to ours, is biologically programmed.
To suppose that language is not is against the balance of the evidence and a mere
piece of species arrogance, as I am sure any Martian arbiter (if only there were
Martians!) would quickly agree.
If indeed language is innate, then to continue looking for ways in which it
could be learned from experience makes about as much sense as dropping your
keys on the left-hand side of the road and then looking for them on the right-
hand side because there aren’t any streetlamps on the left-hand side. Further,
the claim that the theory is untestable, like the claim that innateness represents
a necessary terminus for research, is simply untrue.
In the course of the present chapter I have mentioned specifically a number
of predictions which the theory makes about acquisition processes; these should
be easily testable by reference to primary data. Moreover, acquisition has yet to
be studied in the vast majority of human languages. All of them should show re-
flexes of the bioprogram features claimed in this chapter, although clearly those
reflexes will differ from language to language since we cannot study the activity
of the bioprogram directly, but only its interaction with particular target lan-
guages. Thus, the evidence available will not always be clear, and its interpreta-
tion will be more often than not a matter of legitimate controversy; but nobody
can claim that such evidence is either scarce or hard to obtain. The fact that I
have been able to derive so much evidence from works whose authors were not
even looking for phenomena crucial to the present theory lends further support
to the claim that evidence will be plentiful; if even the crude plow of the pioneer
throws up nuggets, there can be little doubt that the trained prospector following
on his heels will find many more.
Moreover, there are other ways in which the theory can be tested. One is by
a study of the present-day acquisition of creole languages, a study which has
yet to be carried out. Although creoles are nowadays acquired in just the same
way as other languages, the nature of their origins ought to mean that they are
acquired with far fewer mistakes on the part of the children, and in a far shorter
period of time. Comparisons between acquisition in creole and noncreole cases
can empirically test this hypothesis, and if differences in time span and/or quan-
tity of error do indeed exist, they can give them a reasonably accurate statisti-
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cal measurement. Of course, the results will be more meaningful the more that
creoles relatively free of superstrate influence, which have remained relatively
unchanged since their origin, are made the subject of study. Little value would
be obtained from a study of HCE acquisition, for example, given the rising tide
of English that is presently eroding it, and the fact that in its purest form it is
spoken only by a minority of the population, few if any of whom are now under
forty-five.
Eventually, of curse, empirical testing of the theory will depend on advances
in the field of neurology, since whatever is innate must have an objective phys-
ical foundation in the structure and/or mode of functioning of the human brain.
Indeed, linguists are all too often woefully ignorant of this field. For example,
Alleyne (1979) writes: “There is nothing readily apparent in the neurological and
cognitive systems of humans that makes it natural or inevitable” that the cat-
egories I have proposed for TMA systems should be the appropriate ones (em-
phasis added). The expectation that the appropriateness of semantic categories
should be “readily apparent” in our neurological and cognitive systems would
appear to presuppose a human brain charted, labeled, and numbered like the
old-time phrenologist’s diagrams. We are nowhere near that stage yet; if we get
there, it will be due in part to the linguist’s telling the neurologist some things
to look for, and the neurologists telling the linguist whether what he has found
confirms or disconfirms what the linguist predicted.
Remarks like those of Luria or Clark & Clark cited above seem to envision the
linguist as some kind of bucolic sheriff, shaking his fist in impotence because
the perpetrator has just fled across the county line. So what if we have to go
learn neurology? So what if neurologists have to go learn linguistics? We are
boring the samemountain fromdifferent sides, and the idea that innateness spells
scholarly impotence reflects only the lack of imagination of those who entertain
it.
We have not even yet exhausted the remedies available to us right here and
now. There is a diachronic aspect to the whole issue which has not yet been
appreciated. The bioprogram itself must have a history and an origin, and that
history and origin cannot lie beyond all tracing. It is true that the attempt to
trace them will lead us into what has proved a veritable Sargasso Sea of theories:
glottogenesis, the origin of human language. But we will have at least one ad-
vantage over earlier voyagers. We will be equipped with a much more explicit
theory, and one moreover that can draw on the many advances in evolutionary
science which have taken place since the last time glottogenetic speculation was
fashionable.
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In the next chapter, accordingly, we will attempt to reconstruct the prehistory
and early history of human language, in order to determine, if at all possible,
what might be the origins of the language bioprogram whose consequences the
first three chapters have explored. In particular, we will try to suggest specific
bases for a least some of those semantic distinctionswhich, as the present chapter
has suggested, must constitute an important, although far from the only, part of
the structure of the bioprogram. For the convenience of the reader, I repeat the
four major distinctions dealt with in this chapter, together with evidence for
each:
1. Specific-nonspecific. Evidence: universality of creole zero versus indefinite
article; errorless English acquisition of a1 versus a2.
2. State-process. Evidence: “skewing” of creole verbal systems; distribution of
nonpunctuals in creoles; errorless acquisition of English -ing distribution;
errorful acquisition of Turkish -dI/-mIs distinction.
3. Punctual-nonpunctual. Evidence: universality of nonpunctual language
marking in creoles; mode of acquisition of past tenses in French and Italian.
4. Causative-noncausative. Evidence: NiV/NVNi alternation in creoles and
English acquisition; errorless acquisition of causative marking in Turk-
ish and Kaluli; problems of English, Italian, and Serbo-Croat learners with
“generative-semantics-type” causatives.
This list is by no means intended to be exhaustive. Its members are merely
those distinctions best attested so far in both creoles and acquisition. In addi-
tion, we will look out for factors which might have influenced the more purely
syntactic features we have surveyed, such as the order of auxiliaries, sentential
complementation, verb serialization, etc.
So far, our flight has hugged the ground of empirical fact. Now, and quite un-
avoidably, we must take off for a more speculative realm. And yet in that realm,
we must never lose sight of the fact that there is at least one thing there that is
as certain as death or taxes. Even if it could be shown that natural languages are
learned, even if it could be shown that creoles are learned, it cannot be shown that
the original human language was learned – for it could not have been learned.
Even if one believes that our ancestors were taught by spacemen, then the space-
men weren’t taught, or whoever taught the spacemen wasn’t taught. There is no
escape in regress. Somewhere, sometime, somehow, human language began, and
it could not have begun through acquisition strategies, or inductive processes, or
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hypothesis formation, or mother’s home-cooked language lessons. It must have
been “invented.” And if there were already processes by which language could be
invented, it goes against parsimony to suppose that the human species then had
to acquire a whole lot of new processes in order to learn what it could already
invent and therefore, presumably, reinvent, whenever occasion might arise. As
we shall see in Chapter 4, it is much more plausible to suppose that each step
slowly and painfully made in the direction of language was then – had to be –
incorporated into the genotype so that it could serve as the take-off point for the
next step.
Imagine a man ascending the face of a glacier. Painfully and laboriously he
hacks out each step. Each step has to be hacked out to give him space so that
he can stand and hack out the next step. But the steps remain behind him when




Ever since it has been anything you could even remotely call a science, linguistics
has been set in a mold of static formalism. I do not make this remark in a spirit
of reproach, as do so many who offer in exchange some form of quantitative,
communication-oriented, or functionalist approach, equally static but a whole
lot less rigorous. There are many points in the history of a science when develop-
ments that may not seem desirable from an ideal viewpoint may be strategically
necessary if the discipline is to advance; such I believe were the idealizations ini-
tiated by de Saussure and refined by Chomsky. I would not even go so far as to
say that such idealizations had outlived their usefulness. In particular, work by
Chomsky and his associates over the last decade – which I understand is aimed
principally at establishing, as it were, the outer limits of language – is I think
extremely important and complementary, rather than opposed, to the present
approach, as I shall try to show in the final chapter.
The only problem frommy point of view with the generativist approach is that
it tends to create a mind-set rather difficult to adapt to the kinds of problems we
have to address in the present study. In acute cases, the mind-set may be so
rigid that when problems can no longer be ignored, they are verbalized away,
rather than grappled with; I am thinking, for instance, of Chomsky’s response
to a perfectly legitimate question by Harnad (Harnad, Steklis & Lancaster 1976:
57).1 Of course, if you believe that human language is always and everywhere
the same, that all languages are equal in expressive power, and that how human
1 The exchange, which took place at the New York Academy of Sciences Conference on Lan-
guage Origins in 1975, should be quoted at length; it demonstrates the orthogonal approaches
and seemingly invincible mutual incomprehensibility that have bedeviled glottogenetic studies
better than could countless pages of exegesis:
Harnad: Let me just ask a question which everyone else who has been faithfully attending
these sessions is surely burning to ask. If some rules you have described constitute univer-
sal constraints on all languages, yet they are not learned, nor are they somehow logically
necessary a priori, how did language get that way?
Chomsky: Well, it seems to me that would be like asking the question how does the heart
get that way? I mean, we don’t learn to have a heart, we don’t learn to have arms rather
than wings. What is interesting to me is that the question should be asked. It seems to be
a natural question; everyone asks it. And I think we should ask why people ask it.
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language developed can have no conceivable relevance to what language is like
today, if indeed it developed at all, if indeed it did not spring in its entirety from
Jove’s brow by some beneficent and unprecedented mutation – if you believe all
of this, then you are ill-adapted to understand the dynamic processes which, as
every man of sense since Heraclitus has realized, govern all that takes place in
our universe. Those in whom the malady is less advanced are hereby requested
to retune their receivers to a processual wavelength, if they wish to get the most
out of the present chapter.
The fact that static formalism has prevented linguists from grappling with the
origins of language has not, of course, prevented persons from other disciplines –
with, unfortunately but inevitably, rather less understanding of all that language
entails – from trying their hands at it. Their efforts – and those of earlier gener-
ations of linguists – have yielded a host of purely speculative theories which I
shall not attempt to review here.2 Suffice it to say that all of them suffer from the
same defect: they concentrate, exclusively or almost so, on the moment when
recognizable speech first emerged, when Ug first said to Og, “……” (“……” being
some kind of meaningful, even if only monolexical, proposition, delivered in the
vocal mode). This, which one can only characterize as the Flintstones approach
to language origins, totally ignores the vast amount of preadaptation that was
necessary before you could even get to that point, and equally ignores the vast
amount of postadaptation that was necessary in order to get from that point to
fully developed human language.
That the Flintstones approach lives is shown by the current hottest number in
origins studies – the “gestural-origin” theory (Hewes 1973; 1976, etc.). Whether
or not the theory that a gestural language preceded spoken language is a viola-
The question “Why do you ask that question?” is of course a stalling ploy familiar to psycho-
analysts; indeed, it was programmed into the “robot psychiatrist” with which some ingenious
psychologists were able to simulate, with surprising plausibility, a therapeutic session. The
present writer believes, as firmly as Chomsky, that we get language like we get a heart and
arms, yet I entirely fail to see whyHarnad’s question was an illegitimate one or why it does not
deserve, or rather demand, an answer. How we first got arms or a heart are questions so phylo-
genetically remote and so unrelated to the mental life of our species that Chomsky is right to
dismiss them as not worth asking (except, presumably, for those whose professional special-
ism they are). But the evolution of language is so recent that we may reasonably suppose that
its present nature is still conditioned by those origins, and its crucial role in distinguishing be-
tween us and other species (while any number of other species have arms and hearts) is such
that it must strongly influence, even if it does not wholly determine, all that we think and do.
Thus, to put the determination of its origins on a par with the determination of the origins of
physical organs seems to me a piece of evasive perversity.
2 Hewes (1975) provides a fairly exhaustive account of these theories.
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tion of parsimony (as suggested by Hill & Most (1978)) is really beside the point.
Either this gestural language was of a structure as complex and noniconic as
modern sign – in which case the real question would be, how did this gestural
language develop? – or it was some much simpler and more iconic system –
in which case the real question would be, how did it get to be more abstract and
complex? In fact, the “gestural-origins” theory is just as much focused on the sup-
posed “critical point” of language development, and just as indifferent to any of
the substantive questions about language origins as any of the other “Flintstone”
theories.
The trouble with almost all previous attempts to look at origins is that they do
not go back far enough. If we were to understand thoroughly all that language
involved, we would probably have to go back to the birth of the lowliest animate
creatures, for language depends crucially on a matrix of volition and primitive
consciousness which must have begun to be laid down hundreds of millions of
years ago. Such an approach lies far beyond the scope of the present volume, and
will be addressed in a subsequent work, Language and Species (Bickerton 1990).
Here, I shall go back no further than, say, Dryopithecus, although a brief glance
at the frog will not hurt us.
Again, as in previous chapters, a certain amount of ground-clearing workmust
be done if we are to avoid irrelevant distractions. At the very least, we will have
to dispose of what I shall call the Paradox of Continuity.
The Paradox of Continuity is, at the present moment, perhaps the greatest ob-
stacle to a proper understanding of language origins, as well as a powerful factor
in keeping linguistics isolated from other human studies. It may be expressed as
follows. On the one hand, all the species-specific adaptive developments that we
know of have come about through regular evolutionary processes, and language,
remarkable though it may be, is only one such development; therefore, language
must have evolved out of prior mammalian communication systems. On the
other hand, if one has anything like a complete understanding of what language
is and does, one realizes that there is not simply a quantitative, but a qualitative
and indeed unbridgeable, gulf between the abstractions and complexities of lan-
guage and the most abstract and complex of known mammalian systems (which,
indeed, seem pretty direct and simple); therefore, language cannot have evolved
out of prior mammalian communication systems. Thus, there must have been
evolutionary continuity in the development of language, yet there cannot have
been evolutionary continuity in the development of language. This is the Para-
dox of Continuity, and debate on it has followed the approved political model of
both sides hurling slogans at one another from their different and, as we shall
see, mutually irrelevant positions.
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All paradoxes that are resolvable are resolved by showing that one or more of
the presuppositions on which they are based is incorrect or at best misleadingly
stated. In the present case, both sides of the paradox have weak legs. The weak
leg of the discontinuity side is a belief in the unitary nature of language; the weak
leg of the continuity side is the belief that if language evolved out of anything, it
must have evolved out of another communication system. Let us examine each
of these in turn.
The belief that language is one and indissoluble has also taken its toll on the
primate-experiment debate. In both areas, the central point of debate has been
“When can X be said to have language?” – “language” being defined, by the
discontinuity side, as something virtually indistinguishable fromModern English
or Ancient (ancient!) Greek. Although the continuity side may have protested
the definition, few have protested the gambit; instead of pointing out that the
question “Has X got language or hasn’t he?” is an intrinsically stupid, irrelevant,
and actively misleading question, they have mostly contented themselves with
trying to get linguists to lower the target (for a generally bracing and insightful,
if overly soft on the continuity side, account of the ape debate, see Linden 1974).
In fact, we will get nowhere until we appreciate that anything as complex
as language cannot possibly be an internally undifferentiated object, but rather
must consist of a number of interacting systems, some of which may originally
have developed for other purposes and many, perhaps all, of which must have
developed at different times and under different circumstances. Once we accept
this, we can perceive the development of language as a succession of stages and
therefore amenable to reconstruction and study, rather than as a quantum leap,
which then imposes on us, whether we will or not, some kind of catastrophe
theory as the only possible origins story. It then becomes possible to replace “Has
X got language or hasn’t he?” with the more interesting, and more answerable
question, “How far has X come along the road to language – specifically, which
of the necessary prerequisites does he have, and which does he still lack?”
In the opposite camp, the belief that language must have evolved from some
prior communicative system if it evolved at all is clearly connected with the be-
lief that language is only, or originally, or primarily, a communicative system.
Any doubt cast on this is enough to send the continuity side into a flurry of
pooh-poohing. Typical is the attitude of Young (1978: 175), who finds it “a further
problem” that “a major use of language in each of us is internal – for thinking,
that is for speaking to ourselves”, but nevertheless concludes that it is “rather per-
verse not to consider human spoken or written language as primarily a functional
system evolved for communication” (emphasis added). Perhaps a biologist may
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be forgiven for not realizing that language is not just “for communication” but
is also that which is communicated. But in fact the belief is widespread that all
language involved was giving labels to things and stringing the labels together.
It is assumed as self-evident that when we were ready to talk, all the things in
the universe stood there waiting – rock and river, dodo and elephant, storm and
sunrise, thirst and evil, love and dishonor – all waiting patiently for their labels.
That the world had to be recreated in the image of language before anyone could
communicate about anything at all is an idea that seems simply not to have oc-
curred on the continuity side. How that recreation was carried out will form an
essential part of the analysis that follows.
Crucial to extant continuitymodels, even themost recent, is the belief, whether
implicit or explicit, that you could get from a call system to modern language
(with or without an intermediate stop at a gestural system) by a series of im-
perceptible stages. Thus, Stephenson (1979) proposes a “dialectical” evolutionary
process by which, when our ancestors were more preyed upon than preying,
they learned to control involuntary vocalizations and replace them with man-
ual signs (how a four-foot hominid in five-foot grass informs his cohorts of the
imminent approach of a sabertooth by gesture is left unclear); then when they
got to be better predators and were less concerned with unobtrusiveness, they
were able to return to voice, which was now under cortical control. “The dialectic
consists in an increase in the level of complexity of messages coincident with a de-
crease in the limbic content of messages as one proceeds through calls, through
gesture, to spoken language and into written language” (emphasis added). Stek-
lis & Raleigh (1979) dismiss the gestural phase on principles of parsimony, but
maintain call-language continuity by accepting the claim by Hockett & Ascher
(1964) that progressive blending and differentiation of primate calls could have
mediated the transition.3
All these views share the assumption that the only significant difference be-
tween call systems and language lies in “an increase in the level of complexity
of messages”. In fact, complexity is not the issue. A given alarm call could well
receive the reading, “Look out, you guys, a large predator is already near and
rapidly approaching, so get up the nearest tree as quick as you can”, which is
surely at least as complex as “the boy ran” or “John kicked Bill”. Language de-
pends crucially not on complexification but on the power to abstract, as units,
3 In theHockett andAscher “Flintstone”, the key development is a hominidwho, in encountering
food and danger at the same time, gives half the call for food and half the call for danger. Not
one shred of even the most oblique evidence from ethological or other studies, or even the
authors’ own ratiocinations, is adduced in support of this inherently unlikely development,
beyond their admission that they can’t think of any other way language could have begun.
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classes of objects, classes of actions, classes of events, and classes of yet more
abstract kinds (think, for example, for a moment of all the different kinds of rela-
tionships that can be conveyed by so simple a predication as X has Y ). It is these
classes, not the particular objects, actions, etc., of which they are composed, that
constitute the units that language must represent; but in order to represent them
it must first abstract them from the constant sensory bombardment to which all
creatures are subject (wewill see how in amoment). An alarm call abstracts noth-
ing from that bombardment, but merely selects from it a set of stimuli (smells,
colors, physical movement, etc.) to which some kind of immediate reaction is
the only appropriate response. A call and a sentence may both constitute com-
munication, but in the ways in which they work they are more at odds than
chalk and cheese; for some chalks and some cheeses at least have the same color
and texture, whereas language and call systems do not even have this superficial
resemblance.
However, once we are prepared to consider the possibility that language could
have developed in a regular evolutionary fashion without having sprung from
some primitive repertoire of grunts, groans, and grimaces, all the objections to
a continuity approach melt like snow in August. Once we have gotten over the
“communicative” hang-up, we can see that where we must look for the distinc-
tiveness of human language is not in what it shares with call systems – both
communicate – but in how it differs from call systems – language communicates
concepts, call systems communicate stimuli. If we don’t understand conceptual-
ization, we don’t understand language, period.
However, if we are to write an evolutionary history of conceptualization, there
is onemore ghost to be exorcised – the ghost of Descartes. This particular specter
is still haunting the behavioral sciences even though the naturalistic observations
onwhich its man-animal dichotomywas based are now over three hundred years
out of date. If you believe, as Descartes believed, that animal behavior can be
explained by principles as simple as (and similar to) those hydraulic forces which
activated the “living statuary” of 17th-century French gardens, then it does not
seem so unreasonable to suppose that animals are automata but that we (with
souls stashed in our pineal glands) are not. In light of all that has been learned
about both the structure of the nervous system and the behavior of species since
Descartes’ day, it is merely absurd – possible to salvage only with the logical,
if counter-factual, strategy of the hardcore behaviorist who would claim that
animals are automata but that so too are we.
There are four possible answers to the question, “Who has consciousness, vo-
lition, etc.?” (all the so-called “nonphysical” attributes summed up under the
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illegitimate label mind): animals do, but we don’t; animals don’t, but we do; ani-
mals don’t, and we don’t; animals do, and we do. In all the history of human folly,
I know of no one who has seriously asserted the first. The second is Descartes’
answer. The third is the hardcore behaviorist’s answer. The fourth, curiously
enough, has seldom been made and has been scorned almost as often as it has
been made, although in light of what we know now it would seem the most log-
ical. Since it now appears that evolution has advanced not by leaps and bounds
but by infinitesimal gradations, we either have to claim that with respect to a
particular set of attributes (volition, consciousness, thought, language), evolu-
tion behaved in quite a different – and, incidentally, completely mysterious –
way from that in which it behaved with regard to all other attributes, or we have
to accept that at least some of, or some ingredients critical to, these attributes
were and presumably still are shared by species other than our own. I know of
no logical argument against the second move although the emotional arguments
against it seem as numerous as they are strong. Let us therefore see how concep-
tualization – without which language would have been impossible – could have
evolved.
Conceptualization is intimately linked to perception, if only in the sense that
if there were no perception, conceptualization could not take place. But there
is, I think, a great deal of difference between a concept and a percept, which
tends to be obscured by loose ways of talking and thinking. We use “concept”
for any kind of mental image. In fact, there are mental images of percepts and
of concepts. We might say, loosely, that I have a concept of the glass that is
presently standing on my table, meaning, I can close my eyes and present myself
with a mental image of my glass. That is a mental image of a percept, i.e., my
glass as I perceived it now – empty, but for a small slice of lemon. Of course, I
could imagine it completely empty – which is a percept of how it was at another
time; or full – which is the same. However, I can also have a mental image of the
category glass, which embraces my glass and all other glasses, and which is not
a percept, but a true concept.
In some species, percept and concept may not be so far apart. Consider the
frog. The frog can discriminate “fly” and “not fly”, at least as long as the fly is
moving. It is unlikely that a frog can tell one fly from another or would preserve
memory images of individual flies, even if it had a memory to preserve them
in. In a sense, perception and conceptualization in the frog are one. Only in a
sense, of course; for true conceptualization, you have to have volitional control
of concepts, and the frog is as far from that as from flying. But in the sense that
perception in the frog is generalized, it is like conceptualization.
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Now, the fibers which connect a frog’s retina with its brain are capable of pass-
ing only about four kinds of information, of which only two are relevant to the
perception of flies. The first of these two kinds is supplied by a set of neurons spe-
cialized to detect small moving objects with curving edges; the second is another
set specialized to detect sharp boundaries of light and shade (Burton 1970). There
is then a rather tenuous and metaphorical sense in which we could say that the
froggy concept of “fly” is the firing of these two sets of neurons. Of course, we
are several scores of millions of years away from true conceptualization; but the
journey has certainly begun.
In the course of those years, it might have seemed that perception and concep-
tualization were moving apart, as perception became not only wider in range
(most of the environment seems quite undifferentiated to the frog) but more
particularized, with so many parameters recoverable that maybe even individ-
uals could be recognizable to one sense or another, or a combination of several
(when our dog recognizes us, smell is presumably dominant).4 And yet the basic
mechanics by means of which this enhanced perception was carried out were in
fact no different from those of the frog. There might be many more sets of neu-
rons programmed to respond to many more varied types of stimuli, but a percept
would be still the particular firing pattern of the particular set of neurons acti-
vated by that set of stimuli which constituted the object perceived.
The problem of how a percept becomes a memory is still far from solved. Part
of the problem may be that most studies of memory have really been studies of
learning – that is, of forced situations in which given factors caused changes of
behavior. Thus, if an octopus were trained to attack horizontal but not vertical
rectangles, two sets of feature detectors, each of which could formerly initiate
more than one program of action-advancement, withdrawal, indifference – can
now only initiate one each, with corresponding changes in the neural connec-
tions involved (Bradley & Young 1975). Unfortunately, such findings do not seem
to generalize to mammals, where “the search for the engram” remains as fruitless
as it was thirty years ago (Lashley 1950). Furthermore, it would be unreasonable
4 However, I have some (admittedly anecdotal) evidence that dogs use cognitive mapping in
recognition. Our dog, Rufus, will rush from the opposite end of the apartment to greet my
wife when she comes home, but on meeting her on campus he ignores or even recoils from her
until she is just a couple of feet from him, whereupon he performs his usual acts of greeting.
It is not easy to account for such behavior unless (as is the case with us) part of the way he
recognizes people has to do with a network of particular associations. He recognizes her where
he expects her to be, and fails to recognize her elsewhere, in the same way (and why not for
the same reason?) that we fail to recognize, on the beach or in a restaurant, the clerk or cashier
we may have met dozens of times in a work setting.
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to expect them to generalize to the quite qualitatively different kinds of memory
traces which concern us here. For the kinds of memory traces that modify behav-
ior – those traditionally studied by psychologists – may be (although of course
they are not necessarily) laid down in ways quite different from those of memo-
ries which may only modify behavior in the most indirect of ways, if indeed at
all (e.g., my stored memory image of my neighbor’s new car, accurate enough
to enable me to distinguish it from others, but unlikely to prompt me to steal it,
polish it, avoid it, etc., and hardly to be described as having been learned by me
except under the vaguest and most vacuous reading of learning).
Therefore, I shall assume that long-term storage is achieved (precisely how
need not concern us) by storing features of images rather than images them-
selves. Let us assume I can reliably identify several hundred human faces. Now,
the mental representations of these faces that I need for matching purposes –
I can think of no other way in which recognition could be carried out – are
not stored separately in some analogue of a box in my head, not even in the
form of macromolecules. Rather, each of the horizontal, vertical, slanted, curv-
ing, etc., lines that go to make up faces – as well as lots of other things, of course
– is represented by a particular set of neurons. The superset composed by these
sets is simply an analogue of the superset of feature-detecting neuron sets. The
data recorded by the straight-vertical-line perceiving set of neurons (or however
much of them are transferable) are simply transferred to the long-term storage
set for straight vertical lines, and so on. The fact that a particular batch of data
went into a particular batch of storage sets must also somehow be recorded, in
terms of sensitized synaptic pathways or whatever, or I could never recover Aunt
Emma’s face from its component bits. But in some such general manner – and
I apologize to neurologists for my rather Rube Goldberg picture – the processes
of perception, storing, coding, and accessing must be carried out.
It follows that individual images would not be individually stored – members
of the same class of images would not necessarily be stored together, while the
storage of unlike objects might be strikingly similar. Let us consider the possible
storage of the percept images of three objects, any one of which would have to
be separately and individually recoverable: Aunt Emma’s latest hat, the Sugarloaf
at Rio de Janeiro, the distribution curve for IQ in an average population. These
objects belong, respectively, to three quite distinct classes; the class of hats, the
class of mountains, and the class of distribution curves. However, in their general
shape they share some obvious similarities. Let a through g represent sets of
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storage neurons, each set representing storage of a particular parameter. Then
Aunt Emma’s latest hat might be represented by sets abcde, the Sugarloaf at
Rio de Janeiro by sets bcdefg, and the distribution curve for IQ in an average
population by sets cdef. If I wish to visualize an image of any one of the three, I
activate just these sets.
(And what constitutes the “I” that activates? Analogy from observed con-
specifics, use of mirrors and other reflecting substances, plus the higher-order
“traffic-control” neurons which must exist to establish priorities in brain activity
if the whole thing isn’t to degenerate into electrochemical chaos.)
Some kind of memory storage of particular experiences must go pretty far
down the mammalian phylum. So too, I suggest, must the power of playback
– voluntary recall of images or sequences of images. At the very least, involun-
tary playback (another name for dreaming) does. Reptiles don’t dream, mammals
do. Moreover, dreaming (human dreaming, for sure; mammalian dreaming, very
likely) consists not of just straight playback but of the recombination of stored
imagery, something that would be difficult or impossible if memories were indi-
vidually stored. Once playback, straight or crooked, came under cortical control,
our ancestors were well on their way to the world map that is a prerequisite
for language – without which there is hardly anything worth communicating to
communicate.
The question evolutionists will ask at this point is: why? Why should mam-
mals develop these capacities? Prehistory was not a dress rehearsal for homo
sapiens. What selective advantage did the species gain? Some psychologists
have attempted answers in very vague and general terms. For instance, Harlow
(1958), discussing the fact that some apes and monkeys can solve in captivity
problems far more complex than they would ever meet in nature, pins his faith
on receptor system development, since more finely calibrated receptor systems
entail an increase in the central nervous system: “As long as increasingly com-
plex receptor systems provide the organism with slight survival advantages, one
can be assured that increasingly complex nervous systems will develop; and as
long as increasingly complex nervous systems develop, the organism will be en-
dowed with greater potentialities which lead inevitably to learning.” Similarly,
Passingham (1979), who finds it “puzzling” that chimpanzees should have lan-
guage capacities which “do not appear to be used in the wild”, surmises either
that “chimpanzees do in fact use their language capacities in the wild” – in ways
which two decades of patient and trained observation have somehow still failed
to reveal! – or that “their abilities … must be general ones, allowing them to do
other things of importance to them in the wild”.
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The vagueness and timidity of these suggestions are, I am sure, due to the
Cartesian hangover, although the class “Cartesian evolutionist” ought to consti-
tute a logical contradiction. It should be pretty obvious that the power to review
the past would provide its possessor with another power of the highest value
in natural selection: the power to predict. Psychics aside, prediction is based on
analysis of past events, and becomes of greater importance as creatures evolve
and become more complex. Relatively simple creatures lead relatively simple
lives; it is possible to program them, up to around the frog level, so that they
will respond automatically to all or almost all the contingencies they are likely
to encounter. With more complex creatures, in particular with predators who
have to keep (literally!) one jump ahead of their prey, not only does the list of
conceivable contingencies get too long to program, it would probably be dys-
functional for such creatures to be programmed down to the wire, so to speak.
Such programming would leave them unable to respond appropriately, to vary
the moment of attack in accordance with the wind, the light, the prey’s motions,
and countless other environmental factors, to determine whichmember of a herd
to attack, and so on. The power to review past sequences of events, whether at
a conscious or an unconscious level, and to abstract those factors which made
for success or failure in particular cases, would confer a massive advantage on
its possessor – or one that would have been massive had the prey not developed
along similar lines. As shown in the excellent survey by Jerison (1973), brain size
for both prey and predator has gradually but continuously increased throughout
the mammalian era, with the predators always slightly ahead of the prey.
We do not of course know, and have as yet no way of determining, how far
down the evolutionary scale such capacities might extend. But such capacities
and more might have been needed to ensure the survival of the primates, crea-
tures who were predators to some species and prey to others; and it is a reason-
able assumption that Dryopithecus, the presumed common ancestor of ourselves
and the chimpanzees, who lived between five and fifteen million years ago, had
them and probably had more.
We have so far surveyed the capacity to form and store percepts and to review
percepts and sequences of percepts under voluntary control. But we have not yet
considered how percepts can become concepts. Until a percept – the image of a
particular entity on a particular occasion – can be replaced at will by a concept –
the image of a class of entities, divorced from all particular instantiations of that
class – then the power to predict is limited. A creature concerned with prediction
does not want to have to say, “The boar I wounded three years ago did such and
such, and the boar I wounded a year ago did the same, but this wounded boar is
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a different boar so I suppose I’ll just have to wait and see”. It wants to be able to
say, “Wounded boars do such and such, so I can anticipate what will happen and
be ready to act appropriately”. The prediction may be quite wrong, of course –
with fatal results. But if it is right just that little bit more often than chance, the
survival chances of the species are perceptibly enhanced.
Indeed, instantaneity would have rated above accuracy. The creature that
could achieve 60 percent accuracy in one second would surely have outlasted
the creature that could achieve 100 percent accuracy in ten seconds – because in
those ten seconds, too many of the latter would have gotten themselves killed.
“To generalize is to be an idiot” (Blake 1808),5 but for better or worse, the road
to humanity was paved with generalizations. We assume our ancestors to have
been primates not adapted for predation but driven by climatic change to adopt,
in part, the habits of predators – or so most anthropologists have held for a
good many years. Lacking the tiger’s fang, the leopard’s speed, the disciplined
pack strategies of the canids, they had to compete with these and more in a dry
epoch when pickings were scarce. Under such circumstances they would have
selected very fast and very naturally for some kind of instant recognition-and-
reaction device – one that would respond notmerely to the briefest of glimpses of
possible prey or rival predator, but to the most minimal clues in the environment:
movement of a branch at a particular altitude, say, coupled with the appearance
of a patch of brown slightly different in shade and texture from the fall leaves
that surround it.
That modern hunters still have such a device, even though changing times
havemade it more dysfunctional, was illustrated a few years ago when a national
magazine carried out an inquiry into shooting accidents during the deer season.
Hunters were shooting one another instead of the deer. The vast majority of
these incidents occurred in the half-light of dawn or dusk. The shooters, when
interviewed, almost invariably said that they had seen a deer – not “thought”
they had seen one, but actually seen it – and only seconds after they had pulled
the trigger did this image resolve itself into awounded dying fellow-hunter. From
a few half-perceived dues of color, shape, and texture, they had created phantom
deer and reacted to their own creation before additional sensory input could
replace the projected image with a real one.
5 Nothing Blake ever wrote should be taken lightly. In the broad brush-strokes with which we
have to draw our cognitive maps, infinite details are lost, and what is worse, we get locked into
stereotypic reactions to stereotypes (kike, freak, faggot are some pernicious examples) which
lead us to deny one another’s individuality. A creature that could compute from percepts rather
than concepts would outshine us as the sun outshines the moon (more on this in Language and
Species).
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The reader may easily demonstrate a similar if less lethal effect. Simply draw,
on a piece of paper or a blackboard, the structure portrayed in Figure 4.1 below:
Figure 4.1: The minimal “flower”
If you then ask what this is, people will reply, nine times out of ten, “a flower”.
I have tried this many times on students; you can often see their jaws literally
drop when you tell them, “No, it’s a dot, nine short lines, and one long one”.
The capacity to construct predictive images obviously entails the preexistence
of class concepts. The misguided hunters did not project an image of some spe-
cific deer, but rather that of any member of the genus deer. To us, with the
elaborate and labeled cognitive map which language provides for us, the genus
deer seems self-evident. But try to imagine, if you can, the task of constructing
the category deer from scratch, by inductive reasoning, without benefit of labels
or of map. Deer come in a number of shapes, sizes, and species. Some are dark,
some are light. Some have horns, some don’t, some sometimes do, and some
sometimes don’t. Where do deer stop and other genera begin? The problems are
endless.
Yet as work by Berlin (1972) and his associates has shown, generic names are
the most richly represented in natural languages – more numerous than both the
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higher-order categories (“unique beginners”, e.g., plant, animal, or “life forms”,
e.g., tree, bush) or the lower-order ones (“specific name”, e.g., Ponderosa pine, jack
pine, or “varietal name”, e.g., northern Ponderosa pine, western Ponderosa pine);
invariably monomorphemic (contrasted with specific or varietal names); subjec-
tively perceived as primary; the first to be learned by children. It is a good bet
they were among the first words of human language.
Why the genus and not the species? If your eyes are as sharp as I’m sure
our ancestors’ were, differences between species must often have been as salient
as, or more salient than, differences between genera. But behavioral differences
would have had greater significance for our ancestors than visual differences.
All deer, whether large or small, plain or spotted, with or without horns, had a
number of things in common: they were fleet of foot; nervous enough to make
stalking them difficult but not impossible; often camouflaged by the light-and-
shade effects of foliage; excellent eating if you could get them, and so on.
But the fact that classification of the genera would have been selectively ad-
vantageous for our ancestors does not in and of itself make such classification
possible. A number of preadaptations would also have had to occur, perhaps the
most obvious of which is cross-modal association – the importance of which for
language has been stressed in a number of papers by Geschwind (1974). For the
concepts of genera could not have been built on sight alone; each of the senses
must have contributed in varying degrees. But the real key to the crucial devel-
opments must lie in the nature of the recognition device.
I have said that members of our species, and even dogs, if their behavior is
anything to go by, must be able to distinguish individuals, and there is no reason
to suppose that our capacity to summon up at will the visual images of individu-
als necessarily indicates any very recent evolutionary development. I suggested
also that these images might be stored in a fractured manner, so that similar sets
of bits, when put together in various ways, could constitute very distinct images.
But why in that case do we not project genera that would include in the same
category, say, Aunt Emma’s latest hat, the Sugarloaf at Rio de Janeiro, and the
distribution curve for IQ in an average population?
The utility, or lack of it, that such a category might have is beside the point.
If we built category concepts on the basis of individual percepts, such would be
the kinds of categories we would most likely wind up with. One of the main
reasons that we do not is that concepts, as distinct from percepts, do not exist in
isolation. We do not delimit percepts in terms of percepts. I do not distinguish
Aunt Emma’s face because it is bounded on one side by Aunt Mary’s face, on
another by Cousin Emily’s face, and so on; nor (just to show that this fact has
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nothing to do with any heightened perception of conspecifics) do I distinguish
my toothbrush because it is bounded on one side by my wife’s toothbrush, on
another by my son’s toothbrush, etc. But I do distinguish deer because they are
bounded by horses on one side, cattle on another side, and so on; I do distinguish
toothbrushes in general because they are bounded by hairbrushes, nailbrushes,
bootbrushes, etc. Deer stop where horses begin. Toothbrushes stop where nail-
brushes begin. But Aunt Emma’s face does not stop where Cousin Emily’s begins,
my toothbrush does hot stop where my wife’s begins. That is the difference be-
tween percept and concept, class member and class. Concepts are delimited in
terms of one another, percepts only in terms of themselves.
Concepts are like the counties on a state map, in several ways. Where one
stops, another starts. Although each is composed of so many acres and contains
so many individuals, none is merely the sum of the acres that compose it or the
people who inhabit those acres. Each of them has its place with respect to the
others. The same with concepts. Percepts inhabit concepts, but concepts are not
the sum of their percepts. Aunt Emma’s latest hat, a percept, belongs to the con-
cept hat and not the concept mountain; the Sugarloaf, a percept, belongs to the
concept mountain and not the concept distribution curve. It is not because of
its individual characteristics that I do not expect to find the Sugarloaf on Aunt
Emma’s head; it is because I know that the Sugarloaf is a mountain and moun-
tains do not belong on people’s heads. When I see the Sugarloaf for the first time,
I do not have to work out from scratch all the properties it has, including that of
not being on Aunt Emma’s head; all those properties follow automatically once
I have determined that it is a mountain. Mountains have their place on the map,
and so do hats; and those places are different.
But how, on first seeing its picture, did I recognize that it was a mountain
(albeit a rather small one) at a distance, rather than a large if rather eccentric hat,
up close? Not by computing its peculiar properties. If I had, I could have gone
wrong, because in outline it is less like the archetypical mountain than it is like
some hats. I did so by putting two things together: the fact that it fulfilled at
least some of the qualifications for being a mountain together with its relations
to other objects: a harbor, clouds, a cable-car line to its summit. Of course, it
could still have been a hat in a Lilliputian model city; just as the deer the hunter
shot at could have been (and in fact was) a fellow-hunter. The fact that our maps
may occasionally let us down does not mean we could get along without them.
We would be nowhere without them.
If percepts could be filed fractured, so to speak, concepts must be filed as
gestalts. I do not have the slightest idea how this is done, nor to the best of
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my knowledge has anyone else, although neurologists will quite likely find out
in the next century or two. However, since speculation is useful if only to pro-
vide candidates for elimination, let us speculate. Having been stored one way
as percepts, in a manner based on their immediate sensory images, phenomena
would be copied and stored another way in accordance with their observed be-
havioral properties. Did they lie still or move? If they moved, did they soar, lope,
or slither? These heterogeneous bundles of information would again, presum-
ably, be stored in sets of neurons synaptically linked with, and as specialized in
function as, those sets of perceptual neurons that distinguish movement from
nonmovement, loping from slithering, and the smells characteristic of one set
of phenomena from the smells characteristic of another set. However, instead
of the same set of neurons representing similar aspects of the images of quite
different things, as we supposed was the case in the storage of percepts, separate
sets of sets, involving heavy duplication of function, would be required for each
network of neurons that represented a concept.
If this were so, it would explain why, while percepts may be stored in literally
infinite quantity, the list of concepts, or at least the list of primitive concepts,
is certainly finite and probably quite short (of course, an infinite number of sec-
ondary concepts – timber wolf, prairie dog, etc. – can be constructed by com-
bining two or more primitive concepts). It would also explain why the human
recognition device works as it does. Each superset of concept-representing neu-
rons would include representations of all features of a concept. If indeed the ma-
jor genera constituted the first concepts (and there would seem to be no likelier
candidates), this would mean in effect all features of a genus – sensory, behav-
ioral, distributional, whatever. Then whenever any sufficient subset of features
is detected by the perception neurons – a patch of dappled light, motionless, at a
certain height above ground in a forest at dawn – the superset from which that
subset is drawn would immediately be activated in such a way as to yield the full
concept – deer, in this case. The subject has then “seen” a deer, or whatever, and
reacts accordingly.
This account is, again, necessarily crude, necessarily vague – what constitutes
a “sufficient subset of features” for concept triggering, for instance? – and quite
possibly wrong in most or all of its particulars. It is crude, vague, and possibly
wrong because, as Blakemore (1977) observed, studies of memory (and allied hu-
man capacities) have been “concerned with the machinery … not the code – the
symbolic form in which the events are registered” (original emphasis); by “ma-
chinery”, Blakemore means “the manner in which events can cause changes in
physical structures”, but the kinds of changes likely to be caused by the men-
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tal processes we are considering, consisting as they would consist of no more
than the forging of additional links between specialized neurons, would hardly
be amenable to observation in the state of today’s technology (ten billion neu-
rons with sixty thousand connections each – where do you start to look?). It is
crude, vague, and possibly wrong because neurologists have considered themore
“metaphysical” implications of their task as somebody else’s business, because
“continuists” of the grunt-groan-or-gesture school have thought that the nature
of reality is self-evident and therefore didn’t need to be constructed, and because
philosophers, who alone could be expected to perceive the problems inherent in
perceiving anything at all, have resolutely refused to tie their ballooning spec-
ulations down to the nuts-and-bolts of what we already know about what we
have in our heads and what we might be expected to be able to do with it. So the
whole area slipped between the cracks of the disciplines. But that area still exists,
and is crucial in the explanation of human capacities, so a bad map is better than
no map at all.
These last few pages may seem to have taken us a long way from language,
but I do not think that is the case. Unless we have some notion of all that must
have been involved in moving from moment-by-moment perceptions to class
concepts – and it is class concepts that are named, not perceptions, percepts, or
the extramental stimuli for these – then we simply do not know what it entailed
for a species to get language. Moreover, until we appreciate just how difficult
it must have been to name the major genera – the flora and fauna, successful
interaction with which was our ancestors’ very lifeline – we shall not even begin
to conceive the role which is played by the perceiving mechanism, rather than
the perceived data, as progressively more abstract phenomena are involved. We
will come to that in a moment.
But before we do, we should note that if the foregoing account is correct even
in its broadest outlines, we have already suggested an infrastructural motivation
for one of the major semantic distinctions observed in the preceding chapters
(the SNSD). We saw that both creole speakers and children were able to distin-
guish with great ease between specific and nonspecific (generic) reference. Now,
if percepts – images of particular entities on particular occasions, therefore spe-
cific – and concepts – images of classes of entities, therefore nonspecific – are
stored in different places and in different ways, this distinction would be built
into the neural system. In consequence, something which seems highly abstract
and far beyond the powers of two-year-olds, if we suppose it to be acquired in
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the traditional fashion, would apply automatically provided that no alternative
but incompatible distinctions (such as those involved in Japanese case and topic
marking, for example) were simultaneously being imposed on the child by the
target language. Indeed, I shall later suggest that it was just those category dis-
tinctions based on sharply differing modes of cerebral coding and storage which
were the first to be grammaticized, and which were thus to serve as a kind of scaf-
folding by which language was able to rise from an initial low plateau of short
and relatively structureless utterances.
Now, from recent experimentation, we know that the power to abstract con-
cepts from nature is something that we share with the great apes. As Mounin
(1976), among others, has pointed out, the evidence of what chimps did voluntar-
ily, after training, is much more impressive than what they were trained to do.
The fact that they applied names to different-looking objects of the same class,
as well as to pictures of such objects, and their frequent generalizations of names
to broader classes, shows that to them, names were class names – concept labels
– and not mechanical responses linked to particular, individual objects after the
fashion of proper names. The fact that they invented names for classes of objects
whose names they had not been taught – for refrigerators (open-eat-drink), for
ducks (water-bird), for Brazil nuts (rock-berry), for oranges (orange-apple): Sarah
knew only “apple” as a fruit descriptor but had orange separately as a color) –
shows that they had far more concepts floating around in their heads than their
caregivers had the time or patience to name for them and also showed power of
creativity on a lexical (nonsyntactic) level, a fact we will return to in due course.6
With regard to the independence of this power from anything you could call
training, it is worth citing a passage from Mounin (1976): “Sarah, all alone in her
cage (outside any experimental situation) picked up objects or signs and com-
posed utterances on the models of the structures she had just learned …. Can
one discern the transition of the main and primary function of her code, social
6 Some scholars remain unimpressed by the evidence that apes have concepts. For instance,
Seidenberg & Petitto (1979) seem to need reassurance that before and after Washoe signed
water-bird he did not also sign banana-bird, water-berry, banana-berry – in other words, they
at least envisage the possibility that signing apes proceed like demented computers, throw-
ing off random strings of signs (they have, after all, been reinforced for signing) from which
biased experimenters simply pick out the rare one which happens, by pure chance, to be con-
textually appropriate. Leaving aside the unmerited slur which this casts on the morals and/or
wide-awakeness of many dedicated researchers, the approach adds a Cartesian twist to the
old behaviorist-nativist controversy: scholars who are behaviorists with regard to animals and
nativists with regard to people. It is more parsimonious as well as more fruitful to suppose
that when animals similar to ourselves evince behavior like ours, similar mechanisms underlie
both sets of phenomena.
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communication, to a secondary use of it, the possibility of developing for oneself
the expression of one’s own view of the world? Or does this expression only
represent play?” (emphasis added).
This passage comes very close to blinding insight, yet it still manages to get
things the wrong way around. Mounin is right, of course, in that the Premacks
taught Sarah her code for strictly communicative purposes, so that if she turned
it to private, computational purposes, that use would be secondary in a rather
narrow sense. But in a much broader, evolutionary sense, things were the other
way around. Possession of an elaborated world-view must precede, not follow,
communication on even the lowest of linguistic levels. Sarah and Sarah’s species
must already have had an interior world of concepts, not of percepts, or they
would have been unable to transfer names from one object to another, still less
from one class to another.
Moreover, a name like Washoe’s rock-berry (for Brazil nut) is a metaphor at
a level appropriate for barroom joking, if not poetry; it shows awareness of a
superclass of which both berries and nuts are members, and the sharing of an
abstract quality – hardness, not normally associated with that superclass – by
nuts and a member of another, non-vegetable superclass. The coiner of such
expressions has a cognitive map of no mean quality.
A further telling, if oblique, bit of evidence for this claim comes from Rum-
baugh & Gill (1976), who report that it took Lana 1,600 trials to learn the names
for banana andM&M, but that the next five items were acquired in less than five
trials each – two of them in two only. This stunning and instantaneous increment
is inexplicable in terms of Lana’s having “learned how to learn” in the course of
those 1,600 trials; learning curves just don’t jump like that. It is much more plau-
sible to suppose that for a long time Lana simply couldn’t figure out what her
trainers were trying to do, and then suddenly it clicked: “My God, they’re feed-
ing me concept names – why couldn’t they have told me, the dummies?” The
concepts had been there all the while, and only the link between them and these
mysterious new things that people were doing to her needed to be forged.
Finally, Mounin’s use of or and only is a striking example of anthropocentric, or
perhaps I should say Puritan business ethic, modes of thinking. On the one hand,
you have “developing for oneself the expression of one’s own view of the world”,
an activity automatically assumed to be solemn, to be heavy, to be work, in fact;
therefore, on the other hand, something that is play couldn’t possibly be “devel-
oping for oneself …”, etc. Piaget (1962) came nearer the bone when he claimed
that the symbolic function arises first in play, and anyone who has watched a
young mammal exploring the environment for the first time knows that “play”
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and “building a cognitive map” are isomorphic activities (young lizards don’t
play because they don’t have the spare brain cells). It may look like “mere play”
to the supercilious human observer, and indeed it is play – the animal wouldn’t
do it if it weren’t fun – but it is also the means by which lower creatures as
well as human children set about constructing the mental representation of the
world which gives them varying degrees of predictability and thus enables them
to control to a greater extent their own chances of survival.
Now, if chimps can have concepts and label them just as we have concepts
and label them, and if we know (or are reasonably sure) that we have a common
ancestor inDryopithecus, then we can begin to get some kind of evolutionary per-
spective on the development of linguistic infrastructure. When we find behav-
ioral homologies in closely related species, we can reasonably assume that these
homologies represent a common inheritance from a common ancestor (Campbell
& Hodos 1970; Hodos 1976; Dingwall 1979: Figure 1.4). This would mean that the
power to conceptualize and the potential for naming go back at least as far as
Dryopithecus and maybe further back than that. In a moment I will try to answer
the fascinating question that everyone must want to ask at this point: “Why,
if language is so spectacularly adaptive and if the basic infrastructure has been
around for so long, didn’t it develop millions of years sooner?” But first, there is
more to be said about the problems of conceptualization and naming.
We began by tackling the infrastructure of language at just that point where
the gap between language and the external world wasmost easily bridged; where
the classes to be named were at least classes of discrete entities. Let us now turn
from entities to their attributes and in particular to color.
Color is not something that really exists in the external universe. We have
all seen the landscape “change color” as the sun declines without thinking it
at all odd or stopping to remember that the purpling of noon’s green hills is
due simply to the shortening of the wavelengths of light reflected from them.
Color is simply created by the interaction between those wavelengths and sets
of specialized perceptor neurons, longer wavelengths appearing as red, slightly
shorter ones as orange, and so on across the spectrum. But color vision adds yet
another set of parameters to those that are already sorting percepts into their
appropriate classes. The boundary between two colors, for instance, is often a
boundary and sometimes perhaps the only boundary between another entity and
its background.
Useful though color vision is, it presents serious problems for language, prob-
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lems of a kind quite different from those inherent in the naming of the species
or genera. Creatures are discrete; the spectrum is one and continuous. We can
perceive light at wavelengths of between roughly 380 and 800 millimicrons, and
we can perceive it equally well at any wavelength within those limits. It is true
that we can say of some colors, “that’s a real green”, or “a true yellow”, but there
are points in between where we cannot say whether green or yellow is involved.
If Og and Ug had sat down, as in some of the more simplistic Flintstone scenar-
ios, with a bunch of different-colored pebbles to help them, maybe, and started
out to “name the colors”, they would have been stymied from the word go. Even
more sophisticated accounts which would still assume some degree of arbitrari-
ness and voluntary control in naming run up against the insuperable obstacle
that words demand concepts, and concepts demand boundaries; but colors have
no boundaries, so theoretically you should be free to cut up the spectrum into as
many chunks as you fancy and draw the lines between them just where you feel
like drawing them. In fact, as Berlin & Kay (1969) demonstrated in their pioneer-
ing study, nobody is free to do any such thing. Basic color terms (terms neither
borrowed from names of pre-existing objects, e.g. orange, nor compounded, e.g..
dark green, yellowish brown, etc. – that is to say, primitive concepts) are highly
predictable across languages, and the semantic range of each term is determined
by the number of terms in any given language system and by the ranges of pre-
existing terms (if this sounds familiar, remember it was exactly the way I said
TMA systems were structured, back in Chapter 3, and we will look at these, too,
later in the present chapter). This is to say that if a given language has only two
basic color terms, those terms must be “dark” and “light”; if it has three, they can
be only “dark”, “light”, and “red”; and so on.
The neurological substrate of this structuring of color has been explained (Mc-
Daniel 1974; Kay & McDaniel 1978) in terms of Hering’s “opponent” theory of
color discrimination (Hering 1920; since experimentally confirmed for certain
species of primates, cf. de Valois & Jacobs 1968). Primate brains, and those of
some other orders, have various sets of perceptor neurons each adapted to dif-
ferent hands of the spectrum and activated only by stimuli that fall within those
wavelengths. One pair of sets monitors the ranges corresponding to red and
green. One member of the pair hits its maximal firing rate when stimulated by
central red and its minimal firing rate when stimulated by central green. The
other member of the pair hits its maximal firing rate when stimulated by central
green and its minimal firing rate when stimulated by central red. Similar pairs




The far-reaching implications of the Berlin & Kay discovery have yet to be
absorbed by the scientific community. The conclusions reached in a summary by
Clark &Clark (1977: 527) are fairly typical in their unrevealing, indeed inaccurate,
nature: “The very physiology of the human visual system makes some colors
more salient than others. Children find these colors eye-catching and easy to
remember …. There is more occasion to talk about salient colors and listeners
assume that speakers aremore likely to be talking about them. Color terminology
is universal because the human visual system is universal.”
Quite apart from its chatty, wasn’t-everything-simple-after-all tone, and its
evident confusion of perception with lexicalization, this passage makes a grave
factual error. Thewhole point of the Berlin & Kay thesis is that color terminology
is not universal. If the color systems of languages reflected universalities of
the human visual system then color terminology would always be the same and
always mean the same. But it is not and does not.
What happens in these languages that have only “dark” and “light”? Presum-
ably speakers of these languages have the same visual system as everyone else,
and presumably children learning these languages find red, yellow, blue, etc., as
“eye-catching” as any other children. And if all the primary colors are equally
salient, how is it that no language starts by distinguishing only green and blue,
and then works its way back across to red in the opposite direction?
It is worth going into the structuring of color terms in some depth here as
I believe this structuring is paradigmatic of a number of other semantic areas,
some of them much more important than that of color.
First, and contra Clark & Clark, there is no simple one-to-one relationship
between neurological equipment and semantic structure. Rather, the nature of
neurological equipment enables semantic structure to be divided up in a number
of possible ways. At the same time, it prohibits semantic structure from being
divided in an infinitely greater number of ways, any of whichmight seem a priori
no less logical or possible, and imposes rigid constraints on the sequence inwhich
any given analysis of the semantic structure can be rendered more complex.
Let us look at some prohibited color terms. No language has the term *reen
meaning ‘red and/or green, but nothing in between’, or the term *yellue mean-
ing ‘yellow and/or blue, but nothing in between’. There would seem to be no a
priori reason for the absence of these terms, for it is easy to construct not only
meanings but also possible neurological substrates for them. Thus, *reen would
be the representation of activity in the red-green receptors (and no others), while
*yellue would be the representation of activity in the blue-yellow receptors (and
no others). However, we know that lexicalization does not simply represent out-
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puts of particular neuronal sets, for two reasons. First, many languages have
a term equivalent to grue ‘green and/or blue’, which represents partial outputs
of two opponent sets, rather than the full output of one opponent set. Second,
the factor that allows grue to exist, while blocking *reen, seems to be perceived
spatial contiguity, which of course corresponds to wavelength contiguity. Green
and blue are contiguous on the spectrum; red and green, or yellow and blue, are
not.
It has often been noted that spatiotemporal contiguity is a condition on nam-
ing; no language has a word such as *larm meaning ‘leg and/or arm’, or *shee
meaning ‘shoulder and/or knee’; in no language can I say, *I teach on mwidays
meaning ‘I teach on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays’. However, a further
look at color terms will show that spatiotemporal contiguity, although a neces-
sary condition on naming, is not a sufficient condition. If it were, some languages
would have a word *yeen meaning ‘yellow and/or green’ instead of grue. Yellow
and green are just as much contiguous as green and blue. Their conjunction
would mean conjoining the outputs of two opponent sets, but the same is true
of green and blue.
There would seem to be two possibilities. Grue conjoins the two short-wave-
length outputs of two opponent sets: *yeen would conjoin the long-wavelength
output of one opponent set (yellow) with the short-wavelength output of the
other (green). Perhaps one kind of conjunction can be lexicalized and the other
cannot; we simply do not know enough to say. But it is also possible that what
can be lexicalized at any given stage of development may be constrained by the
order in which lexicalization takes place.7
This brings us inevitably to the much deeper question: why were the basic
color terms added to human language in just the order that Berlin & Kay showed
them to be? The answer may lie in a suggestion of potentially immense explana-
tory power first made by Stephenson (1973) but not, to the best of my knowl-
edge, subsequently developed: that the Berlin & Kay sequence of dark/light-red-
green/yellow-blue may reflect the order in which color perception became estab-
lished phylogenetically.
The argument, although hard to support from empirical studies – species rep-
resenting the appropriate evolutionary stages may all be extinct – is neverthe-
7 That the nature of linguistic facts can be determined by the order in which they necessarily
occur and/or originally occurred has already been suggested in the contrast between the devel-
opment of tense that takes place in learners of English and that which takes place in learners
of Italian. Those who continue to believe (see Note 1, this chapter) that there is nothing to be
learned from learning how language developed should read and compare these two cases and
then ask themselves whether their attitude is not one of simple obscurantism.
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less a highly plausible one. Stephenson points out that mammals were originally
nocturnal and could probably only make lighter-darker distinctions; as they be-
gan to shift to diurnal habits, after the extinction of major reptilian predators,
the perception of light-wavelength distinctions became selectively advantageous
(it would permit a much sharper and finer differentiation of the environment).
Stephenson argues that such perception would have begunwith the longer wave-
lengths.
The transfer from the phylogeny of perception to the phylogeny of language
would then have come about in the following manner. In any line of develop-
ment, neurological structure is always incremental; no species sloughs off its
neural inheritance in the act of adding new layers; the new layers are simply
superimposed on the old ones.8 It follows that older layers have a longer time
in which to establish themselves, to multiply numbers cells and cell connections.
This process is likely to be halted or reversed only if the related capacity becomes
dysfunctional to a species – which color perception is unlikely to do unless our
species is forced back to a nocturnal pattern. Thus, other things being equal, the
older of any two capacities should be the stronger. The greater neural strength of
the oldest – the light-dark distinction – would then lead to its being first lexical-
ized; the neural strength of the next oldest – long-wavelength (red) perception –
would lead to its being second lexicalized, and so on.
I shall therefore propose the following hypothesis: those semantic distinctions
whose neural infrastructure was laid down first in the course of mammalian de-
velopment will be the first to be lexicalized and/or grammaticized in the course of
human language development. In the present state of our knowledge, such a hy-
pothesis can have only a tentative status; yet we will see, when we consider the
possible evolution of TMA systems, that it can still have considerable power.
After red, languages can lexicalize either yellow (next wavelength down from
red, also the “high” member of the next color-opponent set) or green (the “low”
member of the set already activated). It may be that herein lies the reason for
the absence of *yeen. If one or the other member of *yeen must be individually
lexicalized, then a large category consisting of just those members cannot subse-
quently be constructed: lexicalization proceeds unidirectionally toward an ever
8 This is not, of course, to say that older structures do not undergo changes, adaptations, and
linkages. The neural dysfunction known as Gilles de la Tourette’s syndrome is one that affects
the limbic area, yet its victims shout lexical obscenities as well as more animal-like cries. In
general, lexical utterances are under cortical control, but in the case of those which express
strong emotion, like nonverbal vocal utterances, linkage between the speech areas of the neo-
cortex and the limbic area must have been forged at some stage subsequent to the former’s
development.
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finer dissection of the color area, so that while existing categories may be split,
they can never be added to or collapsed. But again, research into the color vision
capacities of more species of primates may clarify the situation by demonstrating
a phylogenetic order of acquisition for the shorter wavelengths too.
We should also look at how the meaning of individual terms is affected by
sequential development of semantic subsystems since there is good reason here
also to suppose that similar phenomena will be found elsewhere. In their origi-
nal (1969) treatment, Berlin & Kay referred to “dark” and “light” as “black” and
“white”. Indeed, “black” and “white” is what these terms shrink to in an eleven-
term system like that of English where other terms have spread over most of the
semantic ground. Yet it should surely be obvious that as lexicalization progres-
sively dissects semantic areas, the meanings of the earliest lexical items must
change: “black”, which originally embraces half the spectrum, must gradually
reduce in scope until it eventually occupies only a narrow band of it. Similarly,
“red” in a three-term system must include much – orange, maybe the darker yel-
lows –which it cannot possibly include in the eleven-term English system, which
contains orange, yellow, and pink as units. Thus, the semantic range of terms in
subsystems is determined by the number of terms in such subsystems and by the
semantic ranges of the other terms.
Constraints such as these will loom ever larger as we continue to traverse
semantic space away from representations of concrete entities and toward repre-
sentations of ever more abstract relationships. So far, the semantic infrastructure
we have dealt with is in all probability shared by Homo sapiens, Pantroglodytes,
and Dryopithecus. I doubt whether similar sharing extends to much or even any
of the areas we are about to enter. Indeed, if we were reconstructing to a strict
chronological timetable, we should probably drop semantics here and start talk-
ing about syntax, since from here on out, syntactic and semantic developments
were almost certainly intercalated and their interaction served to drive language
up along a beneficial spiral. However, in the interests of clarity of presentation,
and to counteract the obsession with “communication” that has so far vitiated
any understanding of how language must have evolved, I shall continue to deal
with semantic infrastructure (or rather with such small patches of it as there is
space to deal with) in order to show just howmuch conceptual preadaptationwas
necessary before a “communicative system” as simple as the simplest of early cre-
oles could be made to function communicatively. Later on, we will retrace our
steps to the present point and deal with the early development of syntax, relating




The first of the semantic areas I shall touch on concerns predications which
may be felt to be central in any structured language system: There is an X,X is at Y,
Z has X, X is Z’s. I shall refer to the relationships expressed by these predications
as Existence, Location, Possession, andOwnership. I should emphasize that these
labels are chosen only for convenience of reference and are notmeant to have any
particular semantic significance: “possession”, for instance, is grossly inadequate
for the semantics of has, whichmight better, though still inadequately, be defined
as “stands in a close and superordinate relationship to”.
In an original and insightful study, Eve Clark (1970) reviewed theways inwhich
these four relationships are represented across a sample of fifty-odd languages.
She found a high degree of similarity in the syntactic structures involved, but a
good deal less similarity in lexicalization. Some languages (indeed, almost half
the sample) used only a single morpheme to lexicalize the entire area; others
used four different items, i.e., lexicalized each of the four relationships differently.
Between these extremes there were several different patterns, with two or three
of the relationships being jointly lexicalized, but seldom the same two or the
same three from one language to the next. Not surprisingly, Clark concluded
that, in this area, the lexicon was without internal structure.
At first sight, an area such as this might seem to be affected by constraints far
different from those which would affect the area of body parts or even the more
abstract area of color terms. One would not expect to find, for example, conti-
guity constraints of the type that bar items like *yeen and *shee, since the rela-
tionships we are now talking about do not seem to have any discernible concrete
correlatives of which contiguity or noncontiguity could reasonably be predicated.
And yet, contiguity constraints exist here too.
Consider Figure 4.2. If the four relationships are arranged spatially as in Fig-
ure 4.2, and if we consider only the primary (shortest, simplest, most frequently
used) morphemes in each language – e.g., not allowing exist to substitute for
there IS, or possess for have – the following constraint on lexicalization seems
to apply: no language can use the same morpheme to express any two noncon-
tiguous relationships (i.e., location and possession, or existence and ownership)
unless that same morpheme is also used to express one of the intervening rela-
tionships (i.e., existence or ownership in the first case, location or possession in
the second). In other words, the semantic space mapped in Figure 4.2 is as struc-
tured as real space, and, as with real space, only contiguous sectors can be jointly
lexicalized. This constraint operates on all the languages in Clark’s sample, on
all creoles for which adequate data are available, and for at least thirty other lan-
guages checked so far, or at least one hundred languages in total; I have not yet
met with any counterexamples.
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The reasons for the existence of such a constraint in this particular case are
far from obvious. The categories involved are not highly abstract, but seem to
be mutually inclusive. Species and color terms are mutually exclusive: if some-
thing is a cat, it is not a dog; if something is red, it is not yellow or blue, and
so on. If the semantic space associated with species, color, and certain other ar-
eas is sharply divided, then such divisions can be regarded as no more than ana-
logues of divisions which exist in the material universe. But it is hard to see what
real-world divisions would be correlates of the constraint governing the location-
existence-possession-ownership area, since existence and possession (in the re-
lational sense given above) can be predicated of all entities whether abstract or
concrete, while location and ownership can be predicated of all concrete (and
perhaps some abstract) entities. So why should it not be possible to conjointly ex-
press location and possession, or existence and ownership, given that any other
pairs, any triples, or all four together may be conjointly expressed?
I can think of two possible explanations, not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Both explanations involve principles of broad, indeed universal, application. As
yet, I know of no way in which these natives could be tested.
The first explanation involves semantic primes. The term semantic prime is
normally used in reference to unanalyzable concepts; here I use it in a rather
different sense, to refer to a very limited set binary oppositions; any concept can
then be defined in terms of plus and minus (and perhaps null) values for these
oppositions, in the same way as phonological units can be defined in terms of
plus and minus values for Jakobsonian distinctive features.9
Semantic change would then proceed in a manner analogous to phonological
change. A phonological change cannot spread from voiceless velar or bilabial en-
vironments ( –voi, –cor) to voiced apical environments ( +voi, +cor) with-
out first occurring in voice-less apical environments ( –voi, +car), or in voiced
velar or bilabial environments ( +voi, –cor), or both. In the same way, seman-
tic change could not spread from an environment which had minus values for
two semantic primes to an environment which had plus values for those same
primes without first affecting at least one environment which had a minus value
for one prime and a plus value for the other prime.
An example can be found if we compare the article system of Modern English
with the article system of Guyanese Creole, which is probably not much differ-
ent from the article system of Middle English (the theory predicts that when
9 In fact, discussion of semantics would be clearer if semantic primewere reserved exclusively for
category distinctions of potentially universal application (like the SNSD, the PNPD, etc.) and
if what are sometimes referred to as “semantic primes” were referred to as primitive concepts.
However, note that primitive concepts are not necessarily constructed out of semantic primes.
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an article system arises, it will be governed by similar constraints irrespective
of whether it arises in a creole system or elsewhere). The Guyanese system is
shown in Figure 4.3.
In Figure 4.3, “definite” and “indefinite” have their traditionalmeanings; “gener-
ic” refers to the subject NP in The dog/A dog/Dogs is/are (a) mammal(s), and
“other” includes NP in the scope of negation, “a book or books”, and similar cases
(see Chapters 1 and 2 for a more detailed analysis of the creole system). It was
claimed earlier in this chapter that the specific-nonspecific distinction had as its
cerebral foundation the differential storage of percepts and concepts; if this is so,
then the SNSD must represent one of the oldest (phylogenetically speaking) of
semantic primes. If it is old, it must (by the infrastructural hypothesis proposed
in our discussion of color terms) be strong, and this superior strength may ac-
count for the configuration of Figure 4.3. Although the SNSD divides the entire
semantic area, with “zero” on one side and “some marker or other” on the other,
the presupposed-nonpresupposed distinction (presupposed in this context refers
to “information presumed shared by speaker and listener”) divides only the +spe-
cific area. Now, there is no a priori reason why the latter distinction should not
divide the entire area; generics are +P because everyone can be assumed to know
class names, while “other” is –P because no one can be expected to know which
was the dog that X didn’t see or which was or were the book or books that Y
might have bought. But, as we saw with colors, semantic infrastructure tells you
where lines may, but not where lines must, be drawn between lexicalizable areas
of meaning.
One feature of Figure 4.3 is that there is no overlapping of the territory of
different lexicalizations; there is no such thing in GC as a sentence in which
you could change the article of any NP without simultaneously changing the
meaning. This generalization does not, of course, apply to English. In The dog is
a mammal you may change the article to anything you like without materially
affecting meaning, and sentences such as there are no cows here and there isn’t a
cow here are synonymous. In fact, we may compare the GC situation shown in
Figure 4.3 with the English situation shown in Figure 4.4.
Here, the has spread from +P +S to +P –S, on the basis of both “definite” and
“generic” being +P, while a has spread from –P +S to +P –S, but only by virtue of
having first spread to –P –S, on the basis of both “indefinite” and “other” being –P;
of course, once a has reached “other” it can then spread to “generic” on the basis
of their both being –S. In other words, a contiguity constraint similar to that
governing Figure 4.2 obtains, preventing “definite” and “other”, or “indefinite”































Figure 4.4: semantic space for English articles
A similar spreading process of individual lexicalizations across semantic space
could account for the variable ranges of lexical items in the location-existence-
possession-ownership area. Let us make the same assumption for that area as we
made for articles: that the configuration that emerges in creoles is the primary
configuration whenever articles appear (including, of course, in the original de-
velopment of human language as well as in the development of every existing
natural language). Then the primary configuration for the location, etc., area will
be as shown in Figure 4.5.
The resemblance to the configuration of Figure 4.3 is obvious. Again, two se-
mantic areas are jointly lexicalized, while the remaining two are separately lex-
icalized. Again, as with Figure 4.3, we know that the pattern illustrated is one
that is followed by most, perhaps all, creole languages, and one that cannot be
explained by appeal to the structures of the languages that were in contact at the
time the creoles came into existence. If this represents the primordial pattern,






Figure 4.5: semantic space for location, etc., in GC
have reached that state by dividing and separately lexicalizing the two lower
quadrants, while those that jointly lexicalize three or even four quadrants would
have reached that state by procedures similar to those which spread the and a
to the second and third quadrants, respectively, but without at any stage of the
process jointly lexicalizing noncontiguous quadrants.
However, it remains to identify the semantic primes by virtue of which the con-
tiguity constraint is maintained in the domain of Figures 4.2 and 4.5. Clearly, the
specificity prime, dominant in article systems, cannot be involved, for any entity
must be marked as +specific before it can have existence, location, possession,
or ownership predicated of it. However, there is evidence that presupposedness,
the next prime down, so to speak, may be crucially involved. Entities of which
location and ownership can be predicated must be assumed known to the lis-
tener: compare the desk is in a corner with * a desk is in a corner, or compare the
briefcase is mine with * a briefcase is mine. On the other hand, entities of which
existence and possession can be predicated must be assumed unknown to the
listener; thus, we have there is an answer versus * there is the answer,10 and I have
a cold versus * I have the cold (the fact that the latter sentence is grammatical
under contrastive stress, as in (It’s) I (that) have the cold, not Mary, is, of course,
completely beside the point).
Perhaps less clear here is exactly what the second prime involved is. I shall
suggest, very tentatively and provisionally, something I shall call “relatedness”.
A claim that something exists entails no claim that that something is significantly
related to anything else; similarly, a claim that something is located somewhere
entails no claim that there is any significant connection between that something
and its location. However, claims of possession and ownership involve a substan-
10 The reading “The answer is there!” is of course not intended.
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tive link of some kind, whether genetic (Bill has children, those children are Bill’s),
creative (Mary had an idea, that idea was Mary’s), or of some other nature. We
could then illustrate semantic primes and their interrelationship as in Figure 4.6.
All entities
–S +S









Figure 4.6: Hypothetical tree structure for semantic primes
This would enable us to define ownership as +P +R, location as +P –R, posses-
sion as –P +R, and existence as –P –R. If this were the case, no lexicalization could
spread directly from ownership to existence (or vice versa) or from location to
possession (or vice versa), since in either case the process would involve simul-
taneously reversing the polarity of two semantic primes. The observed facts for
this area would thus be fully accounted for.
However, doubts about the status of “relatedness” – which does not appear to
figure crucially in any other semantic area, unlike presupposedness – may make
it worthwhile to consider an alternative explanation for these facts.
A slightly different kind of contiguity constraint has recently been claimed by
Keil (1979; 1981). The constraint envisaged by Keil derives from a structure which
he terms a “Predicability Tree”. A predicability tree defines the range of different
predication types over various semantic classes of NP (see Figure 4.7 on Page 219).
Each predication type ranges only over those classes of NP which it dominates
in the structure. Thus, predications such as X is interesting and X is thought about
can be made of any class of NP, while at the furthest extreme, predications such
as X is honest and X is sorry can be made only of the class of NP that is +animate,
+human.
Keil’s predicability tree is based on work by Sommers (1959; 1963, etc.), which














































Figure 4.7: The predicability tree (from Keil 1979: Figure 1)
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straint prevents any pair of predicates (A, B) from intersecting, i.e., A and B “can
never span terms in common and also have terms that just A spans and terms
that just B spans” (Keil 1979: 16). It also follows from this that no predicate can
span two noncontiguous sets of terms unless it also spans all intervening sets of
terms.
Experiments carried out by Keil with children as young as kindergarten age
suggest that the M constraint is unlikely to be learned by experience. Even the
youngest children had somewhat truncated versions of the predicability tree,
and such violations of the M constraint as were found tended to support Keil’s
hypothesis rather than disconfirm it. For example, children who claimed that
dreams were tall (thereby apparently violating the hierarchy of predicability) re-
vealed under further questioning that they believed dreams to be physical objects:
“They’re made out of rock”, “They just got grass on them”, “They turn white and
go up in the sky” were among their answers (Keil 1979: 110). Thus, the violations
arose through assignment of “dreams” to an inappropriate category, rather than
a violation of the hierarchy per se. Since children’s output, as we have seen, is
anything but isomorphic with their input, it cannot be claimed that the absence
ofM-constraint violations in their speech ismerely a reflex of a similar absence in
adult speech. There would appear to be no way in which they could negatively
define the scope of predications as a result of inductive processes; thus, Keil’s
results further support the argument of Fodor (1975), referred to at the end of
Chapter 3, that one could not learn the extensions of the predicates of a natural
language unless one already knew the extensions of those predicates.
Although the M constraint is strikingly similar to the types of contiguity con-
straints that we observed in connection with color terms and the area of location,
etc., it relates to predication (the establishment of a relationship between two lex-
icalizations) rather than delimiting the scope of lexicalization itself. Still, since
have, be, etc., and their cross-linguistic equivalents are indeed predications, it
may be that the predicability hierarchy affects permissible lexicalizations within
that semantic area. We noted above that existence and possession could be predi-
cated of all things, and thus would include the entire tree in their scope; location,
however, could only be predicated of classes dominated by the second node down
(is nearby/at the corner), while ownership could only be predicated of classes dom-
inated by the third node down (is red/heavy). Joint scope of existence and pos-
session could therefore have favored their joint lexicalization, while the disjoint
scopes of location and ownership would have favored disjoint lexicalization.
In the present state of our knowledge, there is no principled way to choose
between the two explanations. Those explanations, however, have served to
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show us other ways in which semantic space is structured, and suggest that the
contiguity-constraint approach may yield a rich store of insights into the mas-
sive conceptual infrastructure that underlies, and that alone could make possible,
the simplest “communicative” uses of language.
Before turning back to survey the growth of the syntactic structures that were
based upon that infrastructure, we should look at one last area of semantic space
where contiguity constraints arising from semantic primes, rather than from the
predicability hierarchy, appear to be operative. At the same time, problems that
were deferred to the present chapter when we encountered them in Chapter 2
(in connection with creole variability in the treatment of iteratives) and again in
Chapter 3 (in connection with variable treatment of iteratives by children) may
now be dealt with.
This area can best be understood if we start from those problems. Readers will
recall that although amajority of creoles (including Guyanese Creole, which here
as elsewhere will be taken as representative) merge iteratives with duratives in
a single nonpunctual category, Jamaican Creole (and perhaps one or two others)
treats the same way as past punctuals, while São Tomense (and perhaps one or
two others) treats iteratives the sameway as futures (and perhaps other members
of the irrealis category – existing descriptions are too inadequate for one to tell).
As was seen in the discussion of Bronckart & Sinclair (1973) in Chapter 3, there
is more than one way of looking at iteratives. From one viewpoint, an iterative
predication such as John walks to work ranges over an ill-defined series of in-
stances in which John already has walked (and may be expected to continue to
walk) to work. Since it does not represent a single event perceived as a unit (such
an event as might be represented by John walked to work last Thursday, say), it
can be regarded as falling into the nonpunctual category along with events per-
ceived as extended and uncompleted processes (John is/was walking to work).
But, from another viewpoint, each of the series of actions over which John
walks to work ranges is itself an isolated event seen as a unit. If one regards
the nature of the units in the series as primary, rather than the fact that those
units constitute a series, then iteratives can be perceived as falling into the punc-
tual category. From yet a third viewpoint, one can point to the fact that while
sentences like John worked yesterday or John is working today refer to specific
occasions on which John worked or is working, sentences like John works do not.
A sentence such as John works may be true even if John is not working now and
even if John works considerably less than the average person. The key to the
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difference here lies in what it takes to establish the truth value of an iterative
predication. Let us look a little more closely at the problem of how we would
assign truth value to the sentence John walks to work on Thursdays.
We cannot falsify this sentence by pointing to a particular Thursday on which
John did not walk to work. But we would be wrong if we assumed that the sen-
tence means “John walks to work on mostThursdays”. Not only does it not mean
this, but it is also the case that the sentence could be falsified for any individual
member of any set of Thursdays or for any combination of Thursdays (provided
that such a combination did not equal the sum of all Thursdays) and still be true.
Let us suppose that John drives to work every Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday,
and Friday, and also on a majority of Thursdays, but on the remaining Thurs-
days, he walks to work. Then it is true that John walks to work on Thursdays (but
not on Tuesdays, Fridays, etc.). Moreover, let us suppose that John has only ever
walked to work on one Thursday. In that case, the sentence John does not walk
to work on Thursdays is false and can be shown to be false by instancing the soli-
tary occasion on which he did walk to work on a Thursday. If that sentence is
false, its converse, John walks to work on Thursdays, must be true, no matter how
uninformative or misleading it might appear to be.
It should be obvious then that predications of the iterative class do not refer
to events in the same kind of way that other types of predication refer to them.
John walked to work last Thursday is true if and only if John walked to work last
Thursday, and John is walking to work today is true if and only if John is walking
to work today. In fact, we could claim that John walks to work on Thursdays does
not refer at all to any specific events, but rather to a generalized concept which
may be based on one or more such events. Since the realis category embraces
real events in real time, it could be concluded that iterative “really” belongs in
the irrealis category.
The foregoing paragraphs constitute an informal account of the relationship
between iterative and the nonpunctual, punctual, and irrealis categories. The
question is now whether, in terms of well-motivated semantic primes, we can
show formally how those categories would interact in an analogue of the relevant
area of semantic space.
The status of punctual-nonpunctual and realis-irrealis as semantic primes will
be dealt with a little later on in this chapter, when we try to see whether the
ordering of TMA markers can be accounted for in evolutionary terms. For the
present analysis we need only these and one other primary distinction which
has already been independently established, i.e., specific-nonspecific. Predica-
tions like John works or John walks to work may be regarded as having the same
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relationship to predications like John worked yesterday or John is walking today
as generic NPs have to particular-reference NPs, or as concepts do to percepts.
In other words, habituals are –specific, while nonhabituals are +specific.
The SNSD thus crosscuts the area of semantic spacewhich includes the punctual-
nonpunctual and realis-irrealis distinctions. In order to adequately represent this
situation, we would require a three-dimensional model, but for convenience we
will represent the SNSD as a square boundary within a larger square, as shown
in Figure 4.8 on Page 224. Since, as has been stated already, semantic infrastruc-
ture determines where conceptual boundaries may, but not where they must, be
drawn, the configuration of Figure 4.8 leaves the three analyses of Figures 4.9(a),
(b), and (c) (p. 252) as further possibilities.
Analysis (a) of Figure 4.9 corresponds to the Guyanese (majority creole) anal-
ysis; analysis (b), to the Jamaican Creole analysis; and analysis (c), to the São
Tomense analysis. It leaves open, of course, a fourth analysis: that of English,
Yoruba, and a number of other languages which would correspond to Figure 4.8.
In this analysis, habituals are separately grammaticized (John works) from contin-
uatives (John is working), punctuals (John worked), and various kinds of irrealis
(John will work, John would work). It should be noted, however, that the Romance
languages in general follow the analysis of Figure 4.9(a), the majority creole anal-
ysis, merely superimposing upon it the past-non past distinction: Spanish yo tra-
bajo means ‘I am working’ or ‘I work’, while yo trabajaba means ‘I was working’
or ‘I worked (habitually)’, and in consequence, yo trabajé is limited to ‘I worked
(punctually, on a particular occasion)’.
We now have a vague inkling (probably little more than that, as it may turn
out) of the complexities of semantic space: a space that had to come into existence
before language as we know it could be born. Some of that space was required
for the very first, earliest, and simplest stages of language. Other parts, although
they were not immediately required, probably came into existence prior to the
emergence of language, as we shall see, but were only incorporated into language
as language grew. Yet other parts may only have come into existence subsequent
to the initial stages of language development. However, I suspect that such parts,
if they exist, will prove to be minor, and that the common notion, more often
implicit than explicit (if made explicit, it is hard to defend), that language boot-
strapped its way upward, creating the conceptual categories it needed as it grew,

















(R = realis, P = punctual, S = specific)
Figure 4.8: semantic space around habituals
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As I try to develop the scenario of how a language based on the conceptual cat-
egories we have surveyed could have developed, I shall incur a heavy debt to a
seminal work in glottogenesis, Lamendella (1976). This paper represents the first
systematic attempt to use the development of language in the child as a possible
model for the development of language in the species. Lamendella claims that
“ontogeny manifests a repetition of several phylogenetic stages in the neurofunc-
tional system that allows human infants to learn languages”. In his case, as in
mine, “it strains credulity to pretend that language as we know it suddenly sprang
up intact as a cultural invention in the absence of extensive cognitive and commu-
nicative preadaptations” (emphasis added); he envisages, accordingly, a series of
hominid species, each developing a particular element or stage of language and
then transmitting that development to the next species via the genetic code.
Lamendella defends the foregoing model against accusations of Lamarckism
by pointing out that in all species, individual members show differences in their
capacities. Thus, at any given stage of the development toward full language,
relatively slight differences in the associated capacities would have conferred
a selective advantage on their possessors, so that there would have developed
“a concentration of genotypes producing [these capacities] in the gene pool of
the species”. Thus, the average capacity of the hominid line at stage n+1 would
have equaled the maximum capacity at stage n, and the biological foundations
of language would have been laid down, not in a single cataclysmic event, but in
an ordered series of steps.
This series would then necessarily repeat itself in the course of child acquisi-
tion since, as Lamendella points out, “more recently encoded genetic informa-
tion generally tends to unfold later in ontogeny so as to preserve the temporal
sequence in which the new components of the genetic information code were
laid down”. Lamendella is careful to show that his claims do not fall under the
twomain criticisms to which early recapitulationist theories in biology were sub-
ject. First, he points out that “embryonic” stages of language may reproduce not
the developmental stages of adult language but the language of children at cor-
responding stages. At any stage, adults using general-purpose strategies might
have developed language beyond the range of contemporary children, although
without being able to transmit such developments via the genotype. Second, he
is aware that embryological features do not always or necessarily occur in the
same order as their corresponding evolutionary features, so that the develop-
mental stages of child language do not necessarily occur in the same order as
corresponding stages in the original development of language.
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With regard to this latter point I think that Lamendella is too cautious. Recapit-
ulationist theory in general biology had to cover a very wide range of phenom-
ena, many of which were only very remotely connected. Consider any pair of
such phenomena, say, dentition and the structure of the foot in a given species.
Clearly, these two things are not wholly unconnected since we do not normally
find herbivores with claws or carnivores with hooves. However, within both her-
bivorous and carnivorous species there is quite a wide range of tooth and foot
structures, detailed development of each of which must have proceeded with a
good deal of independence from the other. It should therefore be unsurprising
that on occasion the precise sequence of developments should have been shuffled
somewhat between phylogeny and ontogeny – that, for example, in a given phy-
lum, a certain type of tooth might have developed earlier than a certain type of
foot, but that, in the embryonic forms of some contemporary species, that type of
foot might develop earlier than that type of tooth. However, when we are dealing
with the development of language, we are dealing with a very tight subsystem
of neural structures rather than with a wide range of quite dissimilar physical
features; and within such a subsystem, a high degree of mutual interdependence
might be expected to obtain. We would expect, therefore, that reversals of phylo-
genetic ordering in the ontogeny of language would be quite rare, if indeed any
exist at all.
I shall not examine in detail the stages that Lamendella proposes, which differ
in some respects from those to be suggested here; his work was carried out from
a slightly different perspective and his conclusions are worthy of study in their
own right. I shall return to the last of our speechless ancestors, whose cogni-
tive equipment need not have differed in any material respect from that of the
contemporary great apes.
Earlier in this chapter reference was made to the question why, if there was
such massive preadaptation for language, it did not arise earlier. Attempts to ac-
count for this fact often take the form of simply pointing to the parlous state of
hominids expelled from an arboreal Eden and forced to compete with fitter preda-
tors; the compensatory advantage offered by language then seems self-evident.
But evolution does not behave like the U.S. Cavalry; if it did, it would surely have
ridden to the rescue of the gorilla, now threatened more seriously by our species
than our species was ever threatened by others. Need does not create function
unless that function is already within a species’ grasp.
This view might seem to directly contradict the view expressed earlier that
intense interspecific competition may have rapidly expanded the cognitive ca-
pacities of our species. In fact, there is no contradiction. Cognitive growth –
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the increase in the capacity of creatures to analyze the environment and predict
outcomes – has always been the major thrust of evolution, and to claim this is
in no sense to be guilty of teleology, since the more cognitively developed any
species becomes, the greater would be its chances of survival. Thus, the hominid
line may have been capable of a relatively rapid growth of cognitive capacity,
precisely because there was already a broad evolutionary base to build on. But
there could be no basis to build on with regard to language, since the kind of
cognitive capacity hominids were only now building – the conceptual capstone,
so to speak, on the vast arch of perception that had been building ever since
the first microorganism responded to light or to the touch of another – was the
necessary prerequisite for the most rudimentary form of language.
Yet the question remains. If apes have adequate prerequisites for at least a
fraction of what we have in the way of language, then the probability is that
Dryopithecus had similar prerequisites, and that gives a period of at least five
million years in the pongid line, and x million years in the hominid line, in which
the capacity for language existed, and the need for language existed, but there
was no language.
Here we must consider the channel problem. However refined the conceptual
schemata, however detailed and accurate the cognitive map that a species can
construct, it will profit that species little (except in terms of individual survival)
unless there is also a mode of expression. The only two modes of expression
that seem to have even a chance of being viable for primates are the vocal and
the manual. Without full cortical (consequently voluntary) control over one or
another of these channels, language as communication would not have been pos-
sible.
However, the channel problem has quite another dimension, a dimension sel-
dom referred to but equally critical. This dimension is, in fact, twofold. We will
take the second half and then the first half. The second half is: when A, the first
hominid ever to use either a sound sequence or a gesture referentially, made such
sequence or gesture to B, another hominid, how did B know that A was commu-
nicating referentially, and not merely coughing, clearing his throat, scratching
himself, or brushing a fly away? The first half is: given the same situation, how
did A, totally ab ovo, conceive the idea of representing some object or event in
the environment in terms of a sound sequence or gesture – an act unprecedented
since the Big Bang?
These problems cannot be dismissed by hand-waving. Either language began
as a consciously intended performance, in which case we have to show both how
the intent could have been formed and how a conspecific could have grasped
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both the fact that there was an intent and the reference that was intended, or it
began accidentally. Although it is no aim of this chapter to add to the already
overlong list of Flintstone scenarios, one of the (possibly numerous) ways in
which language could have arisen accidentally is the following: Mrs. Og, breast-
feeding a lusty one-year-old with one hand, is trying to feed herself with the
other. Young Og, ready for a change of diet, makes a grab for the meat. Mrs.
Og pushes him away. He tries harder, babbling in his frustration: gaga. His
stubbornness amuses Mrs. Ug, sitting nearby, and she imitates gaga and maybe
makes a playful grab for the meat. For a while after that, the favorite joke in the
tribe is to creep up on somebody, shout gaga, and try and grab his or her meat.
Perhaps it dies out, as jokes do. Perhaps words were found and lost and found
again a score of times before they took root, or perhaps the slightly older kids
picked it up and began to use it seriously when they got hungry or when they
thought the grown-ups were dividing the food unfairly.
Or a slight variant on this: Ig, young Og’s uncle, is pretending to be a tiger,
an avuncular activity still widespread today and presumably of no very recent
evolutionary history. Young Og withdraws in real or simulated fear, shouting
wawa! Uncle Ig imitates him, and again every one laughs, but tigers are not
everyday occurrences, so the thing is quickly forgotten. But a couple of days later
Ig sees a real tiger about to pounce on Og. By a sheer fluke he yells out wawa!
instead of the regular alarm call, and Og saves himself in the nick of time. Maybe
they and the rest of the band are able to kill the tiger, and dance and embrace
around its carcass like European soccer players after a goal, shouting wawa! And
the word, perhaps soon followed by others of a similar nature, gets incorporated
into the earliest of human rituals; for, as Marshack (1976) insightfully observed,
“Language, in fact, may have been as useful, or more useful, in this cultural realm
than in the comparatively self-evident strategies utilized in hunting, butchering
and gathering”.
Many such scenarios could be elaborated, all equally probable (or improba-
ble). How the Rubicon was crossed is of minor concern; what matters is how it
was reached and what happened after it was crossed. But origin stories like these
which feature ludic and jocular components do have some advantages. First, they
do not require intent on anybody’s part, and since they do not require intent,
they do not require understanding, at least in the everyday sense of that term.
Thus, they neatly avoid both halves of the understanding-intentionality prob-
lem referred to a few paragraphs earlier. Secondly, they are based on behaviors
– imitative and joking behaviors – which are independently attested for other
members of the primate family and which therefore must have been common
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to all our immediate ancestors. Thirdly, they provide an element which may be
essential in the acquisition of language anywhere in the universe: external mod-
eling.
It is not, I think, accidental that chimps did not acquire language until we
taught them. It cannot be the case that they lacked the intelligence to invent
it, since they can use it creatively (within, admittedly, quite narrow limits) once
their pump has been primed, so to speak. It could be that the conceptual leap is
too great to be made in a single stride by any species – that some kind of external
model is needed, whether that model is intentional (as was the case with human
teaching of apes) or unintentional (by young human children, as in the stories
above); otherwise, the whole idea of referential communication would have been
just too radical to work out (in either sense of work out). But if this is so, there is
a channel block for the pongid line that did not exist for the hominid line.
In other primates, vocal outputs have not come under sufficient cortical control
for the vocal channel to be viable for linguistic use; the great apes cannot sup-
press spontaneous vocalizations, have very little if any capacity for voluntary
vocalization, and “show little or no ability to imitate sounds” (Dingwall 1979).
But if hominids could have imitated and assigned meaning to the spontaneous
vocalizations of children, why could not chimps or other primates have done the
same with their own infants’ spontaneous gestures?
If we replay the two scenarios given above with an ape cast, the reason will
become obvious. Instead of gaga for ‘meat’ or more probably some more gen-
eral ‘food’, you would have had some kind of grabbing motion. Instead of wawa
for ‘tiger’ you would have had some kind of fear behavior. Paradoxically, infant
gestures could not have served as proto-words because they were not arbitrary
enough. For the first signs to have had a narrow enough range to fit individual
concepts, they must have had no range, have been quite empty, communica-
tively speaking, so that they could be filled by the particular reference of the
immediate context, by “food” or “tiger”, as the case might be. You could not use a
grabbing motion as a symbol for food because there were so many other things
you might grab for. You could not use a fear gesture as a symbol for a tiger be-
cause there were so many other things you might be afraid of. But something
that had no clear meaning for the parent, such as a child’s pre-speech utterance,
could be hooked to any of the hominid’s preexisting concepts precisely because
it lacked any such general associations.
There would be little point in spending so much time on the actual emergence
point of language if the suggestions just given were not a logical outgrowth of
all that we have already discussed. The major point of this chapter has been that
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language grew out of the cognitive system used for individual orientation, predic-
tion, etc., rather than out of prior communicative systems. It would follow from
this that the most likely means of expression, when this cognitive infrastructure
finally emerged as a communicative system in its own right, would have been
one which was quite separate from, and unlikely to be confused with, the prior
system. True, both hominid calls and hominid proto-words would have been in
the vocal channel, but the acoustic ranges of the modern “call system” – shrieks,
laughter, etc. – and those of speech sounds do not overlap and very likely have
never overlapped.
Once the Rubicon was crossed, progress may well have been rapid, a matter
of a few generations, since the necessary infrastructure for a fairly rudimentary
level of language would have already been in place. Chimps have progressed
(with training, granted) from one-word to several-word utterances in a matter
of months, so I suspect that the one-word, two-word, etc., stages of early child
development do not necessarily reflect stages in adult language development,
but rather rehearse cognitive growth stages in the hominid line that preceded
the emergence of language. Not a lot turns on this, either way, and even how we
would decide between the two alternatives is at present very far from being clear.
But somehow the idea of our ancestors communicating via one-word utterances
for several millennia while awaiting the growth of the requisite neurological in-
frastructure (whatever that might have been!) that would permit them to add
word two to word one falls short of being wholly persuasive. In the absence
of any evidence to the contrary (but bearing in mind the possibility that such
evidence might appear at any time) we will conclude that in the first flush of lan-
guage, our ancestors were able to get about as far as chimps have; that is, they
could:
(a) Lexicalize concepts corresponding to classes of sensorily perceptible enti-
ties and sensorily perceptible attributes of entities (things like color and
size as opposed to things like courage and justice).
(b) Lexicalize secondary concepts by conjuncts of primary concept names.
(c) Organize brief (up to 3–5word) utterances on a predominantly topic-comment
basis (i.e., proceeding from the proximal to the distal, the old to the new,
more or less irrespective of case-role relations).
(d) Despite (c), distinguish in a pinch between X-Vs-Y and Y-Vs-X sequences
(e.g., form appropriately, and react appropriately to, the difference between
Roger tickle Lucy and Lucy tickle Roger, in at least a majority of cases).
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On the other hand, it is likely that they, in common with modern primates,
were not able to:
(e) Produce utterances of more than one clause.
(f) Grammaticize even the most basic semantic distinctions, such as those of
tense, plurality, possession, etc.
These two capacities are, as I shall try to show, phylogenetically linked. To-
gether they constitute minimal requirements for anything even approaching the
kind of language we have today, and the reluctance of many linguists and psy-
chologists to accept that, lacking them, modern apes could be capable of lan-
guage, is very understandable. However, such linguists and psychologists feel
under no obligation to give an account of how language was initially acquired,
which makes things easier for them, but does not do anything toward helping us
to understand ourselves. What apes have, what our ancestors had, you may or
may not call language, but it seems to me simply bizarre to suppose that it wasn’t
something that you had to have in order eventually to have languages like those
of today. Those who disagree have no right to do so unless they can provide a
more plausible route to our present situation.
Seidenberg&Petitto (1979), in reviewing (pessimistically) the linguistic achieve-
ments of apes, make the point that no convincing evidence has yet been provided
that an ape can use a sign for any object that is not in its immediate environment.
This is equally true of children’s language in the first few months of acquisition,
of course; and indeed, with only (a)–(d) as one’s resources, it is hard to see how
reference could escape from the prison of the here-and-now. But being able to
talk, if only about the here-and-now, is an immense advantage for children, and
was presumably at least an equal advantage for our forefathers, over not being
able to talk about anything at all. You could convey highly specific warnings,
bring about cooperative behavior, settle disputes, even construct primitive ritu-
als. In rituals, displacement begins; the head of the cave-bear on a pole stands
for all the cave-bears who control the warm caves you will need in order to get
through the next Ice Age. But it is one thing to be able to think displacement,
and quite another to be able to talk it.
Consider the following situation. You are Og. Your band has just severely
wounded a cave-bear. The cave-bear has withdrawn into its cave. Ug wants to
go in after it. “Look blood. Bear plenty blood. Bear weak. Ug go in. Ug kill bear.
Ug plenty strong”. You want to be able to say something along the lines of the
bear we tried to kill last winter had bled at least as much as this one, but when Ig
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went in after it to finish it, it killed him instead so don’t be such an idiot. Since
in order to think this all you had to be able to do was to replay the memory of
events you yourself had witnessed, I can see no reason to believe that you could
not have thought it because you didn’t have the words to think it in. But saying
it is another story. Let’s suppose you try. Since you have nothing approaching
embedding, there is no way you can use a relative clause to let the others know
which bear you are thinking about. Since you have no articles or any comparable
device, there is no way you can let the others know that you are talking about a
bear that they know about too. Since you have no way of marking relative time
by automatic tense assignment or even adverbs, there is no way you can let the
others know that the bear you want to talk about is one that is not here anymore.
Since you have no verbs of psychological action (we’ll see why in a moment),
there is no way you can use the verb form itself to inform the others that you
are speaking of a past time (remind, recall, remember, etc.). You can try “Og see
other bear”. Everybody panics. “Where? Bear where?” “Bear not here”. Some
laugh, some get angry; Og’s up to his practical joking again. “Bear kill Ig”, you
try. Now even the ones who are laughing are sneering. “Ig! Ig dead! Og crazy!”
If you have any sense, you shut up, or someone will get the idea to push you into
the cave instead of Ug.
It was mentioned earlier in the chapter that the power to predict the course
of future events was what gave a selective advantage to those species which de-
veloped their cognitive capacities, and that this power depended crucially on the
power to categorize and analyze past events. Both powers in turn depend upon
the quality of the cognitive map – its accuracy, degree of detail, and universality
or lack of it. A language that could advance beyond the initial plateau of the
here-and-now could potentially do two things which would lead to an exponen-
tial increment in the survival power of the species possessing it.
First, it could code the cognitive map in such a way that processing time would
be drastically reduced. One can think nonverbally, by processing images, or one
can think verbally, using lexical items instead of images; in order to utter, or com-
prehend, or merely mentally construct the sentence John drove the tan Oldsmo-
bile from Arkansas to Texas, it is not necessary to frame mental images of John,
or driving, or Oldsmobiles, or Arkansas, or Texas. A number of psychological
experiments (several referenced in Hamilton 1974) have shown that where labels
for objects are available, human subjects perform more effectively and much
more rapidly; for instance, Glucksberg & Weisberg (1966) showed that solution
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times for label-aided as against label-free versions of a problem differed by a fac-
tor of fifteen to one. The mere fact that processing time is reduced automatically
makes possible many analyses that could not previously have been attempted.
For instance, where previously there might have been only time to model a sin-
gle hypothetical solution to a practical problem (such as that of dealing with an
angry cave-bear in its cave without getting killed in the process), there is now
time not only to model several hypothetical solutions but also to compare them
and make a choice on the basis of that comparison.
Second, it could make solutions available to other members of the species. Cog-
nitive development without the power to communicate the results achieved by
it may serve the survival of the individual but cannot serve the survival of the
group. You could remember about the bear that killed Ig, but if there is no way
in which you can convey your thinking to Ug, then the odds are that although
you won’t get killed, Ug will, and so will lots of Ug’s children and grandchildren.
True, your smart genes will multiply, while their dumb ones won’t, but all that
will do is bring a little bit nearer the time when the species will break through the
here-and-now barrier and achieve, not just predictability, but the dissemination
of predictability – the unique capacity that launched a single primate species on
its unprecedented career.
Let us consider some fairly minimal requirements that language must have sat-
isfied before it could emancipate itself from the here-and-now. First, the structure
of one-clause sentences must have been stabilized. It must have been stabilized
because freely variable word-order minus case-marking devices equals growing
ambiguity as two-and three-clause sentences develop. In fact, word-order can-
not have stabilized so that longer sentences should be unambiguous; there must
have been some motivation at the single-clause level. Let us consider what such
motivation might have been.
To begin with, we need to look at something apparently quite unconnected
with sentence-order – that is, word-formation. Although there is an extensive
and controversial literature on the range of distinctive speech sounds that early
species (in particular, Neanderthalman) could have produced – see Spuhler (1977)
for references – there can be little doubt that that range was considerably smaller
than the range of our own species. Let us assume a capacity for five consonants
and three vowels (not much less than the range of modern Hawaiian, with eight
consonants and five vowels) together with CV syllable structure; this would give
a maximum capacity of only 15 monosyllabic words and 225 disyllabic words.
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Moreover, all languages we know of under-utilize their inventories, leaving nu-
merous lexical gaps, so that the practically attainable total would be lower still.
Factors such as these would encourage use of the same lexical item in causative
and non-causative senses. In that case, as we saw in Chapters 2 and 3, only the
frames NiiV and NiVNii (where Nii is nonagentive and Ni, agentive) would dis-
tinguish causative from noncausative senses of V.
Let us now consider a hypothetical word, keke, which means ‘die’ in the con-
text N keke, but ‘kill’ in the context N keke N. We have assumed that the first
word-order in early language was topic-comment, with shared, old information
first (or zeroed) and nonshared information second. There is now a potential
conflict. Let X be old information and Y new information, and let it be the case
that Y killed X. Topic-comment order would then call for X keke Y, equivalent to
‘X was killed by Y’. However, X keke Y would also correspond to the structure
NiVNii, in which V has its causative sense and Ni is agentive – yielding an alter-
native reading, ‘X killed Y’. In theory the conflict might be resolved by adopting
either strict topic-comment or strict SVO order, but since the latter holds less
chance of ambiguity than the former, and is therefore fractionally more econom-
ical in processing time, we can assume either that it was universally adopted or
that those languages that failed to adopt it died without issue. In fact, languages
that did fail to adopt SVO must surely have died out when the strict-order lan-
guages achieved embedding and complex structure; it is tempting, although quite
futile, to speculate that what caused the large size of the Neanderthal cranium
was the apparatus needed to process (and store in short-term memory) multiply-
ambiguous parsings of multiclause sentences in which the constituents were not
systematically ordered.
If we accept Lamendella’s hypothesis, there is support for the foregoing picture
from acquisition processes. Bever (1970) has demonstrated the existence of what
he terms “Strategy C” – “Constituents are functionally related internally accord-
ing to semantic constraints” – and “Strategy D” – “Any Noun-Verb-Noun (NVN)
sequence within a potential internal unit in the surface structure corresponds
to actor-action-object”. Experiments carried out by Bever and his associates in-
dicate that children between two and three rely on Strategy C to comprehend
sentences but that a little later they switch to Strategy D. This serves to explain
the otherwise quite baffling fact that children’s performance with regard to sen-
tence types which involve nonagentive initial NPs (passives, clefts) actually de-
teriorates rather than improves between three and four.
The acquisitional sequence Strategy C-Strategy D would then replicate stages
in the early development of language. Strategy Cwould have had to be developed
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in order to interpret case roles in the stage in which topic-comment ordering
was dominant. Strategy D would have succeeded it as soon as sentence-order
stabilized and became the primary marker of case relations. Note that, originally,
adoption of Strategy D would have had none of the dysfunctional side effects
that it does nowadays with children acquiring English since, at that time, there
were no passives and no clefts; Strategy D would have given the right answer
every time.
We can assume that neural modifications accompanied the change. What these
may have been is still beyond anyone’s power to determine; what they would
have had to be able to accomplish is slightly less opaque. There is no evidence that
SVO ever got hardwired into the system, but assignment of case roles must have
become automatic, and underlying this must have been a hierarchy of cases with
the rank-order, agent-experiencer-patient – subjecthood in any given sentence
being assigned to the highest-ranking case in that sentence. Also, if the ape
experiments are anything to go by, speech would have had to be speeded up
considerably (Rumbaugh & Gill (1976) report a human-chimp conversation of
only twenty-one sentences which took nine minutes): more rapid processing
would presumably have required qualitative as well as quantitative increases in
neurons and neuron connections.
So far we have assumed a limit of two case roles per sentence. However, this
does not mean that there were only two case roles in the hominid repertoire.
Insofar apes can use tools and give things to one another, one must assume that
cases such as instrumental and dative are potentially within their grasp. But
problems arise once a third case role is added.
Any two case roles can be ordered around V so that the higher of the two
precedes V and the lower follows. But presence of a third means that two NPs
must be conjoined. This creates parsing problems. If you want to say something
like Ug gave Ig’s meat to Og, there are three possible ways in which you can
overcome these problems.
You can indicate the oblique cases with prepositions, or postpositions, or some
other purely grammatical case-marking device.
In Ug gave Ig’s meat to Og, ’s marks the genitive and to, the dative case. It
is perhaps possible, but highly unlikely, that our predecessors could have in-
vented grammatical case marking ab ovo; even in many synchronic languages,
case markers can be traced back to original content which have been bleached
of their original semantics and downgraded from their original syntactic roles.
In the absence of grammatical marking, you can simply string case roles to-
gether and hope that Strategy C – which must simply be overridden, not erased,
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by Strategy D – will suffice to parse the result. In most cases it may, but in many
it will not. The sentence introduced above, for example, would come out as Ug
give Ig meat Og, which might be parsed as ‘Ug gave Ig’s meat to Og’ but could
also be parsed as ‘Ug gave Ig the meat of Og’. Note that parsing mistakes in dis-
course must be cumulative; the listener who thought Ig got Og’s meat and the
listener who thought Og got Ig’s meat would put quite different constructions
on the sentences that followed.
The third alternative would be to preserve the two-case-roles-per-sentence re-
striction and conjoin sentences: Ig have meat, Ug take meat, Ug give Og. This is
cumbersome but unambiguous. But note that if the second occurrence of Ug is
omitted, you get Ug take meat give Og – the same serial structuring of dative-
incorporating sentences that we found as a frequent feature of creoles in Chap-
ter 2.
In fact, verb serialization, probably arising out of paratactic conjunction plus
equi-deletion, represents the only plausiblemeans bywhich early language could
have broken out of single-clause structure. It is difficult for us now to appreci-
ate the magnitude of the advance that was involved. The single-clause apelike
proto-language was, as we have said, almost certainly limited to dealing with
physical activities in the here and now. Sentences representing mental activities
almost always demand more than one clause. If we say that something happened
when something else happened, or will happen if something else happens, or
happened because something else happened, we are representing not something
that we have perceived directly through the senses, but the result of some kind
of mental computation performed on sensory inputs (or, to be more precise, on
things that originated as sensory inputs but that have already had a lot of process-
ing done to them, along lines suggested earlier in this chapter). Still more clearly,
if we remember, or believe, or think, or hope, or expect that something happened
or will happen, or if we want or hope or decide to do something, we are again
directly representing a mental operation on the product of past inputs or the
projected product of possible future ones, and in either case, one that cannot be
expressed in a single clause. The gap between monopropositional sentences and
multipropositional sentences is the gap between talking only about observables
in the external world and communicating the contents of one’s mind. And the
bridging of that gap must have constituted the greatest single step in what an-
thropologists mean by the ugly terms “hominization” or “sapienization” – the
process of becoming the kind of species that we now are.
Verb serialization helped to bridge this gap, and the way in which it accom-
plished this is worth looking at a little more closely. At first glance, the results
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of verb serialization may look a little like those underlying structures that were
once proposed by generative semanticists in which verbs were disintegrated into
what were supposedly primitive concepts; perhaps the most widely discussed of
these was the proposed derivation of kill from cause to become not alive. Simi-
larly, if one found a language that expressed the meaning of bring the book to me
as the equivalent of carry the book come give me, it might seem that sentences
of the latter type reflected the absence of a means for generating derived lexical
forms. Such a view might lead to the conclusion that there were two types of ac-
tion, a type that was “semantically complex” (capable of being broken down into
primes) like kill or bring, and a type that was “semantically simple” (its members
being themselves primes) like cause or carry.
Such a view is, I think, incorrect. There is probably no action verb which is
either intrinsically simple or intrinsically complex in the ways suggested above.
How actions came to be lexicalized is somethingwhich, like somany other things
of equal or greater importance, we have had to skim over or ignore altogether in
an account as compressed as this one. However, we need to note that verbs are
abstractions from sensory input in a way that nouns are not. At first glance, one
might think that the referent of a verb like hit was as unambiguously unitary as
the referent of a noun like dog, although in fact John hit Bill could be rendered
more accurately (if more circumlocutiously) as John clenched fist John drew-back
arm John thrust forward arm fist met Bill. In fact, there are perhaps no “seman-
tically simple” verbs that could not be represented in a “semantically complex”
way, and vice versa. What determines whether a particular referent action is
represented by one verb or more than one is nothing to do with semantic com-
plexity, but has a lot to do with the number of case roles the action involves. It is
precisely those actions which involve a number of case roles that are singly lex-
icalized in prepositional languages, and multiply lexicalized in verb-serializing
languages.
The aid supplied by verb serialization in bridging the gap between monopropo-
sitional andmultipropositional sentences had nothing to dowith semantics. Verb
serialization simply made available structures more complex than had existed
hitherto – structures that added the possibility of NVNVN to the previous NV
and NVN structures.
Now we need to consider how the representation of mental activities could
have commenced. We have a syntactic bridge, but we also need a semantic
bridge. I shall propose that the semantic bridge was provided by two classes
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of verbs: verbs of reporting and verbs of perception. Both represent actions that
are in some sense “more physical” than the true psychological verbs of thinking,
hoping, remembering, etc. Both entail dual-propositional sentences. Both are
likely to be of high utility in hunting-and-gathering communities where mem-
bers frequently split up in their search for food and need to convey to the others
information about their degree of success in that search. I shall not attempt to
determine priority as between these two classes.
Verb-class membership would now become critical in parsing. The develop-
ing grammar would generate NVNVN sequences, but these would be ambiguous
between two interpretations, e.g., NV[NVN] or NVN[(N)VN] (where the con-
stituent in parentheses had been equi-deleted). However, if the first V was one
of perception or reporting, the second N would be subject of the second V; if
the first V belonged to some other class, the second N would be the object of
the first V, and the sentence would be parsed as a serialization. When the “true”
psychological verbs came to be added, they too would follow the first of these
patterns.
The development of reporting verbs would have begun at the same time as
the development of displacement. If I report what another person said and that
other person is not present, then obviously the saying must have occurred on a
previous occasion. If I tell you Ug say honey here, it requires no Socratic intellect
to figure out that the honey may be here now (although of course it need not
be) but that the saying of honey here by Ug must have occurred at a previous
time (and perhaps in another place, although my capacity to translate Ug’s ac-
tual utterance of honey here is something else that cannot simply be assumed).
However, as sentences become more complex, the need to distinguish observa-
tion from computation, earlier from later, and general from specific statements
must increase. Failure to make such distinctions, preferably in some quite rigor-
ous and automatic way, leads to parsing problems which could compound even
more rapidly than parsing problems arising from case assignment. Some scaf-
folding is required that will accurately fix the place of sentences in the world of
time and reality; TMA systems supply this scaffolding.
Quine (1960: 170) expressed frustration and puzzlement with the fact that all
sentences of all human languages must obligatorily express tense, but then, from
Reichenbach on, philosophers have glaringly failed tomake any kind of sense out
of TMA systems. Their recipe has always been, “Take the distinctions that are
said by traditional grammarians to be made in modern English and reduce them
to some kind of a formal schema”. Since the advantages, if any, of this approach
are totally opaque to me, I shall discuss it no further. From an evolutionary
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viewpoint, it appears plausible that the only distinctions the first TMA system
could grammaticize must have been distinctions which were somehow already
implicit in the ways in which the brain processed and stored information. If cer-
tain types of information were already stored in different places or in different
ways, then attaching some kind of grammatical index to the products of differ-
ent stores would not have presented too much difficulty. On the other hand, the
only possible alternative – that the species invented categories for which there
was no such preexisting infrastructure, and then either built a redundant set of
infrastructures to reprocess it, or somehow assigned marking with 100 percent
efficiency in the absence of such infrastructure – is at best an improbable one.
People find this hard to comprehend because categories such as “past”, “pres-
ent”, and “future” seem quite natural and transparent. In fact, the so-called “mo-
ment of speech” which marks the elusive “point present” which is the linchpin
of Reichenbachian analysis is an abstraction which can never be experienced but
can only be inferred by beings who already have produced some kind of time-
marking device. People talk about “present” as if it were somehow on a par with
“past” and “future”; but while any single point action can be in the “past” or the
“future”, no such action can be in the “present”, simply because it must already
be in the “past” before you can get time to open your mouth to talk about it. As
for “future” and “past”, the former is of dubious status in that events assigned to
it, however probable or plausible, are artifacts of the imagination ontologically
indistinguishable from wants and wishes, however unlikely or even counterfac-
tual, while the latter, although the most tangible of the three, suffers in utility
from being internally undifferentiated.
In fact, time presents itself in experience as an unchanging state – it always
was, is, and will be “now”, as far as the experiencing individual is concerned –
and, with an assist from memory and prediction, as a constant and unbroken
flow pouring against us. No remotely plausible mechanisms of perception or
neural processing would seem to yield the neat bisection of time into two equal
portions divided by a constantly moving point which constitutes the “common-
sense” analysis of time-imprisoned Western man.11 Far different is the case for
the distinctions to be argued here.
11 It is an open question whether any language could make the past-present-future distinction
before the culture that used it produced any kind of time-measuring device. The fact that
time-enslaved linguists may have analyzed preliterate languages as having such a distinction
is, of course, no proof of anything – they have consistently done the same for creoles and they
have been consistently wrong in so doing. In fact, there already exist more careful studies of
such languages (e.g., Arnott 1970; Welmers 1973) which explicitly recognize the absence of the




I shall propose that if the distinctions of ±anterior, ±irrealis, and ±nonpunc-
tual are the TMA distinctions consistently made in creole languages, and if these
distinctions struggle to emerge, as they seem to, in the course of natural lan-
guage acquisition, then they represent the primary TMA distinctions made in
the earliest human language(s), and appear in all three places because of their
naturalness. Since the word “naturalness” has been subjected to so many abuses,
I had better make very plain what I mean by it in this context. The naturalness of
a distinction is assumed to be an all-or-nothing characteristic and not a matter of
degree. A distinction is natural just in case it corresponds to a difference in the
mode of perceiving, processing, storing, or accessing data in the brain, such dif-
ference in turn depending on specific features of the brain’s physical structure.
It is assumed that only distinctions of this kind can be candidates for primary
grammaticization.
Quite obviously, in the present state of our knowledge, any claims about brain
structure can have no more than hypothetical status. This fact is no excuse for
imitating the ostrich, as does Muysken when he claims (1981) that an earlier and
much sketchier account of this area12 “will remain arbitrary until we know a lot
more about the functioning of the brain”. We will not know a lot more about
the functioning of the brain until we have made and compared and evaluated a
lot more models of the brain along the lines of the one I have tried to construct
in this chapter. The idea that scientists “increase knowledge” simply by “finding
out facts” in the absence of any kind of theoretical model-building is an illusion
which, remarkably enough, flourishes only among those who themselves deal
with mainly theoretical issues, while it simply does not exist among workers in
the physical sciences, who so much take for granted the interaction of specula-
tive models and empirical findings that they never even see the need to defend
their methods. In fact, it is quite conceivable that we could track every dendrite
to its synapse and still not have the faintest idea how the brain worked, just be-
cause we had no adequate model of what all its electrical and molecular activity
might be designed to accomplish. Therefore, to try to rebut the claims made here
with the mere cry of “You can’t prove it!” is as irrelevant as it is redundant. Those
who disagree with the model presented here, which may indeed be wrong in de-
tail or even in totality, have no recourse other than to construct better ones.
Muyskenwas right, however, in pointing out thatmy earlier account had failed
to explain the syntactic ordering of TMA markers, and accordingly, the present
12 In Bickerton 1974.
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account will remedy that deficiency. Let us review some relevant evidence. We
know that the ordering of markers in creoles is always TMA, anterior-irrealis-
nonpunctual. We know that in VO languages, as we are assuming the primordial
language(s) to have been, free verbal elements which modify the meaning of the
main verb usually precede the main verb. We know that the commonest source
for TMA markers in creoles (and in other languages) is that of former full lexical
verbs.13 We will assume that whatever distinctions the original markers may
have made, the markers themselves were derived from full lexical verbs. We will
further assume that the markers must have been added in some order, that is to
say, they were not aided all at the same time. These two assumptions seem to me
to be unexceptionable.
Almost as unexceptionable is the assumption that when the first marker was
added, it became an immediate constituent of the verb, and hence any markers
added subsequently would have to be positioned externally to the unit formed
by the verb and the first marker. Certainly, it is hard to think of any motivation
there could have been for inserting a new marker between the original marker
and the verb. Granted, we cannot prove that this did not happen. But there are
ways in which the assumption can be tested.
Earlier in this chapter it was claimed that between any pair of distinctions, the
distinction whose neural infrastructure had been laid down earliest in phylogeny
would be the first to be realized in language. Also, by Lamendella’s hypothesis,
the distinction first realized in language should be the first to be realized in the
acquisition of language. Thus, in principle, we have two different ways of testing
the assumption made above about adding order, two ways that are completely
independent of one another: if both yield the same answer, then this constitutes
mutual support for the two hypotheses, and if the answer yielded by both is
the answer yielded by our (independently motivated) assumption, then further
support is provided for the assumption.
According to that assumption, the nonpunctual marker, being always closest
to the verb, represents the first of the three distinctions to be grammaticized.
Therefore, punctual-nonpunctual should be the first of the three distinctions to
acquire the appropriate neural infrastructure, and it should also be the first to be
acquired by children.
In Chapter 3, we surveyed a considerable body of evidence which suggested
that whatever children might be thought to be learning (and sometimes they
13 Another common source is (phonologically salient) auxiliary verb forms in the superstrate.
However, since there could not have been auxiliaries before there were auxiliaries, the situa-
tions of creole and primordial languages will differ in at least this respect.
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might be thought to be learning past-nonpast before other distinctions), what
they really learned first was punctual-nonpunctual. Our second criterion is thus
satisfied. With respect to the first, let us consider possible neural infrastructures
for punctual-nonpunctual. One of the earliest neural structures known to us is
that which underlies the phenomenon known as habituation. In Aplysia, a slug-
like marine mollusk whose nervous system contains only a handful of ganglia
with a few hundred neurons each, the sensitive organs are extruded from a man-
tled cavity and consist of a gill for breathing, a siphon for eating, and a purple
gland. The last two serve as primitive organs of perception. If anything touches
the siphon or the gland, the gill retracts into the cavity. However, if you touch
either gland or siphon at regular, brief intervals, the withdrawal response will
diminish in both speed and intensity until eventually it is extinguished. Aplysia
has done its equivalent of deciding that your actions are nonthreatening and thus
it is wasteful to respond to them.
Aplysia’s actions are of course entirely automatic and represent the workings
of a mechanism whih has evolved in the vast majority of animate creatures to
prevent them from being wholly at the mercy of every external stimulus. It en-
ables them to disregard irrelevant stimuli and reserve their energies to react to
imminent danger or to seize feeding opportunities. If mechanisms such as this
go back as far as mollusks, they antedate by some hundreds of millions of years
any mechanisms that might underlie the other two TMA distinctions.
Clearly, habituation mechanisms have grown considerably more sophisticated
since Aplysia emerged. Each of our senses has mechanisms that filter abrupt and
sudden outside stimuli, which require immediate action on our part, from on-
going or persistently repeated stimuli, which do not. Driving down a crowded
street, we are not at all perturbed by the constant movement of countless pedes-
trians, but let a ball bounce off the edge of the pavement, and (hopefully) we
instantly slam on the brakes in anticipation of the child that may follow it. Work-
ing alone in an empty house, we pay no attention to sporadic noises in the street
outside or the background murmur from the freeway a block or two off; we prob-
ably do not even consciously hear these things if we are engrossed in what we are
doing; but let the slightest sound come from the rooms around us, and we stop
whatever we are doing and become instantly alert. After the event we may tell
the story as if we decided to brake or decided to attend to the strange sound,
but these are post hoe rationalizations of our neuronal watchdogs’ purely au-
tonomous activities. In otherwords, the sorting of punctual from nonpunctual ac-
tions is done for us automatically, and it seems reasonable to suppose (although
it is still far from provable) that percepts in thememory store are somehow coded
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with reference to whether they originated from sets of neurons specialized for
perception of punctual events or from sets specialized for nonpunctual ones.
This capacity to make the punctual-nonpunctual distinction in real life, so to
speak, must have been crucial to our ancestors, intermediate as they were be-
tween those who might prey on them and those on whom they might prey. It is
hard to think of any distinction which could have been more important for them
to make as they began to build up the store of communal experience that would
become the traditional wisdom of human groups. The interrelation of punctual
and nonpunctual, foreground and background, provided basic ways of analyz-
ing and classifying the diverse experiences with natural forces and other species
which could now be handed on from generation to generation, growing as it
spread through time, yielding knowledge of a wide range of phenomena and the
actions appropriate in the presence of those phenomena.
Alone of the three TMA distinctions, punctual-nonpunctual correlated with
observable phenomena. The realis-irrealis distinction contrasts observed events
with events that are unobservable, at least at the time of speech; the anterior-
nonanterior contrasts, not events at all, but the relative timing of events, a highly
abstract feature. Punctual-nonpunctual, however, can be directly observed when-
ever a single action interrupts a more protracted or a repeated one. It could there-
fore have been grammaticized at a stage when only physical objects or events
were capable of being grammaticized or lexicalized. Whether or not grammati-
cization took place this early, all the evidence suggests that punctual-nonpunctual
was the first TMAdistinction to be grammaticized, and accordingly, the form that
marked the distinction would have been juxtaposed to the main verb.
To find the evolutionary ancestry of the second distinction, realis-irrealis, we
need to know the earliest source for items in the memory store that did not orig-
inate in the organs of perception. In all probability that source was dreaming.
Dreaming began with mammals – reptiles, as far as we are aware, do not dream
– and its origins and evolutionary function remain mysterious. One explanation
treats dreams as “providing for better building of the memory model by contin-
ued operation of the mechanism for memorizing during the night, even when no
further information from external sources is available” (Young 1978: 209). Cer-
tainly, dreams appear to permute actual experiences in ways that produce novel
constructs. However, we have hypothesized that items in the memory store are
coded in ways that reveal the source of each item. If this is so, all items in the
store must have (at least) coding which will indicate whether they originated
from perceptions of the external world or whether they lacked any such origin.
At whatever point our ancestors achieved the power to consciously manipulate
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the memory store in order to generate hypothetical with future events or “might-
have-beens”, a new dimension would have been added to irrealis, but the essen-
tial coding difference would not have been affected; whatever was internally
generated would be coded differently from whatever was externally generated.
Nowadays, of course, most of us can consciously and quite explicitly distinguish,
if required to do so, between events that really happened and events that are
the product of dreams, desires, wishes, and expectations; if we cannot, we are
separated from the remainder of the species and maintained in institutions spe-
cializing in this and similar conditions until such time as we recover the capacity.
To be able to tell realis from irrealis is a crucial part of being fully human. But
the foundation of this capacity and of our capacity to mark verbs in a way ap-
propriate to the status of their referents must be the same: some kind of neural
coding of memory items that reflects internal as opposed to external source.
Unfortunately, in the case of realis-irrealis and anterior-nonanterior, we can-
not draw the evidence that we drew from child acquisition in the case of punctual-
nonpunctual. While it is highly possible that children make irrealis distinctions
before they make anterior distinctions, the point is not easy to prove since the
lack of correspondence between the bioprogram TMA system and the systems
of most target languages is such that it is by no means easy to tell when children
have acquired whatever forms may correspond to irrealis and whatever forms
may correspond to anterior. It is true, for instance, that children learning En-
glish acquire futures long before they acquire pluperfects, but since future does
not correspond one-to-one with irrealis and pluperfect does not correspond one-
to-one with anterior, it would be unfair and unrealistic to base any claims on this
fact alone. Hopefully, studies of acquisition of those creole languages which pre-
serve the original distinctions fairly intact, as well as more sophisticated studies
of the acquisition of other types of language, may be able to provide the needed
evidence.
However, even in the absence of such evidence, it seems likely that anterior
was the last of the TMA distinctions to be added. In order to make the distinc-
tion, the order of past events has to be accessible. Perhaps all creatures that have
memories have mechanisms, as we must, by which the order in which memo-
ries are laid down corresponds with the order in which the relevant experiences
occurred. However, recoverability of that order is another matter, for any kind
of recoverability entails volitional manipulation of the memory store, and there
is no reason to suppose that volitional manipulation preceded nonvolitional ma-
nipulation (i.e., dreaming). Thus, the antecedents of anterior are almost certainly
more recent than the antecedents of irrealis.
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Furthermore, the utility of anterior as a category would be unlikely to arise un-
til discourse had become fairly complex. Anterior marking is primarily a device
which alerts the listener to backward shifts of time in a narrative or a conver-
sation, thus enabling him to preserve the correct sequence of reported events
– a must if features such as causality are to be extracted from it – even when
the reporting diverges from that sequence. Thus, not only are the mechanisms
underlying anterior probably more recent than the mechanisms underlying irre-
alis, but the functional need for anterior is almost certainly more recent than the
functional need for irrealis.
If this is the case, we can claim that according to four sets of criteria – age of
infrastructure, age of functional utility, time of child acquisitions, and sequence
within Aux – the three basic TMA distinctions are ranked in the order: nonpunc-
tual first, irrealis second, and anterior third.14 Note that the surface order of
tense-modality-aspect which this yields is not only the order of creoles but also
what has been assumed from Chomsky (1957) on to be the underlying order for
English, and perhaps other languages too.
Although considerations of space have prevented us from surveying a number
of other features – such as the development of pronouns, pluralization, move-
ment rules, etc. – which must have accompanied or closely followed the devel-
opments actually described, we have carried our account of the early history of
language to a point at which, in its degree of complexity, it can have fallen but
little short of an early creole language. In other words, we have brought language
close to a point at which, for all practical purposes, the biological development
of language ceased, and the cultural development of language began. I have not
even attempted to provide a time scale for these developments, either absolute
or relative; they may have been spread out over two or three million years or
they may have come in a series of bursts or even (though this is intrinsically less
likely) in a single explosion of creativity.
Although at present we can do little more than guess, the suggestion by Hock-
ett (1973) that there might be some connection between the emergence of fully-
developed language and the sudden and extremely rapid series of cultural changes
that were initiated some ten thousand years ago is quite an appealing one. There
is something inherently implausible in the idea that an evolutionary line which
had existed for countless centuries within the hunting-and-gathering framework
in which some members of our species still exist should suddenly begin to grow
crops, herd animals, build permanent settlements, construct complex belief sys-




tems, and evince countless other behaviors typical of our species, and highly
atypical of all others, merely because certain small areas had exceeded their car-
rying capacity (if indeed they had). With all species, areas exceed their carrying
capacity from time to time, and the result is always the same – the species moves,
if there is anywhere to move to, and if it is not an unduly territorial species; oth-
erwise, individual members of the species die off until the balance of nature is
restored. Similar experiences must have happened to our ancestors countless
times and in countless places during the Pleistocene, with its sudden and ex-
treme changes of climate, but the responses must always have been the same:
migration or population loss.
It seems likely that agriculture commenced not as a reaction to climatic change,
population imbalance, or any other external cause, but rather as a result of vast
changes in the computational and communicative power of the species. Dearth
was feared rather than experienced, and plans were made to prevent it. The
shift from taking what nature provided, an attitude characterizing all previous
species, to attempting to control nature was a vast one involving the power to
construct an imaginary future and then communicate that construct to others
so that concerted efforts could be made to realize it. Such attempts could hardly
have been carried out without the aid of a language developed at least to the
extent that we have envisaged here; but if such a language long antedated the
birth of agriculture, how was it that that and all the other arts and sciences were
not born far earlier than in fact they were?
At present, no adequate answer can be attempted. In any case, the precise
dating of the events detailed in this account is really irrelevant. Some series of
events such as have been described must have happened at some time during the
last couple of million years or so for our ancestors to have passed from a state of
no language to a state in which there existed languages recognizably similar to
those of today. When those events occurred is a matter of legitimate interest, but
not one that can affect either positively or negatively the validity of the foregoing
account.
No one can be more acutely aware than I that the account given here is pro-
visional, hypothetical, and can at best serve as no more than a rickety bridge
between our present condition of almost total ignorance and some future state
in which we may have at least a handful of relative certainties to build upon.
However, the purpose of this chapter never was to write a definite prehistory
and early history of language, but rather to show that, first, a series of capacities
that might be plausibly held to have been latent in our last speechless ancestors,
plus some capacities that could plausibly have evolved in the course of construct-
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ing a linear vocal language, could have yielded something recognizably similar
to an early creole language, and second, that on the basis of what we at present
know about our own species, such an outcome – a creole-like language – would
have been intrinsically likelier than any other kind of possible language. The
test of such an account lies not in whether this detail or that detail of it may be
proven true or false, but in whether or not it proves possible to build better (more
plausible, more detailed, more explanatory) models.
If the present model is in essence correct, and if a creole-like language was the
end product of a long period of biological evolution, then the overall capacity to
produce languages of this type (itself a composite of neural capacities that pre-
existed any kind of language and neural capacities that were added as language
evolved)15 must at that point (and for the rest of the life of the species, it should
go without saying) have formed a part of the genetic inheritance of every indi-
vidual member of the species. It would then unfold, as we have claimed, as part
of the normal growth development of every child – in most cases, being quickly
overlaid by the local cultural language, but in a few, emerging in something not
too different from its original form. It would merely require triggering by some
form of linguistic activity from others – how much, and of what kind, remains
one of the most interesting questions we can ask about language – which is why
wolf children, who share our biological inheritance, cannot speak, and why the
interesting experiments of Psammetichus, James IV, Frederick II, and Akbar the
Great all failed.
It is not without some interest that the account given here resembles, in some
respects, the Biblical account of language. The Bible claims that language is a
divine gift. This account can offer no objection to such a belief, assuming that
God has chosen to work through evolutionary process; certainly, both accounts
firmly reject the suggestion that language was in any sense a conscious or de-
liberate human invention. The Bible claims that our species originally spoke a
single language. This account claims the same, with a slight qualification: the
issue of whether language first arose in one group or in several independently is
entirely irrelevant since, assuming the latter, all groups would have had the same
15 It was observed in Chapter 2 that the similarities between creole languages were in many cases
closer and more consistent in the semantic component than they were in the syntactic compo-
nent. This result would issue very naturally if the semantics of language depended on relatively
old neural structures while syntax depended partly on relatively new neural structures but also
partly on extraneural factors intrinsic to the task of building a linear vocal language. These
latter factors might in a number of cases permit more than one possible solution to a given




neurological equipment, and thus their languages, although perhaps differing in
lexical choices (as modern creoles do, for that matter) would have been struc-
turally identical or almost so. The Bible claims that human language diversified
coincidentally with a sudden surge of technological capacity, symbolized by the
erection of the Tower of Babel (a tower aimed at reaching heaven, i.e., usurping
powers over nature which were properly part of the divine prerogative). This
account would also claim (and I will develop the claim a little further in the next
paragraph) that human language diversified as a direct result of rapid cultural
and technological diversification, aiming, consciously or not (and in our time it
has become a conscious goal) at “The Conquest of Nature”: I would be the last
person to adduce Scriptural authority in support of a scientific theory, but the
resemblances are intriguing, to say the least.
The question most frequently asked about the theory presented in this volume
is: “If our biological inheritance provides for us a ready-made language, so to
speak, how is it that we ever abandoned that language in favor of the diverse
and far more complex languages of today?” The answer is that, in a sense, the
biological language self-destructed. It had made possible the construction of cog-
nitive maps more detailed and complete than those available to any previous
species, maps which enabled their users to enter what was in effect a wholly
new cognitive domain, a domain, in which events could be predicted and fore-
stalled and even altered rather than passively endured as all previous species had
endured them. It had conferred on our species the power to live differently –
differently from the past, and differently from one another.
So, differently was how they lived. Previously, as in all other species, our an-
cestors had all lived roughly the same kind of life; if they happened to live near a
mud flat, they would include shellfish in their diet; if they didn’t, they wouldn’t;
and that was about the extent of the difference. Now, some went on hunting
and gathering and some became pastoralists and some became cultivators and
some founded cities and lived by farming other people. New needs arose. New
categories were established to take care of those needs. Some groups found it
convenient to code verbs in such a way that the evidential status of any remark
was immediately apparent. Some groups found it convenient to code nouns in
such a way that the major semantic classes to which they belonged were imme-
diately apparent. These new categories were superimposed on the old ones, but
a language is a system or it is nothing, so that this superimposition shifted and
distorted the older, more “natural” categories and in some cases, perhaps, over-
laid them completely. This, too, was natural, in its way. No biological language
could have been designed to suit the needs of all humans under all the different
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circumstances in which humans could live; indeed, if any such language could
have been designed, it would either have been itself subject to change (since
cultural evolution is not a closed process) or if not so subject would have been
positively dysfunctional, since it could not have adapted to our changing needs
and priorities. Thus, one hundred centuries of cultural change and development
have produced the world of diverse, yet underlyingly similar, languages which
we know today.
But not only cultural factors served to change the bioprogram language. Fac-
tors concerned with language processing are also operative. I will illustrate just
two different types of such factors here.
The first involves relative clauses. As we saw in Chapter 1, HCE has no surface
marker of relativization, even where English obligatorily requires one, provided
that there is a head noun. If there is not a head noun, then an English relative
pronoun is supplied. Thus, we get headed relatives like da gai gon lei da vainil fo
mi bin kwot mi prais ‘The guy who was going to lay the vinyl for me had quoted
me a price’, with no marking, but headless relatives like hu go daun frs iz luza’
(the one) who goes down first is the loser’, with an English relative pronoun.
Obviously, the difficulty of incorporating English relatives per se cannot be what
is responsible for sentences of the first type. Rather, the cause must be, first,
that all HCE sentences require some kind of overt subject (except imperatives,
of course), and, second, that as we hypothesized in earlier chapters, HCE lacks –
“used to lack” might be more accurate – a rule that would rewrite NP as N S, but
possesses a rule that would rewrite NP simply as S, thus yielding the structure
NP[NP V X] VP for both the above sentences.
However, as was shown in Bever & Langendoen (1971), zero relative pronouns
in sentences where the head noun is subject of the relative clause can cause seri-
ous ambiguities in a minority of sentences. Practically all creoles now have some
kind of relative marking, presumably as a consequence of such processing prob-
lems. Thus, change away from the bioprogram pattern can set in very quickly
even where it is not triggered by language contact, if the functional pressure is
sufficient.
The second factor involves word order. It has been claimed here that the orig-
inal language order was SVO with serialization but that this order was not nec-
essarily hard-wired. This directly contradicts a claim by Givón (1979: Chapter 7)
that the original language order was SOV. Givón’s evidence is that a majority of
the world’s language families are either synchronically SOV or reconstruct back
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to SOV, while change in the reverse direction is rare. But in fact, serial SVO often
forms an intermediate stage between SVO and SOV in Austronesian languages,
which are changing under the influence of Papuan languages (Bradshaw 1979).
In our original language, a similar change could have come about in the follow-
ing manner: first, there occur a number of NVNVN sequences in which the final
N is realized as a pronoun; second, object pronouns become cliticized; third, the
first V is reanalyzed as a preposition. In this way, a structure that was originally
analyzed as Subject-Verb-Object-Verb-Object changes until it can be reanalyzed
as Subject-Preposition-Oblique Case-Verb – SXV, in fact. This is then interpreted
as the canonical order, and any full-NP objects left behind the verb are moved
in front of it in order to remove what now appears to be an anomaly. It is, of
course, not necessarily implied that all early languages followed this course; but
if a number of them did, then the data which Givón took as proof of original SOV
could easily be accounted for.
There is not space here to discuss in detail how the bioprogram theory would
affect the theory of linguistic change. It should be apparent that an entire volume
could easily be written on this topic.
The study of linguistic change has been effectively paralyzed for many decades
by the empirically groundless belief that all the world’s current languages are
at a similar level of development. Even the study of Greenbergian universals
led only to suggestions of a kind of ceaseless seesawing between OV and VO
orders. I would predict that, right or wrong, the present theory would at least
give something tangible for diachronic linguistics to chew on.
However, it should at least be pointed out that the present theory does not
claim a steady progression away from the bioprogrammed base. Quite apart from
the drastic recyclings which pidginization precipitates, there are likely to be par-
tial reemergences of bioprogram features in a number of linguistic situations,
prominent among these being, first, the constant surfacing of so-called “substan-
dard” varieties in classes where prescriptive monitoring is minimal, and second,
contacts between typologically different languages (such as the Austronesian-
Papuan clash mentioned above) which set in motion extreme change processes
in one party or the other. Thus, despite a very rightly skeptical survey by Polomé
(1980) which concludes that creolization may hardly ever or never have been re-
sponsible for historical changes, there may still be some truth in the persistent
claims that Germanic, or Egyptian, or Old Japanese may owe some of their fea-
tures to “creolization”. In fact, Polomé would still be correct in claiming that
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true creolization had not taken place; the creole-like features would be derived
from the same bioprogram that is responsible for creoles and for many acquisi-
tional features, but surfacing under rather different and somewhat less radical
circumstances than those which give rise to creoles.
We have now completed our survey of creoles, acquisition, and origins, show-
ing the wide range of similarities that unite the first two and that could derive
in both cases from the reenactment of the third. In the fifth and final chapter I
shall briefly summarize the theory which these findings support, and place it in
the context of existing linguistic theories, and I shall also glance at a few of the




















































The foregoing chapters have surveyed the three major areas of language develop-
ment: development in the individual, development of new languages, and origi-
nal development of language. Parsimony alone would suggest that these devel-
opmental processes might have much in commonwith one another, and the com-
mon pattern that emerges has an independent support that no other linguistic
theory that I know of could claim: it is in accord with all we have so far learned
about evolutionary processes and it is in accord with all we have so far learned
about how processes in the brain determine the behavior of animate creatures.
During the sixties and seventies, we heard a good deal about something called
“psychological reality”, althoughwhat it was was never well defined; I would sug-
gest that whatever the fate of the theory argued here, any future linguistic theory
will have to be able to claim “biological reality” if it is to be taken seriously.
The theory argued here has claimed that many of the prerequisites for human
language were laid down in the course of mammalian evolution, and that the
most critical of those prerequisites – for even things like vocal tract develop-
ment were necessary, but in no sense sufficient requirements1 – was the capac-
ity to construct quite elaborate mental representations of the external world in
terms of concepts rather than percepts. In other words, something recognizable
as thought (though clearly far more primitive than developed human thought)
necessarily preceded the earliest forms of anything recognizable as language.
1 Indeed, one objection to the hypothetical history of language given in the preceding chapter
might be that many essential prerequisites of language, such as the development of the neural
and physiological mechanisms required for vocalization, the lateralization of the brain, and
the growth of auditory processing mechanisms or “templates” which, as suggested in some
fascinating work by Marler and associates (Marler 1977; 1980; Marler & Peters 1979, etc.), show
striking parallels to those of avian species, have simply been ignored. However, these omis-
sions in no way reflect my estimate of the importance of such developments. The reasons for
them are threefold. First, reasons of space (and the overall purpose of this volume) prevented
me from describing everything that went into the makeup of language; second, these other
developments have been excellently treated elsewhere; and third, I wanted to deal precisely
with those aspects of language development which have been most systematically ignored or
misunderstood. Certainly, such omissions were not for the purpose of strengthening my case
since all the omitted developments are much more obviously the product of the genetic code
than the developments discussed in this volume.
5 Conclusions
Circumstances still obscure enabled our (fairly remote) ancestors – perhaps
Homo erectus, perhaps some other species – to lexicalize concepts and construct
a primitive form of language probably not too dissimilar to that achievable, un-
der training, by modern apes. Language even at so primitive a level conferred a
sharp, selective advantage to its users. Over a long period, language developed bi-
ologically in the following manner. In any group of any species, there is a certain
amount of random variation which allows for variation in individual skill. Those
individuals who had higher skills in themanipulation of language had those skills
as a direct result of the fact that such random variation had produced, in their
brains, mechanisms better adapted for converting preexisting mental represen-
tations into linguistic form by lexicalizing and grammaticizing the categories
into which those representations were already sorted by neurological processes.
Since language-skilled individuals possessed a higher potential for survival, they
would produce more offspring than other individuals, and the capacities that had
arisen in them by random variation would be preserved and transmitted intact
to their descendants.
Note that there is nothing particularly novel about all of this; most people
nowadays would agree without any hesitation that the giraffe’s neck, the hum-
mingbird’ s bill, and all other adaptive developments on a physical level have
originated in precisely this manner. It is merely the superstitious persistence of
Cartesian dualism that makes people reluctant to admit that since mental char-
acteristics have just as firm a physical foundation in neurological structures, the
same processes of biological evolution must apply to them also.
If language arose in the way I have indicated, then what was passed on from
generation to generation was not some vague, abstract “general learning capac-
ity”, or even some highly-specified “language learning capacity”. Biological evo-
lution does not trade in nebulous concepts like these; it hands out concrete fea-
tures, concrete capacities for specific operations. What was passed on was pre-
cisely the capacity to produce a particular, highly-specified language, given only
some (perhaps quite minimal) triggering in the form of communal language use.
This capacity had attained the level of contemporary creoles when the compu-
tational power it bestowed on its owners triggered the cultural explosion of the
last ten millennia;2 and since cultural evolution works far faster than biological
2 I certainly do not wish to suggest by this that no sooner had language reached the creole level
than agriculture began. There may well have been an interval of tens of thousands of years
between these two events, years during which cognitive maps became only gradually more
complex; or the interval may have been quite short. There is no way, at present, that we can
choose between these alternatives – or even prove that language in its present form did not
exist two million years ago, although the latter possibility seems intrinsically unlikely.
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evolution, and since it operates at a far more abstract level, the effects of cul-
tural evolution on language could not be transferred to the gene pool. Therefore,
biological language remained right where it was, while cultural language rode
off in all directions. However, it was always there, under the surface, waiting to
emerge whenever cultural language hit a bad patch, so to speak; and the worst
patch that cultural language ever hit was the unprecedented, culture-shattering
act of the European colonialists who set up the slave trade. But it is true that
out of evil, good may come, and if they had not done this, we might never have
found the one crucial clue to the history of our species.
However, even without such setbacks, cultural language could not expand
away from the biological base indefinitely. Just as biology produced a floor be-
low which human language could not fall, so it produced a ceiling above which
human language could not rise. The realm of variability of any species has up-
per limits consisting of capacities from which it is barred genetically from ever
having. There can be little doubt that what we genetically have determines how
far (and in what directions) we can go culturally in ways which, hopefully, will
be major focal points of linguistics, philosophy, psychology, and anthropology
in the decades to come. Thus, though languages may diversify and complexify,
they can never become unlearnable – or if they do, children will soon pull them
back to earth again.
The child does not, initially, “learn language”. As he develops, the genetic
program for language which is his hominid inheritance unrolls exactly as does
the genetic program that determines his increase in size, muscular control, etc.
“Learning” consists of adapting this program, revising it, adjusting it to fit the
realities of the cultural language he happens to encounter. Without such a pro-
gram, the simplest of cultural languages would presumably be quite unlearnable.
But the learning process is not without its tensions – the child tends to hang on
to his innate grammar for as long as possible – so that the “learning trajectory”
of any human child will show traces of the bioprogram, and bioprogram rules
and structures may make their way into adult speech whenever the model of the
cultural language is weakened.
This, then, in outline is the unified theory of language acquisition, creole lan-
guage origins, and general language origins for which the present volume has
amassed numerous and diverse types of evidence. The question must now arise:
how does this theory relate to existing linguistic theories, andwhatmodifications
in such theories does it appear to demand?
Generative theory has now survived for more than two decades as the leading
theory in modern linguistics, despite attacks from diverse quarters. Although
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in the course of this book I have said some harsh words about some current
generative stances, it should have been apparent, first, that the theory expressed
here would probably have been impossible to frame if generative grammar had
never existed, and second, that there is no hostility between the two theories on
major issues. The present theory complements and amplifies generative theory.
The latter has, in fact, ceded most of the former’s territory. The leading figures in
generative grammar have simply ignored creoles and shown a positive antipathy
to the mere idea of language origins; as for acquisition, while they have theorized
about it, they have not deigned to get their hands dirty by actually examining it.
In fact, bioprogram theory and Chomskyan formal universals fit rather well
together, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. The bioprogram language would constitute
a core structure for human language. Natural languages would be free to vary
within the space between the outer limit of the bioprogram and the overall limit
imposed by formal universals, which represent neural limits – species-specific







Figure 5.1: Relationship of bioprogram to formal universals
Note, however, that the bioprogram does not correspond directly to superfi-
cially similar concepts such as “substantive universals” or (in one of its several
senses) “universal grammar”. That is, it does not constitute a body of categories,
rules, and structures that are necessarily shared by all languages. Indeed, above
the trivial level on which all languages have nouns, verbs, oral vowels, etc., I
would argue that such a body could not exist. Language systems are wholes, and
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earlier parts necessarily get mutated to accommodate later parts. Such a state-
ment would be wholly uncontroversial save for the hostility to process that is
shown, quite gratuitously, by generative grammar.
In fact, what linguistics will have to change is not generative theory, in its es-
sential rather than accidental aspects, but a set of much more widely held beliefs,
central to which is the belief that all existing languages are at the same level
of development. Beliefs that have no empirical foundation generally stem from
some kind of political commitment, and I am sure that this one, often expressed
as “there are no primitive languages”, arose as a natural and indeed laudable reac-
tion to the claim that thick lips and subhuman minds underlie the characteristics
of both creole and tribal languages. According to 19th-century racists, languages
and people alike were ranged along a scale of being from the primitive Bushman
with his clicks, grunts, and shortage of artifacts, to themodernWestern European
with his high pale brow and plethora of gadgets. That was when everyone, racist
or anti-racist, did believe that Western Man was superior; the only argument
was about how nasty this superiority permitted him to be toward “lesser” breeds.
Now that we are rapidly disabusing ourselves of this kind of mental garbage, it
becomes possible to uncouple language from “level of cultural attainment” and
look at it developmentally without any pejorative implications.
That there is indeed no simple connection between language development and
cultural development should be obvious from just two facts. First, many peoples
with hunting-and-gathering cultures have languages of horrendous complexity
which seem to be a lot further from the bioprogram than “rich cultural” lan-
guages like English or Chinese.3 Second, creole languages originated in the most
advanced cultures of their day. I do not mean that the strains of Mozart nightly
pervaded the barracoons; I mean that it was in the slave colonies that theWestern
powers developed the industrial technology and systems of disciplined mass la-
bor which later, with the aid of the capital amassed by so doing, they generously
bestowed upon their own citizens. While creole speakers were working in orga-
nized bodies of hundreds or even thousands and operating complex mechanical
processes, the leading technocrats of Western Europe were sitting in their own
kitchens with their handlooms. So much for simplistic “culture-and-language”
equations.
3 I write “seem to be” because only empirical investigation will reveal whether such languages
are indeed as far from the bioprogram as our intuitions would suggest. One test will be the time
taken by children to acquire the main grammatical structures of given languages. It was often
claimed (at a time when acquisition had hardly been studied!) that all languages were equally
easy for children to learn. This belief was, of course, simply deduced from the “all-languages-
are-developmentally-equal” dogma. Work by Slobin and his associates already suggests this
may be quite far from the truth.
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However, old beliefs die hard, and assuredly, no matter what I say, racists will
pounce on the phrase “developmental differences” and use it to suggest that in
some never-to-be-precisely-specified fashion my work “proves” that creoles, or
their speakers, or both, are inferior to those who s their third person singulars
and cross their as, thes, and zeros when they come to generics. Assuredly, too,
progressives, rallying indiscriminately to the struggle, will feel obliged to include
this theory in their denunciations, and to accuse me of having called creoles
“primitive languages” and of having revived the despised “baby-talk theory” of
creole origins. There is no prophylactic against ignorance. But to anyonewho has
read this book with even a minimum of care, it should be apparent that the the-
ory presented here is at an opposite pole to those which sought to derive creoles
from the babyish imitations of Europeans’ condescending simplifications, and
that creoles, far from being “primitive” in anything but the sense of “primary”,
give us access to the essential bedrock on which our humanity is founded; their
re-creation, in the face of what the French sociologist Roger Bastide aptly termed
the “Cartesian savagery” of colonialism, represents a triumph of the human spirit,
and if it were necessary to justify them in such a fashion, I could show a dozen
ways in which they are more lucid, more elegant, more logical, and less easy to
lie in than English or other European languages. But I will let the dedication of
this volume speak for itself.
The idea of language development is not, I would suspect, the only aspect of the
present theory that is likely to arouse ideological rather than logical opposition.
A great deal of human self-esteem is vested in the belief that there is a qualitative
difference between ours and other species, and there is much in this volume that
might be thought to weaken such a belief. Weakening such a belief, it is often
claimed, may destroy “the Dignity of Man” and lead members of our species to
treat other members as if they were no more than beasts.
One could ask a Tasmanian what he thought of this claim, if the advanced
techniques of transplanted English foxhunters had left any Tasmanians to be
asked. Anyone who casts a candid eye down the perspective of human history
must find it hard to explain how the idea that “people are no more than animals”
could get people any worse treatment than they have gotten already. Moreover,
as the discussion of Cartesian dualism at the beginning of Chapter 4 made clear,
the position of this theory is not “Animals don’t have souls, and we don’t either”;
rather, it is “We have souls, and animals do too”. The result, I should have thought,
would have been to upgrade animals rather than downgrade ourselves.
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Further hostility may arise from fears that the theory threatens free will and
human perfectibility. If we speak what we are biologically programmed to speak,
and if what we are biologically programmed to speak directly reflects the struc-
ture of our central nervous system, then the thoughts we think must be biologi-
cally programmed too.
If other reactions to the theory can be dismissed as knee-jerk alarmism, this
one cannot. It is, I think, pretty likely that our thinking is species-specific, and
therefore, almost by definition, incapable of providing adequate solutions to the
problems we see ourselves facing or of answering the questions about the nature
of the universe which we find so easy to ask. If this is so, it is so. If it is even
possible that it could be so, then the appropriate reaction is not to hide behind a
smokescreen of rhetoric, but to determinewhether or not it is so. If it is not so, we
have a green light to go aheadwith human perfectibility, despite the unpromising
auguries of our previous efforts in that direction. If it is so, then we have to learn
either to live within our limits or to change those limits, if we can. For one thing
is certain: if they exist, they cannot be talked away.
Although I am convinced that future research will show the scope of human
freedom to be narrower thanwe had believed, and although there is no value that
I personally rate above human freedom, I do not findmyself in the least depressed
by the prospect. Evolution has maintained a steady increase in the autonomy of
its creatures without, so far as I am aware, a single retrogressive step. We as a
species may lack the infinite capacities which some members of it have thought,
and continue to think, that we possess, but the range of options open to us is
still infinitely greater than that available to any other species, and the peculiar
powers we have inherited allow the possibility that we may one day transcend
the limits of species. But we will not do this by laying claim to capacities that we
do not possess. We will do it only by determining what the limits of our species
are, and then deciding what we want to do about that knowledge.
Wemay decide that less ismore, small is beautiful, and thatwemust livewithin
our cognitive means, even if so living entails perpetuating the cycle of injustice,
revolt, and more injustice which constitutes the major part of our history to date.
But somehow I do not think that this will be our choice.
One recalls the TV game show in which the quizmaster asks, “Will you take
the money or open the box?” “Open the box, open the box!” the studio audience
roars. I think we would try to open the box of species that encloses us, even if
we knew that it was an inside-out Pandora’s Box, and that once we had broken
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